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The magnitude 6.2 Christchurch earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on February 
22, 2011. The earthquake caused 186 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread 
damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to lifeline networks and health care 
facilities. Critical facilities, such as public and private hospitals, government, non-government and 
private emergency services, physicians’ offices, clinics and others were severely impacted by this 
seismic event. Despite these challenges many systems were able to adapt and cope. 
This thesis presents the physical and functional impact of the Christchurch earthquake on the regional 
public healthcare system by analysing how it adapted to respond to the emergency and continued to 
provide health services. Firstly, it assesses the seismic performance of the facilities, mechanical and 
medical equipment, building contents, internal services and back-up resources. Secondly, it 
investigates the reduction of functionality for clinical and non-clinical services, induced by the 
structural and non-structural damage. Thirdly it assesses the impact on single facilities and the 
redundancy of the health system as a whole following damage to the road, power, water, and 
wastewater networks. Finally, it assesses the healthcare network's ability to operate under reduced and 
surged conditions. The effectiveness of a variety of seismic vulnerability preparedness and reduction 
methods are critically reviewed by comparing the observed performances with the predicted outcomes 
of the seismic vulnerability and disaster preparedness models. 
Original methodology is proposed in the thesis which was generated by adapting and building on 
existing methods. The methodology can be used to predict the geographical distribution of functional 
loss, the residual capacity and the patient transfer travel time for hospital networks following 
earthquakes. The methodology is used to define the factors which contributed to the overall resilence 
of the Canterbury hospital network and the areas which decreased the resilence.  
The results show that the factors which contributed to the resilence, as well as the factors which 
caused damage and functionality loss were difficult to foresee and plan for. The non-structural 
damage to utilities and suspended ceilings was far more disruptive to the provision of healthcare than 
the minor structural damage to buildings. The physical damage to the healthcare network reduced the 
capacity, which has further strained a health care system already under pressure. Providing the already 
high rate of occupancy prior to the Christchurch earthquake the Canterbury healthcare network has 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Earthquakes pose a significant risk to the ability of hospitals and hospital networks to provide 
continued uninterrupted healthcare to the community. They do so by damaging the vital physical 
elements which are required to supply, house and treat patients. 
A functioning healthcare network is a crucial part of disaster response. Therefore the facilities that 
make up the healthcare network must be able to not only to treat the victims of any type of likely 
event, but also to continue the healthcare services necessary to maintain the healthcare for the 
community (WHO 2006). The United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) made hospital risk 
and vulnerability reduction a priority by introducing the “Safe Hospitals” Initiative (WHO 2009). 
Despite these efforts, healthcare facilities have suffered great losses globally due to natural and 
human-caused disasters, particularly earthquakes and hurricanes.  
The Mw=6.2 earthquake that ruptured beneath Christchurch, New Zealand, on the 22
nd
 of February, 
2011, at 12:51 pm (NZ local time), also caused significant disruption to the main health care facilities 
in Christchurch. In total there were 185 fatalities and 7171 injuries (Ardagh et al., 2012). The 
extensive physical damage caused by the earthquake placed the Canterbury healthcare system under 
considerable strain. However, despite the physical damage, lifelines outages, and damage to internal 
services the Canterbury Health Care System continued to provide a high quality of healthcare 
following the Christchurch earthquake. The cause of the healthcare network resilience presents a 
valuable learning opportunity.  
The approach that is used to determine the how the Christchurch hospital network exhibited a resilient 
response is outlined in Section 1.4. The methodical approach begins with a review of related literature 
and seismic vulnerability assessment methodology for hospitals. The assessment methodology is 
implemented with data collected from the post Christchurch earthquake Christchurch hospital 
network. The purpose for implementing the methodology is to define the areas that accounted for the 
resilient response in the Christchurch hospital network. As well to provide recommendations based on 
the performance of the assessment methodology for future pre earthquake hospital network 
vulnerability assessment.  
1.2 Context 




 of September, 2010 to present day Canterbury earthquake sequence produced ground shaking 
in several events which was much larger than previously forecast for Christchurch (Stirling et al., 
2007). As a result the seismic model only predicted a medium intensity earthquake would strike 
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Canterbury. Prior to the 4 September 2010 Mw7.1 Darfield earthquake the predicted sources for an 
earthquake which could damage Christchurch were the Alpine Fault, Foothills Fault (Porters Pass 
Fault) and a Blind thrust Fault beneath Canterbury (Dorn et al., 2010). The threat of a “direct hit” 
from a blind thrust fault beneath Canterbury was deemed to be much less likely than an Alpine Fault 
earthquake or a Porters Pass Fault earthquake (these faults are further defined in Section 2.1.1.1).  In a 
wider sense, attention on seismic hazard generally focused on identified, active, high recurrence 
interval faults located close to urban centers, such as the Wellington Fault which runs directly beneath 
New Zealand’s capital City Wellington.  As a result, Christchurch was deemed to have a 
comparatively moderate or even low seismic hazard before the Canterbury earthquake sequence 
(Dorn et al., 2010). 
New Zealand’s approach for quantifying the seismic hazard is based on the probabilistic seismic 
analysis model (NZS4203:1992). The model incorporates geological data including; recurrence 
intervals and locations of 305 active faults, a catalogue of historical seismicity, attenuation 
relationships for peak ground acceleration and spectral acceleration (geological context further 
defined in Section 2.1.1.1). The seismic hazard is the highest in Wellington since it is closest to a 
number of major active faults. In descending order of seismic hazard following Wellington are; 
Christchurch, Dunedin and Auckland (Davenport 2004) (Section 2.3.2). 
In preparation for an earthquake the Canterbury hospital network and the Canterbury District Health 
Board (CDHB) had planned for the issues that were predicted to arise following an earthquake. The 
hospital network achieved this by running hazard scenarios at a regional and local level in order to 
identify areas of weakness (MOH 2010). The structure of the CDHB and the CDHBs approach to 
hazard management is defined in further Section 2.1.5.1. 
1.2.2 Canterbury earthquake’s sequence 
The Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake ruptured at 4:36am on the 4
th
 of September, 2010. The rupture was a 
combination of oblique strike-slip movement on a previously unknown fault (Figure 1.1). Now called 
the Greendale fault (assigned a slip rate of 0.2 mm/year) (Villamor et al., 2011) it is one of a series of 
previously unknown seismically active faults in the Canterbury region to have ruptured during the 




Figure 1.1: The epicenters of Mw 71 Darfield earthquake and the Mw 6.2 (M 6.3) Christchurch 
earthquake and their aftershocks 
The most destructive aftershock thus far was the Mw 6.2, 12:52 PM, 22
nd
 of February, 2011 
Christchurch earthquake (Figure 1.1). It ruptured 10 km south of Central Christchurch with a 
hypocenter depth of 7 km on a previously unknown blind thrust fault located below the Port Hill’s of 
Banks Peninsula (Geonet 2011). The earthquake is characterized as a reverse thrust event with a slight 
oblique movement (Geonet 2011). The rupture was oriented towards the Christchurch Central 
Business District (CBD), because of this large energy pulses were directed towards the city. While the 
magnitude and duration of the Christchurch earthquake were less than the Darfield earthquake, the 
PGA and the impact of liquefaction in Christchurch City were much larger. The PGA in central 
Christchurch exceeded 1.8g (vertical) the highest recording was 2.2g (vertical) at Heathcote Valley 
(Geonet 2011). 
The Christchurch earthquake caused extensive liquefaction which induced permanent ground 
deformations in the form of land settlement and lateral spreading, the result was lifeline damage, 
utility damage, road network damage and building damage. There have been 13 earthquakes of Mw 
5.0 or greater following the Christchurch earthquake (Figure 1.1) (up to the 31
st
 of March, 2012), in 
some cases further straining damaged critical infrastructure (Geonet 2013). Just two of the Canterbury 
earthquakes and aftershocks caused fatalities. 185 casualties were caused by the Christchurch 
earthquake and one fatality from the 13
th
 of June, 2011 earthquake (New Zealand Police 2011). 
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1.3 Research objectives  
The aim of this research is to determine ways to increase the resilience of hospitals and hospital 
networks to earthquake induced physical damage and organizational disruption and further define 
ways to provide continued healthcare following large earthquakes. The main objectives are: 
- Prepare a literature review in order to draw common themes from post disaster hospital case 
studies. As well the review of literature is intended to determine the key components of 
hospitals and hospital networks that increase resilence and impeded post disaster 
functionality. 
- Define how the Canterbury hospital network was prepared for seismic hazards in the short 
term and long term leading up to the Christchurch earthquake and how the 4
th
 of September, 
2010, M 7.1Darfield earthquake influenced the preparedness of the Canterbury Hospital 
network (disaster management strategies, seismic zoning, anti-seismic building codes). 
- Define how the physical and organizational elements of the Christchurch hospital network 
performed following the 22
nd
 of February, 2011, Mw 6.3 Christchurch earthquake. 
- Assess the merit and apply scenario based, physical and organizational assessment 
methodology to quantify the damage Christchurch’s hospital network sustained.  
- Develop a conceptual model in order to predict the location and speed of patient redistribution 
following functional loss to hospitals. 
- Provide recommendations for other hospitals and hospital networks in seismically active 
cities.  
Hospitals can be affected by a range of factors following large earthquakes; this is symptomatic of the 
complexity of modern hospital networks. The performance of the Canterbury hospital network 
following the Canterbury earthquakes has provided an opportunity to identify gaps in knowledge 
regarding modern hospital network disaster preparedness and apply the results to other New Zealand 
and international seismically active centers such as Wellington. It is of huge importance that hospitals 
provide continued care following earthquakes in order to avoid further secondary casualties (FEMA 
2007).  
1.4 Methodology of Thesis 
The thesis is the divided into six chapters in order to methodically address the objectives (Section 
1.5). Each chapter builds on information presented and or critiqued in the previous chapters. The first 
and broadest review of information is the Literature review. The literature review of hospitals and 
hospital networks in the context of past disasters, their components and their design and construction 
standards defines the scope of the objectives.  
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The conclusions which were drawn from Chapter Two informed the type of data which was collected 
and presented in Chapter Three. The specific areas within the hospital network that indicate the loss of 
functionality and inter-hospital network response were indentified. Princess Margaret’s Hospital, 
Akaroa Hospital, Kaikoura Hospital and Ellesmere hospital are used to represent the Canterbury 
hospital network. The five Hospitals were chosen because they represent a cross section of the 
Canterbury hospital network. As well there is limited data available for all the other hospitals in the 
Canterbury Hospital network.  
Different hospital seismic risk assessment methodologies are reviewed in Chapter Four.  Applicability 
to the Christchurch situation is informed by the data available in Chapter Three. Only the methods 
that are identified as being realistic with the available Christchurch hospital network data are 
implemented. Implementing the assessment methodology with data from the post Christchurch 
earthquake Canterbury Hospital network tests the effectiveness of the methodology. A holistic 
assessment methodology is then used in Chapter Five to define the areas of the Canterbury hospital 
network that increased resilence and the areas that hindered the response. 
Recommendations and conclusions are provided in Chapter Six drawing on common qualitative 
themes throughout all of the chapters and from processed quantitative data. 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
1.5.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter One provides the framework for the thesis, including; the geological background, the context 
and justification for the research, the aim and scope and finally the breakdown of the chapter content. 
1.5.2 Chapter Two: Literature review 
The purpose of Chapter Two is to review the literature relevant to the hospital organizational structure 
and building standards in place prior to the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand and 
internationally. Focusing on how the Christchurch hospital network was prepared in light of the 
perceived seismic hazards in the short term (following the Darfield earthquake) including overseas 
hospital disaster case studies including the; Maule earthquake (Chile) (2010), Kobe earthquake 
(Japan) (1995), Northridge earthquake (United States of America) (1995), Hurricane Katrina (United 




1.5.3 Chapter Three: Impact of the Christchurch earthquake on the Canterbury healthcare 
system  
The content of Chapter Three exemplifies data collected through surveys and access to hospital 
operational data via the Rhise network (Research re the Health Implications of Seismic Events). The 
data is laid out qualitatively and quantitatively, characterizing the effects of the Christchurch 
earthquake on the physical elements of individual hospitals as well as the organizational response of 
individual hospitals and the hospital network in its entirety. 
 
1.5.4 Chapter Four: Review and implementation of hospital functionality/fragility assessment 
methodology 
The purpose of Chapter Four is to review the prior fragility and functionality methodology for 
hospitals and hospital networks, by critiquing their suitability for the analysis of the Christchurch 
hospital network following the Christchurch earthquake. The elements of the methodology considered 
are; the type of data required the analysis process, the scope of required inputs and the outputs. The 
most suitable methods are used to model the individual hospital data from the relevant Christchurch 
hospitals outlined in Chapter Three to ascertain whether the methods provide the outcomes that were 
observed post Christchurch earthquake. The data used is specific to the individual facilities structural, 
nonstructural, ground acceleration and organizational components. 
1.5.5 Chapter Five: Holistic analysis of the Canterbury Hospital network post Christchurch 
earthquake 
The purpose of Chapter Five is to apply a methodological approach based on the holistic assessment 
methodology previously reviewed in Chapter Five in order to define a method to quantify the time 
taken for inter-hospital patient transfer. In order to quantify the affect of the Christchurch earthquake 
on the entire Christchurch Hospital network and provide a critical review of what was observed. The 
holistic assessment incorporates; the capacity redistribution, the seismic hazard, the affect of facilities 
damage and the organizational performance of the Christchurch hospital network following the 
Christchurch earthquake. 
1.5.6 Chapter Six: Conclusions and recommendations 
The purpose of Chapter Six draws conclusions from the content of all the previous chapters. This is 
achieved by drawing from; the observed common themes in the literature review, trends and gaps in 
the qualitative/quantitative data collected from the Christchurch hospital network following the 
Christchurch earthquake and the outcomes of the applied methodology. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations regarding ways to increase the earthquake resilience of hospitals and hospital 
networks in other seismically active cities. 
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2. Chapter Two: Literature review 
The purpose of this literature review is to analyse why seismic hazards can affect hospitals’ 
functionality in order to inform the research methodology used in this study.  The literature review 
undertakes this by: 
 Analysing risk management approaches for hospital disaster resilience, including 
organizational planning (individual hospital to national hospital network scale), seismic 
design standards, critical building characteristics and probabilistic seismic assessments  
 Case study analysis of hospitals and hospital networks affected by damaging earthquakes. 
 Assessment of research methodologies from previous studies that quantify how the physical 
performance of hospitals during disasters impacts on the provision of health care.   
By integrating current best-practice national and international healthcare risk management and lessons 
from cases studies, conclusions can be drawn as to the most effective methodology for quantifying 
risk within hospitals and hospital networks. In order to quantify the risk hospitals are exposed to from 
a known seismic hazard, firstly, the hospital organization’s pre existing disaster management plans 
must be assessed because the “organization” is the structure tasked with the hospital management. 
Hospital organizations can be categorised as follows: 
 The individual hospital organization. 
 The regional hospital network organization (Regional District Heath Board). 
 The national hospital network organization (The Ministry of Health). 
Organizational hazard management strategies are implemented and managed at all of the three levels 
mentioned above. The natural disaster/earthquake management plans are designed and implemented 
at individual hospital and regional network levels based on guidance from the national level. Whereas 
the seismic design standards are designed at a national level and implemented at an individual hospital 
level. The importance of the organizational environment is illustrated in international case studies 
including the Maule earthquake (Chile) (2010), Kobe earthquake (Japan) (1995), Northridge 
earthquake (United States of America) (1995), Hurricane Katrina (United States of America) (2005), 
Chi-Chi earthquake (China) (1999) and the Kashmir earthquake (Pakistan) (2005). 
Well researched case studies have led to a greater understanding of hospital and hospital network 
fragility. The organizations’ ability to cope with seismic hazards is principally quantified using 
scenario based risk assessment methodology. The purpose of the methodology is to quantify the 
degree the geological hazards, building codes, the organizational environment, and individual 
physical components affect the resilience of the organization. Previous studies of earthquake induced 
hospital/hospital-network damage indicate that disruption and discontinuity are commonly 
experienced. “Disruption” is used to describe the decrease in functionality but not loss of the 
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provision of healthcare. “Discontinuity” entails the loss of continuously applied healthcare. The 
causes of disruptions and discontinuities are varied and complicated, symptomatic of the complexity 
of modern hospitals and hospital networks. 
2.1 Risk assessment within hospitals and hospital networks 
Risk = the probability of a disaster x the probable impact of the event upon an entity (FEMA 2007). 
The ‘outrage’ of the population may also determine how risk is assessed (Sandman 1999). Outrage is 
the term given to the public perception of a hazard. The public may falsely perceive a hazard to be 
higher than it really is and influence how it is mitigated.   For the purpose of this research “Hazard” is 
defined as any physical object that is reasonably likely to harm or kill humans (Sperber 2001). 
Planning for risk in hospitals and hospital networks with a known hazard is difficult given the 
complexity of hospitals and hospital networks. Therefore, trying to incorporate the probability of 
unknown hazards is extremely difficult. The complexity of hospitals and hospital networks makes risk 
hard to quantify. The Pan-American Health Organization described a hospital as “a hotel, an office 
building, a laboratory, and a warehouse” owing to the complex nature of the services it provides and 
its dependence on outside resources (PAHO 2000). Risk can never be entirely avoided within a 
hospital network, so an “acceptable level of risk” by known hazards must be determined from 
balancing all the components (CEEP 2009). The components which define the seismic risk to 
hospitals are covered in a framework consisting of the following five environments: 
2.1.1 Natural environment 
The global, regional and local characteristics of the natural environment determine the probability of 
an earthquake.  Typically, seismic risk is calculated as a probability of a certain magnitude earthquake 
which creates a certain ground acceleration at a particular location occurring in a given period of time 
(ICEF 2011).  Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) integrates all possible earthquake source 
scenarios, the possible magnitudes and distances all of which are weighted by the relative likelihood 
of occurring. The output is the probability of exceeding given ground motion intensity measures (IM) 
within a constrained time period. Spectral acceleration (e.g., Sa at 0.2, 0.5, 1 and 2 second period) for 
return periods of 50, 150, 475 and 1000 years is the principle means of classing the degree to which 
zones in New Zealand are classified vulnerable to seismicity (Stirling et al., 2007) 
The seismic intensity is captured using a number of factors which affect ground motions including; 
source, path, site response and soil structure interaction effects, travel path effects on seismic waves, 
site response effects and evaluation of ground motion input ate the structures base (Rutenberg et al., 
1980). The sources for earthquakes are defined in terms of magnitude, location, focal mechanisms, 
and the rate in time which earthquakes of different magnitudes occur (ICEF 2011). The parameters 
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associated with the fault characterization are often uncertain due to limited data; this is considered a 
source of epistemic uncertainty in the complete computed site hazard (Goulet 2007). 
2.1.1.1 Canterbury’s natural environment 
 
New Zealand’s landmass is situated in the southwest of the Pacific Ocean on the highly geologically 
active Indian-Australian and Pacific Plate margin. The plate margin in the South Island is the right 
lateral oblique strike slip fault Alpine Fault (slip rate of 27 mm/year). The Alpine Fault is capable of 
generating a magnitude 8 earthquake (Dorn et al., 2010). An Alpine fault earthquake was considered 
to be Christchurch’s biggest seismic hazard, due to the size of the predicted magnitude. An array of 
regional faults including the Porters Pass Fault accommodates the strike slip stress associated with the 
Alpine Fault (Dorn et al., 2010). The regional faults were also considered a seismic hazard for 
Christchurch due to their relatively close proximity even though the predicted magnitudes are 
comparatively smaller than what the Alpine Fault could generate. 
Large earthquakes occur regularly in New Zealand, with an average of 363 Mw 4.0 or larger events 
annually. However in Canterbury alone there were 373 earthquakes of Mw 4.0 and above in the 
period between the 4
th
 of September, 2010 and the 12
th
 of September, 2011 (Geonet, Canterbury 
quakes 2011).  One rare large earthquake such as the Darfield earthquake event can generate a rich 
aftershock sequence and skew the annual average and generate even more damaging earthquakes such 
as the Christchurch earthquake. 
The Greendale fault, Port Hills fault and Christchurch Fault were unknown until rupturing between 
the 4
th
 of September, 2010 and the 22
nd
 of February, 2011. These faults are part of the less active 
regional and sub regional fault system in Canterbury (Dorn et al., 2010). A “direct hit” under 
Christchurch from a less active unknown fault was considered to be a small seismic hazard. The 
Greendale Fault was “hidden” up to when it ruptured on the 4
th
 of September 2010, because of its low 
recurrence interval. As well the rapid deposition and reworking of the Canterbury plain’s sedimentary 
units destroyed any evidence of historic ruptures and made the faults difficult to identify. 
Christchurch is situated on a low energy back barrier environment, in close proximity to an active 
plate margin (Brown and Weeber 1992). The low energy coastal alluvial deposition created a shallow 
gradient and low elevation environment where Christchurch was built. The ground water table is 
generally between 2 to 3 meters below the ground surface in the west, and 0 to 2 meters below the 
ground surface towards the central and eastern portions of urbanized Christchurch (Shulmeister et al., 
1999).  
2.1.2 Social environment 
The size and health of the population served by the hospital network and the importance of the 
hospital’s function contributes to, the size of the impact. It is beneficial in the long term to build more 
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resilient facilities, but obtaining a high level of resilience takes substantial financial investment. With 
limited funds, hospitals must balance the need for seismic resilience against coverage of the 
population. The degree to which risk is mitigated is controlled by its perceived severity, or whether or 
not the hazard presents an “Acceptable risk”. As well as the willingness of society to finance risk 
mitigation at the expense of other public spending (see Section 2.1.4) (Schmid 2001).   
The social environment may influence functionality of the healthcare system in the long term. The 
epidemiological profile of the population and the way the population is affected by the earthquake 
influences the demand on the healthcare system. In addition to casualties directly caused by the 
earthquake, increases in stress, fatigue and domestic violence are common following earthquakes.  
The degree to which longer term health problems afflict the population depends on the characteristics 
of the earthquake and the aftershock sequence, as well as the organizational environments ability to 
deal with the long term health problems (Schmid 2001).   
2.1.3 Built and legislative environment  
The understanding of the local natural environment and standard of construction of the built 
environment determines the level of risk to which facilities are subjected to. The knowledge of risk in 
the natural environment and the standard of construction vary internationally as they are financially 
dependent (McVerry et al., 2006). New Zealand’s current seismic standards use the Ultimate Limit 
State (ULS), Serviceability Limit State (SLS) and Uniform Hazard Spectra (UHS) (Davenport 2004) 
in order to quantify the level of financial investment deemed appropriate (explained in Section 3.2). 
New Zealand’s earthquake standards for structural, nonstructural components and lifelines are further 
defined in Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 (Davenport 2004). California’s current hospital seismic safety laws 
are; Senate Bill 1958 (SB 1958), Senate Bill 1661 (SB 1661), Senate Bill 499 (SB 499) and Senate 
Bill (SB 90). The standards included within the Bills ensure all hospitals are designed and built as 
critical facilities, which are required to not only protect life but also be completely operational 
following strong seismicity. The current Bills also include requirements for extensive upgrades of 
existing hospital facilities and services. The laws are generated by the Office of State wide Health 
Planning & Development (OSHPD) further defined in Section 2.4.4 (OSHPD 2009). 
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2.1.4 Economic/financial environment 
Financial planners must take into account all the other environments to provide the most efficient use 
of money reducing the level of risk. That is, a plan must offer the best value for money while 
managing the risk at a publically acceptable level. Perceptions of the level of risk that are acceptable 
are often highly subjective and require inter-disciplinary collaboration to determine how to weight all 
the environments when operating on a constrained budget. It is important that facilities managers 
efficiently mitigate known risks in order to have secure insurance and finance (Oldfield et al., 1997). 
In order to efficiently use the available finance a quantitative value must be given to the value of life 
and the influence and probability of all the probable hazards must be known. The Value of Statistical 
Life (VSL) is the statistical per capita value of an individual life which risk planners utilize to 
distribute finance equally for risk mitigation. New Zealand’s VSL was $3.5 million as of 2009 
(NZIER 2010) and varies internationally. However, the VSL cannot be used to define the quantity of 
funding for an unknown hazard. However it is useful when mitigating known hazards in hospitals, as 
a tool that can quantify how much seismic mitigation is needed for each individual physical 
component that makes up hospitals in order to protect the individuals residing in the building.  
2.1.5 Organizational environment 
The organizational environment’s purpose is to define the scope and manage the above mentioned 
environments. The organizational structure, disaster planning, information systems, communication 
systems and staff structure/training are integral components that define the organizational 
environment’s ability to mitigate risk. New Zealand’s current “bottom up” approach to disaster 
preparedness and response places the responsibility for action on the individuals and organizations 
closest to the actual events (Figure 2.1) (MOH 2010). A bottom up approach is quicker and more 
efficient than a top down approach (MOH 2010). 
Organizations must plan for multiple emergencies because the characteristics of events influence the 
post event functionality. In an earthquake physical capital and social capital are vulnerable, whereas 
in a pandemic only social capital is vulnerable. Thus emergency planning must be specific to the type 
of emergency.  
The role and structure of the organizational environment in hospitals and hospital networks vary 
internationally. The OSHPD in California and Ministry of Health in New Zealand (Section 2.4.4) are 
strict national and regional regulatory organizations that insure that all standards are met in hospitals. 
The challenge for these organizations is to plan for risks in hospitals that are continually evolving 
with new technological advances, building/design standard iterations and the alteration and addition 
of services to existing facilities.  
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2.1.5.1 Canterbury District Health Board organizational structure 
The Canterbury District Health Board organisational structure is presented here as an example.  The 
CDHBs emergency response structure is conceptualised in Figure 2.1, the base levels of the 
organizational structure consists of; Vulnerable people, Public health, Primary health and Hospital 
services. All the base levels are independent, during the disaster they are coordinated in unison from 
“Operations” with support from “Logistics” and “Planning and Intel”. “Operations” is supported by 
the local District Health Board (DHB) and Ministry of Health, the response is structured as so to 
insure the higher levels provide resources at the request of the lower levels which coordinate the 
response.  The structure is implemented for all health crisis, whether they be sudden onset disasters or 
slow onset pandemics. 
 
Figure 2.1: The health emergency response organizational structure including; NHCC (National 
Health Coordination Centre), NCMC (National Crisis Management Centre), DHB I/C (Incident 
Controller), EOC (Emergency Operations Centre), ECC (Emergency Control Centre) and the 




Figure 2.2: The CDHB resource control and co-ordination process (McColl 2012).  
The flow chart in Figure 2.2 provides a description of the process for patient transfers following a 
sudden onset disaster. The process of patient transfers is dependent upon local DHB mangers 
identifying the required patient transfers and the resources required. The patient transfers are then 
approved by the local DHB and the ECC, the NHCC request beds and resources from within the 
afflicted hospital network and the broader hospital network that is not affected by primary earthquake 
damage at the request of the local CDHB and ECC. The NHCC operates at a national level by 
providing support for the regional DHB at the DHBs request. The NHCC sources bed space and 
resources from other DHBs, while clinicians and engineers within the afflicted DHB communicate 
directly with other DHBs.  
Prior to the Darfield earthquake the 2010 pandemic plans provided the newest guide for a healthcare 
network wide emergency response. The Pandemic plans provided a framework for inter-hospital 
coordination and integration with the general practice sector (MOH 2010). 
2.2 Critical Building Characteristics in Health Care facilities 
The most critical elements of seismic design in buildings are; damping, natural period oscillation, 
linearity and land characteristics. A building’s natural period represents the time it takes to oscillate 
one full cycle. Low rise buildings with short periods have the tendency to oscillate with high 
accelerations which are more likely to lead to nonstructural damage. High rise buildings have greater 
flexibility and thus longer oscillatory periods; during earthquakes they deform with lower 
accelerations but with higher lateral displacements. Larger displacements will be more likely to 
detach staircases, floors and ceilings (DBH 2011). 
Like construction, land conditions also control building resonance during ground motion. In some 
cases buildings with oscillatory periods around 1.5 seconds situated on young soft sedimentary soils 
can suffer amplified acceleration because the resonance patterns of the soil match those of the 
building (FEMA 2007). Damping reduces the size of the building oscillation during earthquake 
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motion; rapid damping is desirable in buildings’ in order to reduce the buildings exposure to high 
accelerations. The level of damping is dependent on the construction materials, the structural layout 
and the connection of structural components to architectural/nonstructural elements. (Beatty 2006). 
It is generally not cost-effective to design buildings to be completely undamaged by strong 
accelerations. Modern building codes are based on forces that are not as large as the shaking can 
generate, assuming that the building’s structure will deform elastically and absorb a portion of the 
energy (Wagg et al., 2010). The concept is labelled “nonlinear behaviour”; if severe enough, it can 
cause structural damage. Nonlinear deformation is incorporated into hospital structures in order to 
minimize structural damage and the transfer of acceleration to non structural components, ensuring 
that facilities will remain operational after strong accelerations. 
2.3 Seismic Design Standards/organizational planning in hospitals and hospital 
networks 
 
Building codes have been developed to promote the protection of society from collapse of structures 
during extreme natural events (Hamburger 2002). They are usually legally enforceable, providing 
standards and guidelines for engineers and architects. Enforcing building codes is crucial for the 
resilience of buildings. Code implementation is achieved by compelling designers and architects to 
follow the law and by spreading awareness of resilient design (Hamburger 2002).  
2.3.1 International seismic design 
California’s current seismic code is regarded as the most comprehensive design standard of all 
international codes. It has gone through a long history of successive iterations following 
comprehensively investigated destructive earthquakes (FEMA 2007). California’s most modern 
comprehensive code is the structural resistance code “Senate Bill (SB) 1953 (OSHPD 2009) SB 
1953”. The code was developed by the California Seismic Safety Commission 2001, after the 1994 
Northridge earthquake demonstrated that the pre-existing Act did not encompass nonstructural 
components as comprehensively as structural components. The pre-existing code was reworked to 
include nonstructural components. The mechanical and electrical equipment standards are categorised 
as follows: 
1) The critical electrical and mechanical systems required for continued functionality, including; air 
handling units, air conditioning units, switch gear and emergency power supply systems. All first 
category systems must be certified by an approved laboratory or agency. 
2) The systems that do not play a significant role in operational continuity include motors and motor 
operators, vacuum pumps and sterilizers. These systems do not require any certified testing (Uma 
et al., 2010). 
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The other most advanced seismic codes are found in Japan where, the two-level code used at present 
was introduced in 1981.  The code dictates that a structure should remain elastic in small to moderate 
earthquakes (Level 1 design), while it can sustain some “yielding and plasticization” in some 
structural components during large earthquakes (Level 2 design). Level 1 design is defined as “no or 
very limited damage” ensuring continued occupancy and operational functionality. Level 2 design is 
defined as “collapse prevention” in order to ensure the safety of life, not operational functionality.  
The seismic design forces are set with respect to the distance of buildings to known active faults, the 
local soil characteristics and the height of the structure. The standard base-shear coefficients are set at 
0.2 for Level 1 and 1.0 for Level 2. The peak ground acceleration values are 0.3 ~ 0.4g for Level 2 
design, and they are reduced to one-fifth for Level 1 design.  A force reduction factor is introduced in 
Level 2 design to allow for the trade-off between the structural rigidity and ductility of the building. 
The strength required for the most ductile category of buildings is reduced to 0.25 for steel and 0.3 for 
RC from the unreduced base-shear coefficient of 1.0 (Nakashima et al., 2000). 
2.3.2 New Zealand seismic design codes 
New Zealand’s performance based earthquake engineering loadings code has been developed 
continually since the first 1935 seismic code was introduced (NZSS No. 95-1935). The 1976 code 
introduced strength design (NZS 4203:1976), replacing the 1965 working stress design (NZSS 
1900:1965). The NZS 4203:1992 code built on the previous iterations, by increasing the complexity 
of seismic spectra requirements and advising that buildings be symmetrical structures (King 1999).  
The 1992 code introduced the ULS and the SLS requirements to prevent structural damage and limit 
damage to nonstructural components during moderate earthquakes. To protect life and prevent 
building collapse during large earthquakes. NZS 4203:1992 also introduced the “uniform hazard 
spectra”, defined as a 10% probability of occurrence in 50 years, or a return period of 475 years (the 
ultimate limit state) (Davenport 2004). The foundation soil requirements encompass three categories 
that determine the foundation: "rock/stiff soil", "intermediate" and "flexible/deep soil" NZS 
(4203:1992).  
NZS 4230:2004 expanded the limit state requirements to match the performance expectations for 
operational continuity that were also introduced (DHB 2008). The ultimate limit state for earthquake 
loading further defined the avoidance of collapse. Also recognized as important was the loss of 
support to elements that represent a hazard to a crowd of more than 100 people inside the building, 
and hazards to individual life within and without the building (NZS 1170.5:2004). The requirements 
were further constrained to the components necessary for the continued function of life safety systems 
in the building and the avoidance of inoperative damage to nonstructural systems for emergency 
building evacuation. The SLS stated that buildings should not require immediate repair after a SLS1 
earthquake and must remain operational after a SLS2 earthquake (Table 2.1) (King et al., 2004).  
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The latest seismic standard iteration is NZS 4219:2009. The code improves upon the prior 
requirements for restraining engineering systems that resist seismic damage. Engineering systems 
include; boilers, ducting, chillers, cooling towers, cable trays, steam pipes, gas pipes, water pipes and 
lights (NZS 4219:2009). The requirements which were introduced are for the calculation, selection 
and installation of seismic restraints, anchors and braces (Uma et al., 2010).  
New Zealand’s current zone factor is a continuously varying value between 1.2 for Wellington, 
between 0.7 and 0.9 for Christchurch and 0.6 for Auckland and Dunedin. The risk factor reflects the 
function of the structure; it ranges from 0.6 for temporary buildings to 1.3 for essential buildings 
(Table 2.1) (NZS 4203:1992) (Davenport 2004).  NZS 4219 also includes longitudinal and transverse 
restraint requirements for suspended components excluding gravity support elements (Uma et al., 
2010). 
Table 2.1: Annual probability of excedance variance and the building importance level 
Source; (King et al., 2004) 
2.4 Vulnerability of hospitals and hospital networks to Seismic Hazards  
The four main categories of hospital and hospital network vulnerability are the buildings structural, 
nonstructural, lifelines and organizational components (FEMA 2007). Failure of anyone of the 
categories can be responsible for the functional failure of the hospital, or in extreme situations the 
entire health care system (WHO 2008). 
2.4.1 Structural Vulnerabilities 
Structural building elements are the necessary components required to physically support the 
buildings structure (WHO 2006). Structural elements include; foundations, bearing walls, columns, 
beams, staircases, floors,  roof decks, including and other types of structural components that support 
the building against the force of gravity (MOH et al. 2002). The level of vulnerability of these 
components depends on the following factors: 
 The level the design of the structural system has addressed the known hazard forces. 
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 The quality of the building materials, construction, and maintenance. 
 The architectural and structural configuration of the building. 
 
The aspects of design and construction in areas known to be hazard-prone are regulated by building 
codes and regulations, which are further explained in Sections 2.3.1 & 2.3.2. In New Zealand seismic 
building code requirements (Section 2.3.2) for essential buildings such as hospitals are heavily 
focused on reducing causalities and on maintaining functionality following earthquakes (King 1999). 
The later is harder to accomplish due to the fragility and interdependence of all the components 
required for hospital functionality. However, building regulations alone cannot guarantee hospitals 
remain operational after earthquakes, because many other factors effect hospital functions such as 
nonstructural elements, lifelines and support agencies (FEMA 2007 ). 
2.4.2 Nonstructural Vulnerabilities 
The affects of damage to nonstructural building components and equipment and breakdowns in public 
services (lifelines), transportation, re-supply, or other organizational aspects of hospital operations, 
are as disruptive and as dangerous for the safety of patients, as any structural damage. In modern 
facilities nonstructural damage is often the biggest disruption following large earthquakes (FEMA 
2007 ). In most modern hospitals nonstructural components represent up to 85 to 90 % of the entire 
buildings worth (WHO 2006). For example, during the moderately sized 2001 Nisqually earthquake 
most buildings did not sustain major structural damage, but nonstructural damage meant many 
buildings were un-occupiable (Filiatrault et al., 2001). 
The nonstructural complexity of modern hospitals is due to the dependence of facilities on extensive 
networks of mechanical, electrical, and piping installations for essential services (FEMA 2007 ). The 
air conditioning, suction and ventilation systems are highly important in maintaining an appropriate 
pressure gradient in different areas; malfunction in any one part of the system could create a risk of 
infection to patients and staff. This system like other services is extremely vulnerable to disruption as 
a result of large ground accelerations (WHO 2006). 
Damage can result from relatively small events. Vulnerabilities that will most likely affect hospital 
functionality and the safety of occupants are detailed in Table 2.2. If severe enough the damage may 
require patient evacuation (Section 2.7.1), and if not the required repair work will cause disruption. 
Patients in critical and acute care units are particularly vulnerable during evacuation because they 
require medical gas, monitors, lighting, and other essential life support services (FEMA 2007). 
Non-load bearing partition walls and ceilings are rarely designed and constructed to the same 
standards of hazard resistance as the structural elements. Ceiling panels are particularly vulnerable 
during earthquakes (FEMA 2007). The misinterpretation of nonstructural damage as structural 
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damage following the 8
th
 of October, 2005 M7.6 Kashmir Pakistan earthquake caused the unnecessary 
evacuation the Ayub Medical College in Abbotabad (Sections 2.5, 2.8.1) (EERI 2006). 
Table 2.2: Nonstructural components common in hospitals (PAHO 2007) 
Architectural elements Installations Equipment and furnishings 
Divisions/wall partitions Drinking water Industrial equipment 
Facades Industrial water Cleaning equipment 
False ceilings Steam pipes Medical equipment 
Cornices Medical gasses Office equipment 
Chimneys Fuel Furnishing 
Aesthetic covering elements Vacuum/pressure network Supplies 
Glass Air conditioning Clinical files 
Antennas Piping Pharmacy shelving 
Ceiling panels Waste disposal Laboratory shelving 
2.4.3 Lifeline vulnerabilities 
Lifelines such as electric power, water supply and telecommunications are critical services which 
hospitals depend upon to function adequately. These services are often supplied by main grids which 
are susceptible to earthquake damage (Guest 2004). Automatic switch offs are common in power 
substations and gas lines in order to mitigate damage from the secondary risks of fire following large 
earthquakes. The unintended effect of automatic switch offs is to cut services to hospitals.  
The emergency power generator system along with its fuel supply is the hospital’s most critical utility 
following critical lifeline damage. Backup power enables equipment and installations not directly 
damaged to function after an earthquake (FEMA 2007). The performance of back up utilities depends 
on the integrity of the source as well as the components needed for distribution such as battery racks, 
pipelines and electrical connections (FEMA 2009). The fragility of each system must be reduced to its 
individual components separately in order to reduce interdependency and insure back up utilities are 
functional after strong seismicity. For example following the Northridge earthquake the Olive View 
Medical Center (OVMC) had to switch off its power generators after the cooling systems water 
supply was lost (Pickett 1997) (Section 2.5.3). As well, the Kobe Central City Hospital had to be 
evacuated following the Great Hanshin earthquake due to the similar flow on effects of water loss on 
water cooled generators (further explained in Section 2.5) (Ukai 1996).When Hurricane Katrina cut 
New Orleans’s mains power extreme heat caused a number of hospitals to evacuate, as the backup 
power did not cover the air-conditioning systems as they were not seen as critical services (FEMA 
2007). Following strong ground acceleration sewers and mains water often become inoperable; this is 
an issue because waste disposal and water for showers and fire sprinklers are essential for hospitals. 
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When the toilets, sterilizers, and cleaning equipment are nonoperational the hospitals ability to 
function is immediately affected (FEMA 2007). 
Specialized services not supplied by a mains grid but by regular deliveries are also vulnerable to 
disruption, they include; chemicals, oxygen, pharmaceuticals and other medical gases. The resilience 
of specialized services following disruption depends upon the level of storage on site and the fragility 
of the internal network used to supply wards (FEMA 2007).  
2.4.4 Organizational Vulnerabilities 
In the event of disruption of the normal movement of staff, patients, equipment, and supplies disaster 
mitigation or emergency operation plans play an important role in providing operational continuity. 
The hospitals disaster plan must identify the risks of a disaster/emergency, integrate its disaster plan 
with the community wide disaster plan, assign responsibility for the coordination of the response and 
provide the capacity to treat mass casualties after a damaging earthquake (Section 2.1) (Henry et al., 
2006). 
The interdependence and spatial distribution of the inter-relationships of hospital functions make 
disaster planning difficult. The way in which they are dealt with determines the extent hospital 
operations are effected when the normal movement and communication of staff, patients, materials 
and waste products are disrupted (MD 2004). Organizational vulnerability can steam from damage to 
any of the components mentioned in Sections 2.4.1 - 2.4.3.  
It is the task of the organizational environment to mitigate the risk of failure of the physical 
components which comprise its facilities. California’s OSHPD operates a review program for hospital 
organizational  plans and nonstructural installations, in order to ensure all buildings comply with the 
current seismic building codes and ensure the organization exhibits “operational continuity”(OSHPD 
2009). New Zealand’s regulatory organizations are the Ministry of Health (MOH), local District 
Health Boards (DHB) and the Department of Building and Housing (DBH). The Department of 
Building and Housing defines the code requirements for; facilities, contents and lifelines the MOH 
and DHB’s are responsible for organizational requirements such as pandemic planning and the 
organizational structure of facilities. Each major hospital has an emergency planner tasked with 
identifying the risks in facilities, contents and services. The MOH’s current pandemic plan provides 
guidance for necessary actions following a pandemic, by defining the likely weakness in hospital 
network organizational structures, the agencies and individuals required to act, and the authoritative 
limits for organizations and individuals undertaking actions.  
The operational characteristics and connectivity of a hospital or hospital networks organizational 
structure govern the severity of an earthquakes effect on the hospitals ability to operate. In order to 
mitigate disruption it is important that hospital organizations coordinate during emergencies, good 
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communication is also vital to achieve continued operation during the response phase. The inter-
corporate and inter-personal relationships are highly valuable during earthquake responses phase 
(EQC 2012). New Zealand’s current “bottom up” approach to disaster preparedness and response 
places the responsibility for action on the organizations and individuals closest to the actual events 
(MOH 2010). 
2.5 Prior hospital performance following earthquakes  
In order for a hospital to operate without disruption it must depend on the components mentioned in 
Section 2.4 working without interruption 24 hours a day even after a large earthquake. Hospitals 
continually evolve as older facilities are extended and upgraded; as a result, hospitals have to adapt 
new technology to be integrated into older facilities. The rarity of large earthquakes in developed 
cities makes it difficult for designers to predict how certain elements of hospitals will perform given 
hospitals are continually evolving, changing the way components interact following damage to part of 
the system (Achour 2011). 
2.5.1 Great Hanshin earthquake 
The M7.2 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake (Kobe, Japan) ruptured at a depth of 16km and 20 
kilometres from Kobe. It was considered a “shallow inland earthquake” on a fault that had not been 
active for roughly 400 years, sixty one percent of hospitals in disaster area were severely damaged 
(Ukai 1996).  Out of 180 hospitals in the disaster area, four were destroyed and 110 suffered serious 
structural damage. Most of the complex medical equipment, such as computed tomography (CT), 
magnetic resonance (MR), X-ray angiography and chemical auto analysers were damaged and 
unusable in the hospitals that sustained severe damage. 
In Kobe Central City Hospital, wards were evacuated after water flowed from damaged roof top water 
tanks. As the water in the tanks drained, water was automatically pumped up from water tanks in the 
basement, all stored water was lost (Section 2.4.3) (Ukai 1996). The water loss caused the breakdown 
of the backup water-cooled power plant, shutting down the hospitals electricity supply for 30 minutes. 
The medical instruments that weren’t physically damaged were un-operational without power. The 
depleted staff pool also decreased the hospitals functionality (The City of Kobe 1999). The body of 
research following the Kobe earthquake has been influential in the formation of Japans current 
building code for critical buildings (section 2.3.1). 
2.5.2 Kashmir earthquake 
The 2005 M7.6 Kashmir (Pakistan) earthquake ruptured at a depth of 10 km and 100km north-
northeast of Islamabad, it destroyed most major hospitals near the epicentre. The financial cost to the 
health sector was equivalent to about 60% of the national health budget. The damage to the hospital 
network is characteristic of a strong shallow earthquake on facilities comprised in most cases of 
insufficiently earthquake proofed buildings, services and non structural building elements (EERI 
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2006). One of the biggest Hospitals lost was the Ayub Medical College (AMC) in Abbotabad. The 
AMC was one of the few critical care facilities designed to withstand high seismic loads, it was lost 
due to the lack of a proper post-earthquake assessment. The hospital was evacuated due to the 
mistaken categorization of non structural damage as severe structural damage (Sections 2.4.2& 2.8.1). 
(WHO EMRO 2009). Quickly and effectively assessing hospitals is very important, unthreatening 
nonstructural damage can often appear initially dangerous and cause unnecessary evacuations.  
2.5.3 Northridge earthquake 
One of the biggest hospitals to sustain damage after the 1994 M 6.9 Northridge earthquake 
(California, United States of America) was the Olive view Medical Centre (OVMC). The current 
OVMC was built as a replacement to the original OVMC building which sustained severe structural 
damage during the M6.4 San Fernando, California earthquake of the 9
th
 of February, 1971 (Celebi 
1997). It was subsequently demolished along with the Veteran’s Administration Hospital complex 
which partially collapsed (Rutenberg et al., 1980). Engineering research following the 1971 San 
Fernando Earthquake found that the seismic forces experienced at the Veteran’s Administration (VA) 
Hospital were underestimated by the current seismic codes (Holmes 1976). The positive and negative 
effects of nonlinear soil structure interaction and PGA amplification caused by soil resonance helped 
some structures to withstand damage, while nearby structures collapsed (Rutenberg et al., 1980).  
The replacement OVCM building was designed before 1976 with an increased level of seismic 
resistance, similar to most other hospitals built in the last 40 years in seismically active, economically 
developed nations. The new OVMC building was designed to survive two levels of zero period 
acceleration (ZPA) of 0.52g and 0.69g. The peak ground accelerations experienced by the Northridge 
earthquake far exceeded that of the design limits, due to the epicentres proximity (16km) and the large 
spectral characteristics of the recorded motions. The observed accelerations were 0.91g (free field) 
and 2.31g (roof) (Celebi 1997).  
Even when building sustain minimal structural damage, structural components can still impact 
nonstructural components by transferring forces through the structure itself and damage utility or 
architectural elements connected to the structure (Section 2.2)(WHO SEARO 2002).The new OVMC 
buildings rigidity and linear behaviour (Section 2.2) contributed to the transfer of strong accelerations 
through the building during the 1994 M 6.9 Northridge earthquake, in some cases overwhelming the 
seismic anchorage and bracing provided for the building’s nonstructural systems. Some of the 
damaged components and systems were not considered sufficiently vulnerable to require special 
bracing, the failure to recognize the transfer of forces through different components is indicative of 
how complex fragility assessments are in hospitals (defined in Section 2.6) (FEMA 2007). Similarly, 
the failure of nonstructural walls at St. John’s Hospital following the 1994 M 6.9 Northridge 
36 
 
earthquake caused the rupture of water lines and as a result the hospital lost water services (Pickett 
1997).   
2.5.4 Chi-Chi earthquake  
During the Mw 7.6 22
nd
 of September, 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake (China) the 400-bed reinforced 
concrete (RC) Christian Hospital suffered only slight structural damage (NCREE1999). However the 
newest section sustained considerable nonstructural damage from the main 20
th
 of September, 1999 
event and was evacuated to the hospital grounds. The damage to backup power, water, 
communications, piping, HVAC anchorage, medical equipment, gas storage tanks and mechanical 
equipment and the lack of an emergency management plan added to the crisis. The result was to 
reduce the capacity by 10% at a time when the demand was the highest (Lee 1999).  The building 
sustained significant nonstructural damage again during the M6.8 26
th
 of September, 1999 aftershock 
(NCREEa 1999).  Patients were again evacuated and housed in temporary trailers with 50 fewer beds 
than the hospital had prior to the aftershock. The excess patients were transferred to other hospitals in 
the area. The first floor of the building remained open and was used for emergency care, patient 
registration and as a command post (Soong et al., 2000).   
2.5.5 Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the coast of Louisiana on the 29
th
 August, 2005 (New Orleans, 
United States of America) causing 1,836 deaths. Similar to the Chi-Chi earthquake (Section 2.5.4) and 
Kashmir earthquake (Section 2.5.2) case studies, New Orleans’s Charity Hospital was evacuated 
following Hurricane Katrina (Berggren 2005) (Section 2.4.3). The exhausted food and water supply 
was also responsible for the hospitals evacuation. The observations are symptomatic of the trend 
towards reducing onsite storage of linen, food, and other essential materials by out sourcing the 
services in order to maximize efficiency (FEMA 2007). 
2.5.6 L’Aquila earthquake 
The three-story San Salvatore Hospital located in western L’Aquila was constructed in 2000 and 
sustained damage during the M6.3  6
th
 of April,  2009 L’Aquila earthquake, even though the facility 
was thought to be able to resist strong accelerations. It was concluded that irregularities in plan and 
elevation, poor detailing (steel bars were exposed) and design (beams larger than columns) lead to 
structural damage (EEFIT 2009). These factors caused the inadequately anchored third level 
unreinforced masonry infill walls of the hospital to collapse onto the emergency entrance and the 
disintegration of the exterior wall panelling. Widespread nonstructural failures of insufficiently braced 
and anchored suspended ceilings, brick infill walls and equipment also ceased clinical services.  In 
response to the damage all patients were evacuated and treated outdoors immediately after the 
earthquake (L’AQUILA 2009). 
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2.5.7 Maule earthquake 
The Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake in Chile ruptured off the coast of central Chile on the 27
th
 of Saturday, 
2010 at 03:34am. The earthquake resulted in 484 fatalities Chile’s hospital functions were widely 
disrupted
 
by the earthquake. The loss of communications
 
impeded the response efforts at all levels. 
All of the 7 hospitals in the Bio-Bio region lost their municipal electrical
 
power, water and 
communications for days after the earthquake. 23 of the 117 hospitals in the Bio-Bio and Maule 
regions lost some functional capacity. As well, many of the hospitals sustained physical
 
damage to 
varying degrees however, only one hospital sustained severe structural damage (Kirsch et al., 2010).
 
Chiles strong adherence to good seismic standards prevented any of the hospitals from completely 
collapsing, however Structural and nonstructural damage did negatively influence their functional 
capacity. It was identified that the loss of lifelines and water forced some hospitals to evacuate. There 
were also issues with the decision making process, because the major decisions had to be made in 
Santiago where the national healthcare service is centralized (Kirsch et al., 2010). 
2.6 Risk assessment for hospitals and hospital networks 
 
Modelling fragility and functionality is the principle means of risk assessment; it enables the disaster 
response to be planned for and for increased building resilience within individual hospitals and 
hospital networks. Risk assessment is not just used to increase health care facility resilience, but also 
to define specific areas of vulnerability in facilities and the organizational structure for post 
earthquake hospital emergency response procedures (Berler et al., 2009). 
Risk assessment aims to quantify the probability of failure of; physical elements, services and lifelines 
within a hospital or healthcare network, and the affect the damage has on the capacity of the facilities 
or the hospital network (Cimellaro et al., 2007). Functional and fragility evaluation methods are 
important means to assess individual components (structural, nonstructural, equipment and lifelines), 
or hospital networks. Hospital evacuation, surge capacity and residual capacity can be used as 
affective measures that quantify the holistic affect of physical damage on society. The elements 
needed for the holistic assessment of hospital networks are the: 
 Operational characteristics of the network and individual facilities. 
 Geographical distribution of the facilities. 
 Physical characteristics of the facilities. 
 Degree to which the system is able to meet the health care needs of the population.  
 Epidemiological and demographic profile of the population. 




2.6.1 Fragility assessment for physical components 
Fragility is defined in seismic engineering as the probability that a structural, nonstructural and/or 
geotechnical component or system violates a limit state when exposed to a seismic force of a specific 
intensity (Kafali et al., 2004).Fragility can be calculated for an entire hospital network, single hospital, 
or a particular physical component or function of a hospital. The assessment methodology requires a 
certain level of generalisation and assumption in order to calculate either qualitative or quantitative 
outputs. The methods covered in this section are critiqued for their suitability in Chapter Four.  
2.6.1.1 Assessment methodology for physical components  
Structural Damage fragility curves have been used to model building damage from prior earthquakes 
globally (Wenzel 2008). The world health organization (WHO); Health facility seismic vulnerability 
evaluation – a handbook – (WHO 2006), outlined a structural vulnerability function (Section 4.2.3). 
The assessments purpose to provide a numerical output that can be used to estimate the vulnerability 
of facilities for a given MMI value. The assessment is implemented and critiqued in Chapter Three 
using data from Christchurch Hospital following the Christchurch earthquake. 
The WHO (2006) Nonstructural vulnerability assessment is similar to the WHO (2006) structural 
assessment; however the nonstructural assessment has 21 indicators whereas the structural assessment 
has 14. The indicators for the WHO (2006) structural and nonstructural assessments are both 
qualitative and quantitative (WHO 2006). Kafali (2003) defines fragility Analysis methodology for 
nonstructural and structural systems in critical facilities. The method includes calculations for; site 
specific ground motion, structural response at attachment points, motion of the structural system, 
second moment properties and fragility surfaces by Monte Carlo simulation (Kafali et al., 2003). 
2.6.1.2 Capability assessment methodology 
WHO’s “Health facility seismic vulnerability evaluation: a handbook” outlines a capability 
assessment methodology considering the allocation of resources and personnel to the various medical 
services. Assigned personnel, emergency supplies, medical equipment and backup systems define the 
capability of each of the medical services (WHO 2006). The parameters define the ability of the 
service to function under both normal and emergency conditions. The four parameters are labelled as 
following: 
1. Optimal: “efficient allocation of resources and personnel”.  
2. Adequate: “acceptable allocation of resources and personnel; operation can proceed 
normally”. 
3. Minimal: “barely acceptable allocation of resources or personnel; operation can proceed with 
certain restrictions”. 
4. Inadequate: “unacceptable assignment of resources or personnel; severe limits on the service 




The medical services with an importance index of 5, 4 or 3 are considered the most important to 
maintaining a functional hospital during an emergency. All medical services with an importance index 
of 5 or 4 must have all parameters rated 1 (optimal) or 2 (adequate) in order to attain a net “high” 
capability rating. Services with an importance index of 3 may have a parameter with a rating of 3 
(minimal). Services with an importance index of 5 or 4 with parameters rated 3 (minimal) or 4 
(inadequate) have an overall healthcare capability rating of “moderate” or “low” (WHO 2006).  
2.6.1.3 Functionality assessment methodology  
Cimellaro. et al., (2010) defines a method for calculating the functionality of individual hospitals by 
using Waiting Time (WT) in an Emergency Department (ED) as a key parameter in the quantification 
of the Quality of Service (QS). The WT is defined by the time taken between the request for care by 
the patient and the provision of the care by the hospital, it is determined by the number of; staff on 
duty, labs, Beds (B) and Operating Rooms (OR). The outcome of the model is the Qualitative 
functionality (Qqs), which is calculated using the outcomes of the Quality of Service (QS). And the 
Quantitative functionality (Qls) related to the losses in the healthy population calculated with the 
variables mentioned above (Cimellaro. et al., 2010).  
The required data is as follows: 
 (Wt) waiting time in emergency department (saturated or unsaturated) 
i) (B) Number of spare beds 
ii) (OR) Operating rooms 
 (WT0) Waiting time during normal unsaturated conditions 
 (WT(t)) Waiting time during saturated conditions 
 (NTR) Number of patients treated under saturated conditions (indicator of functionality) 
 (Ntot) Total number of patients requiring treatment 
 (NNTR) Total number of patients not treated 
 
The above variables are used to calculate the qualitative functionality output using equations 1 to 6, 
which are further defined in chapter three (Section 4.3.1) (Cimellar et al., 2010). Simularily Hossain 
(2012) defines methodology for modelling coordination in emergency departments through social 
network analysis following disasters (Section 4.2.5) (Hossain et al., 2012). Cimellaro (2010) also 
contains methodology that aims to capture the influence of the hospital networks interconnecting road 
network. 
2.6.1.4 Holistic assessment methodology 
Fawcet et al., (2000) provided a regional model in “Casualty Treatment after Earthquake Disasters: 
Development of a Regional Simulation Model; Disasters 2000”, the models output estimates the 
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number of causalities under different scenarios in “Casualty Treatment after Earthquake Disasters: 
Development of a Regional Simulation Model”. The models inputs are; the quantity and localities of 
casualties rescued alive, the pre-earthquake hospital capacity, the post-earthquake hospital capacity, 
and the transport network (Fawcet. et al., 2000). The method outlined by De Boer et al., (1989) uses 
the number and severity of casualties as the model input to define a “numerical Medical Severity 
Index” (MSI) (De Boer. et al., 1989). Masi (2012) proposes vulnerability assessment methodology, 
the results of which help define seismic risk reduction strategies (Masi 2012) (defined in Section 
4.3.2). The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) (defined in Section 4.3.3) is similar to (Masi et 
al., 2012) in that it is a holistic assessment that includes the financial environment (PDNA 2010), 
2.7 Patient capacity redistribution 
2.7.1 Facilities evacuation and patient transfer 
Hospital evacuations are relatively common following large scale natural disasters. Examples include; 
the evacuations of the Ayub Medical College in Abbotabad following the Kashmir earthquake (EERI 
2006) (Section 2.4.2), the Tulane and Charity hospitals in New Orleans following hurricane Katrina 
(Section 2.5) (Berggren 2005), the Christian Hospital During the Mw 7.6 20
th
 of September, 1999 
Chi-Chi Earthquake and the M 6.8 26
th
 of September, 1999 aftershock (Section 2.5) (Lee 1999) and 
the San Salvatore Hospital following the M6.3 L’Aquila 6
th
 of April, 2009 earthquake (Section 2.5) 
(EEFIT 2009).  However, there are relatively few detailed accounts of hospital evacuations in the 
literature that consider the motives for evacuation, the decision process and the resulting capacity 
redistribution. Any of the factors mentioned in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 can cause facilities to be 
evacuated, although evacuation is considered a measure of last resort (FEMA 2007 ) following critical 
damage it is unavoidable. The process of evacuation itself is also vulnerable to disruption that can 
seriously aggravate the health and safety of patients and is a financially costly process (FEMA 2007 ). 
A study by the OSHPD (OSHPD 2009) suggested that even after moderate earthquakes, Californian 
hospitals may need to evacuate patients immediately because of nonstructural damage. The study 
found that delayed identification of structural damage may result in permanent closure of facilities 
even if they remained occupied immediately after the earthquake. Wards can be safely evacuated if 
the hospital has an effective emergency management plan and the damage is limited to elements not 
required for horizontal movement and vertical egress such as corridors, elevators and stairwells. The 
same study found nonstructural damage caused the greatest initial concern for patient safety (CHSSL 
2005). After the Northridge earthquake, six hospitals evacuated patients because nonstructural 
damage made the provision of healthcare unpractical and unsafe. The most disruptive of the 
nonstructural damage was caused by water leakage from ruptured, pipes, sprinklers, rooftop tanks, 
and other plumbing fixtures.  Similar findings were reported in hospitals damaged during the 
Hanshin–Awaji earthquake in 1995 (Ukai 1996).  
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Ukai also identified traffic congestion as a problem for patient transfers following hospital 
evacuations. Both the wide spread destruction of transport infrastructure and increased traffic are 
common after large earthquakes (Ukai 1996). Damage to transport infrastructure caused severe traffic 
congestion following the Hanshin–Awaji earthquake. Within an hour of the earthquake every main 
road in the disaster zone was jammed (Ukai 1996). The congestion delayed the arrival of relief teams 
from outside the city and complicated the transportation of casualties. The traffic congestion was 
compounded by the lack of adequate communication between hospitals. The combination of the 
aforementioned factors meant the transfer of severely injured patients from damaged hospitals was 
delayed. Miss-communication and transport issues meant that when the severity of the damage in 
Kobe was reported on TV news most of the hospitals in nearby Osaka freed up beds to receive large 
numbers of casualties. But in the first twelve hours only three patients were transferred to Osaka’s 
emergency centres (Ukai 1996). 
2.7.1.1 Factors influencing patient transfer  
The key factors that influence evacuation time include (HHS 2011): 
 Available exit routes within the hospital. 
 Available staff. 
 Available transportation resources. 
 Entry and egress points at the hospital. 
 Location of receiving care sites. 
 Number of patients and mix of patient acuity. 
 Patient transportation requirements. 
 Road and traffic conditions. 
The amount of assistance patients require during evacuation and/or transfer is dependent on their 
condition and location within the hospital. The patients in the following hospital units require the 
most assistance during transfer (HHS 2011): 
 Adult medical/surgical wards. 
 Adult ICU. 
 Bariatric patients.  
 Burn Unit or Burn ICU. 
 Dialysis patients. 
 Neonatal ICU. 
 Pediatric medical/surgical ("floor") wards. 
 Pediatric ICU. 
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 Psychiatric unit. 
 Patients restricted to negative pressure/isolation rooms. 
 Patients in prisons. 
 Other specialty care units. 
The availability of transport resources, staff, equipment, and supplies determine the extent and speed 
of patient transfers. The mode of transfer is critical in determining how long patient transfers take. In 
order to be effective the means of transfer must be properly equipped and staffed (HHS 2011). 
The location of the receiving facilities is determined by whether or not the hospitals in the entire 
region or city must be evacuated or just an individual hospital. If one hospital has to be evacuated 
patients can be more easily transferred to undamaged hospitals which are close by. In urban centers 
the distance of transfers is likely to be a distance of less than 15 kilometers. In this case ambulances 
can transfer patients easily with little need for helicopter and fixed wing transfers. If there is little 
residual capacity in the surrounding city or region patients will have to be transferred by fixed wing or 
helicopter to other regions (HHS 2011).  
Estimating transfer time is dependent on the variability of all the factors mentioned above. There are a 
wide variety of possible hospital evacuation times which are determined by different sets of 
assumptions based on the characteristics of the disaster and the Hospital network characteristics (HHS 
2011).  
2.7.2 Surge Capacity and Capacity Redistribution 
“Surge capacity” is the term used to describe the ability of a hospital or hospital network to surge the 
capacity to treat patients immediately after a disaster. Surge capacity is achieved by quickly freeing 
up the resources needed to treat and accommodate casualties following a mass casualty sudden onset 
disaster. The number of available beds in a facility is the principle means of defining “surge 
capacity”, however other resources must be made available including; staff, supplies and equipment. 
Hick et al., (2004) categorizes ‘‘surge’’ response into three areas (Hick et al., 2004).  
1. ‘‘Public health surge capacity’’ is the ability of the entire health system to increase capacity 
for patient care and other health services and cope with disruption. 
2. ‘‘Health care facility–based’’ and ‘‘community-based patient care surge capacity’’ refers to 
the ability of individual facilities to provide resources in order to deliver adequate acute 
medical care to the community. 
3. ‘Surge capability,’’ refers to the specialized healthcare resources required for specific groups 
of patients (Hick et al., 2004). 
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The capacity terminology includes both the physical resources and the organizational structure of 
individual facilities and the network as a whole. (Hick et al., 2004). Cimellaro et al., (2010) outlines 
an effective method for quantifying the capacity response of individual facilities by measuring the 
waiting time in the emergency department (Section 4.3) (Cimellaro et al., 2010). 
2.8 Conclusions  
The post disaster and risk assessment literature on hospital/ hospital network suggests that in areas 
with modern building codes, large earthquakes, and other disasters such as hurricanes, will cause 
damage to services and nonstructural components which are far more disruptive in the long term than 
structural damage. As nonstructural systems are comprised of more components than the structural 
system, the additional complexity and interdependency increases exposure, and can increase 
vulnerability and make restoration more difficult. However, in extreme cases, if structural damage is 
severe enough can permanently reduce the capacity of facilities, whereas nonstructural damage can 
usually be remediated with adapted but continued hospital operation – albeit with disruption. In some 
cases the nonstructural damage caused evacuations in hospitals following damage to pipes, sprinklers, 
rooftop tanks, and other plumbing. Evacuations are also initiated following damage to elements 
required for horizontal and vertical egress such as corridors, elevators and stairwells. 
The ability of hospitals to withstand seismicity is clearly related to the robustness of the national and 
regional anti-seismic design standards. The challenge of mitigating nonstructural damage is more 
difficult than that of structural components due to the number of elements that complete the systems. 
The inter relationships between the structural system and the nonstructural components is also of great 
concern, as in some cases undesirable positive feedback from the structural system has resulted in 
nonstructural damage. 
There are many challenges in indentifying a particular seismic hazards probable impact on the 
physical system and the expected performance of the organizational system. The literature contains a 
significant body of assessment methodology which is further analysed in Chapter Four.  The methods 
range from the holistic to very specific for all the components that define a hospital/hospital network. 
Both pre-disaster and post disaster fragility assessments are important in maintaining operational 
continuity. Because they define areas of fragility prior to a disaster or areas of fragility that have 
become apparent following a disaster that the existing assessment methodology did not find. In some 
cases nonstructural damage incorrectly assessed as structural damage triggered evacuations and 
capacity redistributions (Kashmir earthquake) (Section 2.5.2).   
In the literature hospital capacity following earthquakes is not only influenced by the physical damage 
but also the organizations response to the damage. As well, the national regional or individual hospital 
organizations’ quality and scope of pre disaster mitigation in the form of emergency plans, building 
codes and inter hospital/hospital network connections defines the impact of a seismic hazards. 
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Lifelines, supply networks and critical infrastructure although not directly part of hospitals and 
hospital networks also have the potential to impact hospital functionality. Both the wide spread 
destruction of transport infrastructure and increased traffic are common after large earthquakes. 
Traffic congestion is defined in the literature often as a problem for patient transfers following 
hospital evacuations. The loss of power and water often forces facilities to rely on backup systems 
that are less reliable and in some cases not big enough to supply noncritical systems such as air 






















3. Chapter Three: Impact of the Christchurch earthquake on the 
Canterbury healthcare system  
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of Chapter Three is to define how the Canterbury hospital network was prepared for seismic 
hazards in the short term and long term leading up to the Christchurch earthquake and define how the 
physical and organizational elements of the Christchurch hospital network performed following the 
Christchurch earthquake.  
The methodology of Chapter Three is firstly; to present data which for the key areas that make up 
hospitals and hospital networks which were identified in Chapter Two. Secondly, the raw data relating 
to the physical damage and capacity redistribution is processed in order to define the areas of the 
Canterbury hospital network that were resilient and the areas that hindered the response. As well, the 
data presented in Chapter Three is used for critiquing various seismic hazard vulnerability assessment 
methodologies in Chapter Four. Quantifying the affect of physical damage and the loss of lifelines on 
the capacity of Canterbury’s hospitals and the individual wards of Christchurch Hospital is used as a 
methodological approach for determining the affect the Christchurch earthquake had on the 
Canterbury Hospital network.  
3.1.2 Data collection methodology 
The data used in Chapter Three was collected during a Joint project between the University of 
Canterbury and Johns Hopkins University after being awarded a National Hazard Research Platform 
(NHRP) grant titled “Hospital Functions and Services”. Following the University of Canterbury/Johns 
Hopkins University collaboration, continued data collection was made possible with help from the 
Rhise network. 
The data collected during a University of Canterbury/Johns Hopkins collaboration included photos 
and surveys of structural, non-structural, equipment and lifeline damage that disrupted essential 
hospital functional areas and healthcare services. The impacts surveys include questions regarding the 
consequence for patient-care systems of losing any one or multiple functions in a hospital due to 
earthquake damage (McIntosh et al., 2012).  
The survey tool (Appendix A) was initially developed to assess the impact of the 27
th
 of February 
2010, Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake on the hospital network in Maule and Bío-Bío regions of Chile 
(Kirsch et al., 2010). The “Hospital Functions and Services” project adapted the survey tool to match 
the needs of the CDHB Health Care System based on feedback from relevant CDHB personnel. The 
survey tool was administered to several hospitals in the Canterbury region by way of interviews with 
key maintenance and clinical staff (Kirsch et al., 2010).  
46 
 
Following the initial data collection; media publications originating from CDHB and private hospital 
staff, CDHB resources and data from the Rhise network were collected. This data includes 
quantitative and qualitative information for structural, nonstructural, equipment, and lifeline damage 
and the redistribution of Canterbury hospital network treatment capacity in the two weeks following 
the Christchurch earthquake. 
3.2 The Christchurch Hospital Functional impact 
The Christchurch earthquake heavily impacted the Canterbury region’s healthcare system (Figure 
3.1). The main regional hospital, the Christchurch Hospital, sustained damage following the 
earthquake that severely strained the hospital’s ability to function at regular capacity. Christchurch 
Hospital is the largest hospital in Canterbury and operates the only Emergency Department (ED) and 
performs the majority of elective surgeries within Canterbury. The hospital serves a population of 
560,000 and the inpatient wards provide services to over 35,600 inpatients each year, of which 
approximately two-thirds are admitted acutely; a further 13,000 people are day patients. There are 
16,000 theatre visits each year and over 197,000 outpatient attendances, excluding those for radiology 
and laboratory services. The hospital operated 600-650 beds before the earthquake (Table 3.3), 
including 15 ICU beds, 18 high-dependency beds, and 9 step-down beds. Before the earthquake, the 




Figure 3.1: Map of hospitals within Christchurch and the surrounding area (Geonet). 
Christchurch Hospital is located on the western edge of Christchurch’s Central Business District 
(CBD) and is bordered by the Avon River and Riccarton Avenue. The hospital was built on lenses of 
liquefaction prone alluvium, during the Christchurch earthquake the site experienced peak ground 
acceleration of 0.547g (Geonet 2011a). The hospital’s proximity to the CBD and ability to provide 
emergency care meant it was at the centre of the emergency response. However, the area’s 
susceptibility to liquefaction and the exceedingly high ground acceleration caused structural and 
nonstructural damage in both clinical and non-clinical hospital facilities as well as lifelines and 
utilities damage (described in Sections 3.1 to 3.4). The resilience of the back-up systems that were 
operational and the resourcefulness of the clinical and non clinical staff insured the hospital continued 
to function and provide healthcare during the emergency response phase of this disaster (McIntosh et 
al., 2012) (Ardagh et al., 2012). 
3.2.1 Christchurch Hospital: Structure and Baseline Hospital Information 
Christchurch Hospitals buildings (Figure 3.2& 3.3) were constructed during different time periods 
using a variety of construction methods including concrete-shear-wall or reinforced-masonry which 
are further defined for each building in Chapter 4 (Table 4.4).The buildings include the Riverside 
Building (built in the 1970s), Parkside Building (built in late 80s to early 90s), the Diabetes Centre 
(built in late 1950s and early 1960s), the Christchurch Women’s Hospital (built in 2005) and the 
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Nurses Hostel (built in 1931). The Nurse hostel was vacant during the earthquake and scheduled for 
demolition (McIntosh et al., 2012).  All the medical services contained in the Christchurch Hospital 
buildings are divided into wards with different specialities (Table 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.2: Layout of Christchurch Hospital (CDHB 2012b). 
 
Figure 3.3: Christchurch Hospital in the lower right corner adjacent to the CBD and the Avon 
River, October 2012 (Photo is taken looking SE) (Christchurch City Council). 
The Christchurch Women’s Hospital building is the most recently constructed facility within the 
Christchurch Hospital. The structural frame is comprised of reinforced concrete precast beams and 
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columns, cast in situ mid-span joints, and pre-cast flooring units with timber infill and concrete 
topping to floors. The shear load is accommodated by steel K-braces at the buildings and by the 
exterior structure. The building is connected to the Parkside west building via three seismically 
controlled link-ways (CCANZ 2011). The concrete shear wall Parkside and Riverside buildings are 
older facilities with less modern anti seismic design characteristics, however they were still designed 
and built with seismic joints and regular plans. 
Table 3.1: Christchurch Hospital medical wards (Rhise network).  
Ward Description 
Ward 12  
Part of Christchurch Hospital’s Cardiology Department that admits patients directly from 
the Emergency Department. Specialises in the care of post coronary angioplasty patients, 
whereas the other Cardiology ward (Ward 26) caters for pacemakers and ablations. The ward 
consists of 30 beds, of which two are isolation rooms and 15 are telemetry units.  
Ward 14 Urology and Nephrology services but also accommodates excess from Cardiology. 
Ward 15 Acute/elective general surgical and vascular patients. 
Ward 16 (SARA) 
One of three surgical wards that take acute/elective patients. It compromises of two surgical 
wards: Ward 16 is a 16 bed General Surgical unit that specializes in the upper GI. The Surgical 
Assessment and Review Area (SARA) is a 12 bed unit that is situated in front of ward 16. The 
SARA is structured to provide an area where patients can be clinically assessed by the general 
surgical team. 
Ward 17 Deals with elective/ Colorectal and acute patient admissions. 
Ward 18 & 19 Orthopaedic wards consisting of 55 general ward beds and 5 Trauma unit beds. The ward 
exclusively provides services for acute trauma and spinal injury patients. 
Ward 20 
The Plastic Surgery and Reconstructive Unit (PSU) is comprised of a 30 bed ward and adjoining 
Plastic Surgery Outpatients department. The PSU is also the Regional Burn Unit (RBU) for the 
whole South Island with the exception of the Nelson / Marlborough DHB. The ward specialises 
in Plastic Surgery, Reconstruction, Maxillofacial, Burns and all acute hand injuries. All Adult 
patients are admitted to ward 20, whereas Paediatric patients are admitted to wards 21 and 22. 
However, the PSU outpatients department deals with both paediatric and adult outpatients. Ward 
20 operates with a high turnover although the numbers of short stay patients have decreased after 
the 23 hour unit was introduced on the May 9, 2011 which has a capacity of 6-8 patients and is 
currently located in the Preoperative Suite. Ward 32 (ENT) is co located within ward 20 
following the Canterbury earthquakes. The current redevelopment program aims to replace the 
ENT / 23 hour unit and the plastics OPD by early 2013. 
Ward 23 Acute General Medicine, Rheumatology and immunology Ward. 
Ward 25 
 27 bed Respiratory that caters to patients with exacerbations of Asthma as well as 
Pneumothoracies and Pleural Effusions which require chest drainage. Patients are admitted either 
to Ward 25 acutely or as pre arranged admissions.  
Ward 26 
25 bed cardiology ward that specialises on Electrophysiology studies, Pacemaker/AICD 
insertions. The ward also provides facilities to monitor cardiology patients, patients are either 
admitted directly from the ED or via the catheterization Laboratory. 
Ward 27 Oncology has 25 beds, it provides specialized facilities for Oncology services.  
Ward 28 
Neurology & Neurosurgery has 28 beds and specializes in Neurology and Neurosurgery. The 
ward includes 4 Progressive Care beds for post-operative craniotomy and spinal surgery, head 
injury, neurological patients who must be invasively monitored. 
Ward 29 Acute medical and gastroenterology ward situated on the 4th floor of the Riverside building. The 




Ward 30 An acute medical ward that provides facilities for the treatment of Infectious Diseases. The ward 
has 29 beds, with a layout of 5 multi bed rooms and 6 single rooms. 
Ward 31 Acute 27 bed general, medical ward which includes a 15 bed acute stroke unit. 
Ward 32 ENT and EYES but also caters for a variety of other specialties. 
CCU The Coronary Care Unit is an 8 bed special unit with an emergency procedures room that can 
cater to patients suffering from life-threatening cardiac events and require close observation. 
MDU The Medical Day Unit accommodates pre and post procedure patients and other patients which 
require full treatment such as IV infusion. 
BMTU 
The South Island Bone Marrow Transplant Unit specialises in haematological disorder treatment. 
ODU The Oncology Day Unit is associated with the Oncology, Haematology and Palliative 
departments that reside within the medical/surgical division of the CDHB. 
CTW Cardiothoracic Ward specialises in cardiac and thoracic surgery.  
OOD 
The Orthopaedic Outpatients Department has approximately 38,000 presentations per year one 
third of which are acute injuries. Ward admissions also include acute presentations which are 
triaged from the ED or sent in via GPs, After Hour Surgeries and other centres.  
POD The Parkside Outpatients department consists of clinical rooms, offices, a biopsy theatre and a 
PUVA treatment area. 
ED Emergency Department  
ICU Intensive care unit 
SPCU The Surgical Progressive Care Unit is responsible for the treatment of un-well surgical patients 
(CDHB. 2012b). 
OTU Orthopaedic Trauma Unit 
EO Emergency observation 
CWH Christchurch Women’s Hospital incorporates a day surgery unit seven operating theatres, 33 bed 
gynaecological Unit (GYU) and obstetric services and a 37 bed neo-natal intensive care unit.  
GSD Gastro Day Ward 
NED CWH Labour Ward  
NEL Lincoln Babies 
NEM Maternity Babies 
NIC Neonatal Intensive Care  
NSC Neonatal Special Care  
OBD CWH Labour Ward  
OBM Maternity Ward  
 
3.2.2 Geotechnical and Structural Damage  
Geotechnical failures on the Christchurch hospital site caused facilities damage in some areas. 
Liquefaction induced lateral spreading caused the Avon River retaining walls on the south and eastern 
boundaries of the hospital to fail. The lateral spreading also caused severe sewage pipe line damage in 
areas close to the Avon River. Liquefaction caused flooding in all the clinical building basements to 
varying degrees. The worst flooding was in the Parkside and Riverside buildings basements as well as 
the lifelines tunnel that connects the clinical facilities to the non-clinical facilities across Riccarton 
Avenue, which was flooded in up to half a meter of liquefied sediment and water. There was also 
liquefaction induced land deformation on the banks of the Avon River which the Generator Building 
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is situated adjacent to. Land remediation was required in order to secure the areas of the Avon River 
bank which threaten the generator buildings (Stylianou 2012). 
 
There were no local or global structural failures of any clinical or non-clinical buildings on the 
Christchurch Hospital campus. However, structural damage to the underground lifelines tunnel 
mentioned above caused the tunnel to be unusable for at least 5 months. Two nonclinical 
administrative buildings on St. Asaph Street also had to be closed; one closure was due to damage to 
inadequate roof to wall bracing. Spalled concrete beams and columns and cracked steel K-beams 
caused the closure of the hospital’s car parking building (Figure 3.4). The Boiler house on St Asaph 
street was about to be seismically upgraded prior to the Darfield earthquake. The building was 
damaged during the Christchurch earthquake however the damage was remediated by reinforcing K 
walls. The adjoining 55 meter high Boiler stack had to be demolished when structural damage was 
identified (Stylianou 2012). 
  
Figure 3.4: (A) A spalled concrete column inside the Christchurch Hospital car parking 
building. (B) Cracking in car parking building K beam (Bavis 2011). 
Minor structural damage was also evident in the Riverside Building when shear wall cracking was 
discovered some of the cracks went all the way through the wall (Figure 3.5). However, these were 
fixed relatively easily with epoxy resin. In the Riverside building critical structural weaknesses were 
indentified in three of the structures that make up the Riverside building. The buildings only met 
about 40 per cent of the building code, which was introduced May 2012 (Stylianou 2012). All clinical 
buildings suffered roof damage; however the damage did not warrant closures. In some cases the 
separation joints of between 100mm and 150 mm were not large enough to accommodate the 




out of service for significant repairs, as well some structural walls and floors in the Parkside buildings 
needed to be injected with resin (Stylianou 2012). 
 
Figure 3.5: Damaged shear wall panels Riverside building, Christchurch Hospital. 
 
In New Zealand hospitals and other critical buildings are categorised in AS/NZ 1170.0 (SNZ 2004) 
with the “importance Level 4”. The code requirements are implemented to insure that critical 
buildings remain operational under the 500 year serviceability limit state for SLS2 earthquakes 
(Section 2.3.2) (Uma & Beattie 2010). Christchurch Hospital was most likely mitigated from severe 
structural damage because the buildings were predominantly rectangular with no abrupt vertical 
discontinuities; no L- or T- shaped structures and no large overhangs. The separation joints within the 
structures and the base isolation of the CWH were also mitigating factors. A number of older 
nonclinical buildings on Antigua Street were seismically upgraded prior to the Christchurch 
earthquake and thus they were only minimally damaged. The Foundations of the Diabetes Building 
sank at one end; as well assessments as of the 2
nd
 of March, 2012 identified structural vulnerability in 
beams, walls and reinforcing steel (CDHB 2012f). 
3.2.3 Nonstructural Damage 
The effects of nonstructural damage, services damage and transportation network damage along with 
disruption to supply chains and the organizational structure were far more disruptive to the provision 
of healthcare at Christchurch Hospital than the minor structural damage. The nonstructural damage 
affected an array of components that are essential for providing continued healthcare. 
The failures of tongue-and-groove jointed, plaster tiled suspended ceilings were one of the most 
disruptive forms of nonstructural damage to afflict the functionality of Christchurch Hospital (Figure 
3.6). The suspended ceiling tiles were designed as thick and heavy fire barriers. The weight of the 
tiles made them dangerous falling hazards when the ties holding them in place were damaged. The 
tiles were diagonally braced to the walls when they were first built. However, after they were initially 
constructed the diagonal ties were replaced with less seismically resistant vertical ties. The damaged 
tiles’ either fell out completely or sagged in place, in some cases the sagging had to be identified by 
laser level analysis. The weight and damage susceptibility of the old tiles meant they had to be 
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replaced with lightweight less dangerous tiles which were clipped to ceiling grids and diagonally 
braced. Fuses and light fittings also had to be replaced along with the ceiling tiles. In order to repair 
the ceilings, parts of Christchurch Hospital had to be closed for periods ranging from hours to days. 
The majority of the inpatient wards were disrupted for at least two weeks while the tiles were 
replaced, but in some cases repairs had to be carried out months after the earthquake because the 
repairs took a lot of planning in order to minimize disruption. Along with the ceiling tiles many light 
fittings had to be replaced at the same time as the tiles after becoming dislodged from the ceiling tiles 
during the Christchurch earthquake.  
In some areas of the hospital non-load bearing partition walls were also badly damaged. The damage 
was mostly cosmetic and did not cause the immediate loss of functionality. However, the damaged 
areas have had to be shut down in order to be repaired in the months after the earthquake. Along with 
plaster wall damage; concrete wall damage, glazing damage and ceilings damage caused the Diabetes 
Centre to close for one month for repairs. Broken glazing was also an issue for other areas of 
Christchurch Hospital.  
Most staircases in the clinical buildings had cosmetic cracking along the walls because the 
connections to the adjacent floors were too rigid. The stairs had to be propped up in order to remain 
operational during the emergency phase as they are critical for vertical egress. The staircases were 
later closed one at a time during the recovery phase to be repaired. Power outages described in Table 
4.2 meant that emergency lights in some stairwells that were used to evacuate patients failed to work. 
Most of the hospitals traction elevators were not functional for up to two hours because the seismic 
switches activated and forced the traction mechanisms to lock the counter weights, they all had to be 
checked before they could be reactivated (the same situation occurred at Princess Margaret’s 
Hospital). All elevators were traction elevators, except for a hydraulic elevator in the kitchen. The loss 
of both stairs and elevators complicated the hospitals functions during the emergency phase. 
However, the disruption failed to impede staff and patients, in some cases staff carried patients with 
torches through stairwells that lost emergency lighting (Section 3.5). 
Most of all the pumps and chillers which were kept in rooftop plant rooms jumped off their mounts 
following strong shaking; however the snubbers (seismic braces) were not damaged. In the CWH 
piping for the condenser collapsed because chillers moved.  The pumps and chillers were on seismic 
mounts in accordance with the current NZ seismic standard NZS 4219:2009 (SNZ 2009). NZS 
4219:2009 provides the seismic design guidelines and the required performance levels for the 
engineering systems mentioned above. The code is structured to ensure engineering systems in 
hospitals are operational under a serviceability level earthquake (Clause 2.4, SNZ 2009).  
The River Side Building was extensively disrupted by the effects of nonstructural damage, perhaps 
more than any other clinical building on the hospital campus. The building is a Level three building 
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designed to protect life but not be functional after 475 year return period earthquake. The 
nonstructural damage to internal and external roof coverings and roof top water tanks caused water to 




 floors of the Riverside building. Precast concrete panels were also damaged 
throughout the building and have caused disruption during the recovery phase.The water damage 





 floors had no horizontal egress so the patients had to be evacuated via the stairwells as explained 
below in Section 3.5. The loss of clinical space in the Riverside building has been the only permanent 
loss of capacity at Christchurch Hospital (Section 3.3.1).  
 
Figure 3.6: Damage to nonstructural ceiling tiles in Christchurch Hospital. 
3.2.4 Internal and external services damage 
During the Christchurch earthquake all of the Christchurch Hospital lifelines were damaged to 
varying degrees (Table 3.2). The water, wastewater and power networks were all completely un-
operational (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). The hospitals internal systems such as suction and back-up 
power were also partially or completely lost for various periods of time. The loss of power was the 
most severe internal and external lifeline outage, both the Parkside and Riverside Buildings lost power 
for one and a half hours. The hospital had back-up generators with a total of 1.5 Megawatts of 
capacity and one and a half days of fuel stock, the generators were regularly tested roughly every two 
weeks. However, some of these generators malfunctioned or were damaged (Table 3.2), which 
affected the immediate functionality of the emergency power supply system. For example, the oil 
pressure gauge on the Riverside generator broke during the earthquake, which caused that generator to 
shut down immediately. The 1000 KvA caterpillar Parkside building generator initially ran for a 
couple of hours, but stopped working because of clogged filters due to sediment in the tanks that had 
been disturbed by the ground shaking. The filters were replaced and the fuel pumps were re-primed 
with some trouble by syphoning fuel from a groundskeeper’s car. In addition, shortages to the main 
low-voltage switchboard caused small fires, damaging the main electrical panel and further 
complicating the power restoration efforts.  
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Damage to water and sewage systems, including fire sprinkler systems, also proved a major obstacle. 
Broken sewage pipes had to be replaced. After the pipes were fixed and re-pressurized new leaks were 
found and the pipes had to be drained and replaced. Main water was out completely for two days, and 
full water pressure was not restored for a week. The hospital had back-up water supplies (<1 day’s 
worth), and access to artesian wells, but these did not prove entirely sufficient. Some water could be 
successfully extracted from the boreholes immediately after the earthquake. However, the silt content 
in that water was initially too high, which caused issues in moving the water from the ground to the 
storage tanks as well. Even when this issue was resolved, the water from the borehole could not be 
used for drinking because it was feared to be contaminated. As well the pressure was too low to 
pressurize the fire sprinklers because the well was too small. The hospital used bottled water for the 
first few days after the earthquake.  
The lack of water impaired other systems as well, including the fire sprinklers, which could not be 
pressurized. In order to prevent this situation from occurring in any future disasters, a ½ million-litre 
capacity tank system was installed after a few days to provide emergency water for crucial systems, 
including the fire sprinklers. Fortunately, there were no major fires after the event yet the fire alarms 
were activated because smoke detectors detected dust from damaged nonstructural components. The 
alarm had to be turned off after the constant sound became an annoyance to clinical staff.  
The Riverside building suction network was damaged and un-functional for 30 minutes; the network 
was quickly restored by connecting the Riverside suction systems to the Parkside suction systems via 
a bypass in CWH. The Riverside suction network required continued remediation work during the 
response phase. The medical gases network also continued to be operational however maintenance 
staff later conducted ultra sonic testing and found some leakage.  
Christchurch Hospitals IT system was not lost except for the brief period when it was restarted 
because of the power outage. Some of the clinical machinery locked up after the strong shaking and 
had to be recalibrated and restarted, however none were physically damaged. The Sterilizers were all 
braced and did not cease to operate, however they had to re-circulate the same water for some time. 
The Steam mains were not damaged but had to be taken out of service while they were fitted with new 




Table 3.2: Summary functional loss by hospital (Y) yes, (N) no (Kirsch et al) 
      
Hospital 



































































































































Electricity Y(1.5hr) Y(1.5dy) Y(4hr) Y(1wk) Y Y N Y(4dy) Y(1dy) Y Y Y 
Back up 
electricity N Y(1.5dy) N Y(1wk) N(4dy) - N - N - - 
- 
Water Y(1wk) Y(<1dy) Y(12hr) Y(1wk) Y(14dy) N N Y(5dy) Y(3dy) Y Y Y 
Sewer N N Y(2wk) N Y(3dy) N N - N - - - 




Computers N - N - N - N - N - -  
Medical 
gases N - N - Y(4dy) - N - N - Y 
Y 
Suction Y(30min) - N - Y(3dy) N N - NA NA NA NA 
Total 














3.3 Impact on Hospital Functionality and Residual Capacity of Health 
Care Delivery Emergency Response and Medical Evacuations at 
Christchurch Hospital 
The day of the Christchurch earthquake (22
nd
 of February, 2011) Christchurch Hospital admitted and 
dealt with 160 casualties. The triage after the earthquake was set up in the parking lot in front of the 
Emergency Department. There were no deaths related to the Christchurch earthquake in Christchurch 
hospital post earthquake patients or staff, though four staff members were injured during the 
evacuation of some of the hospital wards. Evacuations of sick or injured patients are potentially 
dangerous events under any circumstances, but are particularly risky when moving a large group of 
patients with limited personnel, no power, and no elevators.   
The darkness of the stairwells and the unavailability of elevators (Section 3.3) made evacuation very 
difficult. Most patients were able to walk down on their own, but some had to be carried down five to 
six flights of stairs in the dark. Many patients and some staff self-evacuated after the earthquake to 
areas perceived as safer locations outside the buildings. The third floor of the Riverside Building was 
evacuated in a subsequent phase. All evacuations after the initial Riverside evacuation were by 
horizontal egress routes. These evacuations were triggered by failures of suspended ceilings, the lack 
of functionality of the fire sprinkler system, and the lack of sufficient pressure in the back up water 
system (Section 3.2.3). A total of 350 patients were evacuated from the hospital overall. The Oxford 
Clinic, a general practice located nearby on Oxford terrace evacuated to Christchurch Hospital.  
Supplies and non-clinical services were mostly undamaged. The kitchen maintained its functionality, 
guarantying the provision of food. However, the laundry was shipped out for two days because of 
short-staffing and lack of water; half of the laundry was handled by Timaru Hospital during this time. 
Drinking water was provided in bottles brought by a private company. The pharmacy did not run out 
of pharmaceuticals, blood products, dressings, splints, surgical supplies, or other any other treatment 
supplies. Similarly, there was no loss or shortage of lab supplies, radiological supplies, or other 
diagnostic supplies. Two off-site laboratories used by the hospital, one of which was located in the 
CBD, were shut down, but the onsite laboratory remained functional. All the shelves containing the 
medical records tipped over. 
3.3.1 Short-term Losses of Health Care Capacity at Christchurch Hospital 
The hospital never closed completely, the adult wards on the 4th and 5th floors of the Riverside 
building were the only closures during the quake (wards 29, 30, 31 and 32), making 106 adult medical 
beds unusable out of a normal 650 beds (CDHB 2012a) (Table 3.3) (or a 17% loss in capacity). The 
surge capacity of the selected facilities in Christchurch immediately after the Christchurch earthquake 
is summarised in Table 3.3 
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One child assessment unit had to be temporarily repurposed to treat adults. Twelve ICU patients were 
evacuated to other ICUs in Dunedin, Nelson and the North Island. There were 25 ICU patients after 
the earthquake, but only 16 beds. In order to generate capacity stable patients were evacuated by air to 
the Wellington Hospital ICU (table 3.3, 3.4 & 3.6). And other patients were steeped down to the 
Christchurch Hospital recovery wards. The ICU did not have to deal with burns patients because the 
burns casualties died at the site (CTV) and never had to prioritize the treatment of patients in the ICU 
and ED. Only two earthquake causalities died within the hospital ICU. Four other patients were 
deceased upon arrival. The Hospital did not admit many alcohol related patients in the days after the 
earthquake as the CBD bars were closed. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of hospital capacity following the Christchurch earthquake (Kirsch et al) 






































































522 - - - (-) 44 522/650 
Princess Margaret's 
 
109 155 109 1 (+)47 109/109 
St George's 
 
80 0 52 52 0 80/101 
Kaikoura 
 
26 26 15 0 (+) 3 26/ 26 
Akaroa 
 
8 8 8 8 (+) 8 8/8 
Ellesmere 
 
10 10 8 0 (+) 3 10/10 
 
Following the Christchurch earthquake three wards at Christchurch Hospital were un-operational 
(ward’s 29, 30 and 31) (Table 3.1). Christchurch Hospital was severely strained during the winter of 
2011 as a result of cold weather, earthquake induced deprivation and poor housing. An increase in 
respiratory and cardiology admissions were also anticipated based on experiences after the Darfield 
earthquake (CDHB 2012a). Burwood birthing unit staff were deployed to Christchurch Woman’s 
Hospital while the Burwood birthing unit was closed for two weeks due to earthquake damage.  
  
Christchurch Hospital increased support to the Adult Medical Assessment Unit (AMAU) and the 
Surgical Assessment Review Area (SARA) ward in order to streamline the assessment and discharge 
processes. The actions increased the patient flow from the ED to the AMAU. The strain on the ED 
was relieved by directly referring GP patients to the AMAU and SARA and sending Ambulance and 




The Orthopaedic Rehabilitation ward was closed for extensive nonstructural repairs and was 
accommodated in the Surgical Orthopaedic ward (; however this strained both wards capacity (CDHB 
2012a). Following the 22
nd
 of February, 2011outpatient appointments increased from an average of 
around 4% before the earthquake to around 6.5% after. The Lyndhurst day facility and Christchurch 
Hospitals Oral Health Centre facilities had to be transferred. As well Christchurch Hospitals ENT 
(Ear, Nose and Throat)/ophthalmology ward was unable to operate for a period of time (CDHB 
2012a). 
 
Christchurch hospital stopped all elective surgery and outpatient services immediately after the 
emergency in order to surge capacity. This decision greatly reduced the number of patients in the 
clinical buildings. There were approximately 320 inpatients in the hospital after 24 hours, 270 after 72 
hours, and 400 after 7 days, Table 3.6 summarises the ward relocations and Table 3.3 summarises the 


















Table 3.4: Hospital transfers to and from Christchurch’s hospitals between 22
nd
 of February, 2011and 
8
th
 of March, 2011 (Rhise network). 
Hospital 



































BWD birthing 0 1 1 
Christchurch 387 35 -352 
Hillmorton 0 4 4 
Parklands hospital 0 1 1 
PMH 0 71 71 
Rosewood rest home 0 1 1 
Parkside Rest home 0 1 1 
St Georges 0 1 1 











Ashburton 14 29 15 
Darfield 1 4 3 
Ellesmere 0 2 2 
Kaikoura 1 0 -1 
Lincoln 0 51 51 
Oxford 1 3 2 
Rangiora 1 57 56 
Timaru 0 22 22 
Waikari 1 4 3 










Grey 0 3 3 
Nelson 0 10 10 
Southland 0 2 2 
Wairau 0 1 1 
Buller 0 1 1 







HAS 0 1 1 
Hawke’s Bay 0 1 1 
Middlemore 0 2 2 
Napier 0 1 1 
North Shore 0 2 2 
Tauranga 0 7 7 
Waikato 0 4 4 
Wellington 0 17 17 
Unknown 0 5 5 -  
Undocumented 18 18 0 - 
Total 455 457 2 - 
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Akaroa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ashburton 3 3 10 6 4 3 0 0 5 3 2 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Auckland city  0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burwood 7 2 10 4 5 3 19 10 9 7 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 5 3 
BWD birthing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CWH 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Darfield 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dunedin 1 1 8 5 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ellesmere 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grey 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawke’s Bay 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hillmorton 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Kaikoura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lincoln 0 0 2 2 10 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 0 0 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 10 4 0 0 4 2 
Middlemore 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Napier 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nelson 0 0 2 2 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Shore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Oxford 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parklands  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PMH 14 3 6 3 2 2 8 5 5 3 1 1 5 3 6 4 5 5 8 6 6 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Rangiora 4 2 4 3 6 2 0 0 11 4 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 3 4 2 10 5 6 4 0 0 4 2 
Rosewood  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southland 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 






































































































































































































































































Timaru 0 0 8 7 7 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Waikari 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Waikato 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wairau 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wellington 0 0 9 6 3 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
St Georges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buller 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 32 14 71 45 46 29 46 30 39 26 13 10 11 9 20 16 18 14 24 17 21 13 17 9 2 2 17 11 
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Christchurch Hospital’s nuclear medicine and clinical engineering operations were undamaged, but 
the unit had staffing problems. The Dialysis Centre closed for repairs after the earthquake, though it 
moved and reopened elsewhere. Outpatient services were lost for one day after the earthquake, and 
reduced for the next two weeks. Rehabilitation and physical therapy were also lost for the first day 
and partially down for a week.  
There were more clinical staff than needed immediately after the earthquake, because off duty staff 
arrived to help. The Hospital also received staff from the North Island and South Island’s West Coast 
in the weeks after the Christchurch earthquake. Many staff were reluctant to leave the hospital in the 
hours after the earthquake when compulsory leave was instated.  Senior staff identified staff fatigue as 
a possible future issue when the long term affects of stress caused by the earthquake became apparent. 
As well the large quantity of volunteers that offered to assist the hospital became disruptive to clinical 
staff.  
The immediate capacity redistribution and there mode of transport for the Canterbury hospital 
network is quantified in Tables (3.5 & 5.1). Christchurch Hospital’s individual ward capacity 
redistribution for the short term, medium term and long term are quantified in Table 3.6. Analysis of 
the Christchurch Hospital capacity data shows that the Medical Day Unit (MDU), Christchurch 
Women’s maternity wards (NED, NEM, OBD & OBM)  account for a large portion of the immediate 
transfers (151/387) (Table 3.5 & Table 3.7). The five wards were not severely damaged; therefore the 
patients were transferred in large numbers to reduce demand on the hospital and were able to be 
transferred because they were relatively stable. The MDU and certain maternity wards had large 
numbers of patients that were discharged at the request of the patients and of clinical staff.  
The total number of orthopaedic patients 107 orthopaedic patients were admitted over the five days 
following the February, 22, 2011 earthquake, 65 of which were admitted on the first day. The mass 
casualty incident response framework and a major external incident plan helped the facilities (ASMS 
2012). In Christchurch immediately after the Christchurch earthquake 516 elderly care patients were 
evacuated and transferred from residential care homes. 298 patients were transferred to other aged 
care facilities outside of Christchurch, 194 were transferred to other facilities in Christchurch and 18 
were accommodated by family (14 within Christchurch and 4 elsewhere). One patient was admitted to 
Christchurch hospital and died within 24 hours, and 5 patients were lost during the follow up period. 
Initially elderly care patients from residential care homes were transferred to other areas in the south 
island, but then they ran short of beds so they had to transfer patients to the north island (CDHB 
2012c).   
3.3.2 Long-Term Rebalancing of Canterbury Health System  




) (Table 3.5) to date 
has been the only permanent loss of capacity at Christchurch Hospital. Due to the lack of horizontal 
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egress and the presence of only a single stairwell, the decision was made to permanently change the 
use of those floors from clinical wards to administrative space. The capacity was accommodated at 
Princess Margaret’s Hospital, also another 10 beds at Ashburton Hospital were created to 
accommodate long-term care. 
 
Initiatives like the Medication Management Service (MMS), Community Rehabilitation Enablement 
Support Teams (CREST) and elective surgery outsourcing have reduced the pressure on Christchurch 
Hospital. Elective surgery at Christchurch Hospital resumed on the 7
th
 of March, 2011. During 2011 
approximately 500 elective surgeries such as hip replacements were contracted out to the private 
hospitals Southern Cross and St Georges under the “Electives Recovery Programme” which will 
continue up to at least 2013 (CDHB 2012a). The CDHB predicted a shortfall of 740 elective surgery 
cases during 2011, down 5 per cent on the annual target (The Press 2011). CREST catered to 829 
patients in the nine months up to the 31
st
 of March, 2012. MMS had 78 community pharmacists 
operating as of the 1
st
 of May, 2012 (CDHB 2012). Christchurch Hospital and Princess Margaret 
Hospital initiated a process that tracks the status of beds within the CDHB on a daily basis (CDHB 
2012e). 
Christchurch Hospital’s capacity over the 18 months following the Christchurch earthquake is 
quantified in Tables 3.5 and 3.7. The data reveals the quantity of immediate transfers of patients 
following the earthquakes and the wards the patients were transferred from. The ward capacity data 
was retrieved from the CDHB on August 21, 2012 which in some cases may not be exactly the same 
as the ward capacity immediately before the Christchurch earthquake.  The 20th of August, 2011 ward 
location data was retrieved form Bruce Hall the emergency planner for Christchurch Hospital. 
Approximately 70% of the transfers for the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake were in 
the first week (Table 3.5). However, the data doesn’t include discharges, which were significant 
immediately after the earthquake.  The data presented in Table 3.5 shows that the surging of capacity 
was quick with the largest portion of transfers occurring in the day after the earthquake. The mode of 
transfer within the Canterbury regional Hospital network was by road and helicopter, the 20 patients 
from the top two floors of the Riverside building were transferred by truck. Whereas all the transfers 




Table 3.6: Transfers from Christchurch Hospital wards between 22
nd
 of February, 2011and the 8
th
 of March, 2011 for earthquake related injuries and non 































































































Ward 12 Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor 7 0 30 
Ward 14 Parkside West 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside West 3
rd
 Floor Parkside West 3
rd
 Floor 4 0 25 
Ward 15 Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor 3 0 24 
Ward 16 Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor 5 0 16 
Ward 17 Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor 6 3 30 
Ward 18 Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor 15 15 60 
Ward 19 Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor 15 7 - 
Ward 20 Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor 6 3 30 
Ward 21 Riverside G Floor  CWH & GYN Riverside G Floor 0 0 - 
Ward 22 Riverside G Floor  CWH & GYN Riverside G Floor 0 0 - 
Ward 23 Riverside 1
st
 Floor  Riverside 1
st
 Floor Riverside 1
st
 Floor 16 2 - 
Ward 24 -  - Riverside 0 0 - 
Ward 25 Riverside 2
nd
 Floor  ICU + PACU Riverside 2
nd
 Floor 6 1 27 
Ward 26 Riverside 2
nd
 Floor  GASTRO Riverside 2
nd
 Floor 15 1 25 
Ward 27 Riverside 3
rd
 Floor  SARA Riverside 3
rd
 Floor 4 0 25 
Ward 28 Riverside 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor Riverside 3
rd
 Floor 17 2 28 
Ward 29 Riverside 4
th
 Floor  PMH, Gastroenterology WD26 PMH, Gastroenterology WD26 10 0 27 
Ward 30 Riverside 4
th
 Floor  PMH, infectious diseases WD23 PMH, infectious diseases WD23 10 0 29 
Ward 31 Riverside 5
th
 Floor  PMH, closed to outpatients PMH closed to outpatients 2 0 27 
Ward 32 Riverside 5
th
 Floor  - Parkside East 3rd Floor WD20 0 0 22 
MDU Parkside West G Floor  Parkside West G Floor Parkside West G Floor 21 0 6 (15 chair) 

































































































NEM Chch Women’s  Chch Women’s Chch Women’s 29 0 - 
OBD Chch Women’s  Chch Women’s Chch Women’s 35 0 - 
OBM Chch Women’s  Chch Women’s Chch Women’s 37 0 - 
AMAU Riverside 1
st
 Floor  Parkside West OPD Riverside 1
st
 Floor 3 0 - 
CICU Parkside East 1
st
 Floor  Parkside East 1
st
 Floor Parkside East 1
st
 Floor 1 1 - 
ICU Parkside East 1
st
 Floor  Parkside East 1
st
 Floor Parkside East 1
st
 Floor 7 7 18 
NEL -  - Chch Women’s 1 0 - 
NIC Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor  Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor 9 0 - 
SPCU Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor Parkside East 2
nd
 Floor 3 0 6 
BMTU Riverside Lower G Floor  DOSA Riverside LG Floor 1 0 15 
CTW Parkside East 1
st
 Floor  Parkside East 1
st
 Floor Parkside East 1
st
 Floor 3 0 10 
OTU Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor  Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor 1 3 - 
SARA -  - Parkside East 2nd Floor 1 1 - 
EO Parkside East 1st Floor  Parkside East 1st Floor Parkside East 1st Floor 2 1 10 
GSD -  - Riverside 4th Floor 1 0 - 
NSC Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor  Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor Chch Women’s 4
th
 Floor 9 1 - 
GYU Chch Women’s  Chch Women’s Chch Women’s 1 0 33 
CHOC Riverside G Floor  Chch Women’s Riverside G Floor - - - 
OOD Parkside East 3
rd
 Floor  - - - - - 
ODU -  - - - - - 
CCU Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor 1 0 8 
UU Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor  Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor Parkside West 2
nd
 Floor 1 0 - 
DOSA -  - Parkside West 1st  Floor 0 0 - 
OPD -  - - - - - 





340 48 - 
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Table 3.7: Patients transferred from Christchurch Hospital wards in the two weeks following the 

























































































































AMAU 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BMTU 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CICU 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CTW 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EO 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
GSD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GYU 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ICU 0 13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MDU 2 14 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NED 1 1 5 1 4 3 0 0 4 0 3 3 0 4 
NEM 2 0 5 0 5 1 1 3 0 4 3 5 0 0 
NEL 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NIC 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
NSC 0 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
OBD 2 1 6 2 5 4 0 1 4 0 3 3 0 4 
OBM 2 2 5 3 5 2 1 3 0 4 3 5 0 1 
OUT 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SARA 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SPCU 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UU 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 12 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 14 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Wd 15 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Wd 16 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 17 0 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Wd 18 1 7 1 6 7 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Wd 19 1 3 2 6 2 0 2 0 2 5 0 0 0 3 
Wd 20 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 23 0 0 0 3 4 0 2 3 1 2 2 0 0 1 
Wd 25 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
Wd 26 0 2 3 0 0 0 3 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Wd 27 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Wd 28 1 6 1 4 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Wd 29 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 30 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wd 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  33 75 46 48 39 17 11 20 18 25 20 17 2 16 
Percentage 8.5 19.3 11.9 12.4 10.1 4.4 2.8 5.2 4.6 6.4 5.2 4.4 0.5 4.4 
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3.4 Physical and Functional Impact on the Canterbury hospital network 
Canterbury’s Hospital network is comprised of 29 publicly and privately operated hospitals (Table 
3.8) including public private and elderly care hospitals and seven rural Regional Hospitals which each 
contain less than 20 beds. The publicly owned hospitals provide the majority of secondary and tertiary 
medical care. A smaller not-for-profit private hospital sector specializes mainly in elective surgery 
and long-term care. The private hospitals are operated directly or subsidised by the Canterbury 
District Health Board (Health, M. O. 2011). The “third sector” providers, made of non-profit non-
government organizations (Health, M. O. 2011), offer other services, including general practitioners 
(GPs), nursing homes, and ambulance service. Following the Canterbury earthquakes, damage to 
facilities and lifelines placed considerable strain upon the Canterbury health care system, specifically 
Christchurch’s network of private/public hospitals, GPs, and elderly care facilities. To cope with 
demand, the health system has had to utilize the entire health network’s capacity. 
Table 3.8: Canterbury Hospital network (Rhise network) 
Hospital name Location Type  Function 
Akaroa Community Hospital  Akaroa Public/regional Maternity, rehabilitation & general medical 
Ashburton and Rural Hospital Ashburton Public Maternity, medical, gynaecology and surgery 
Bethesda Hospital Christchurch Private Elderly 
Bidwill Trust Hospital  Timaru Private Elderly 
Burwood Hospital Christchurch Public Rehabilitation & elective surgery 
Canterbury Charity Hospital  Christchurch Community Elderly 
Cashmere View Hospital  Christchurch Private Elderly 
Christchurch Hospital  Christchurch Public 
Paediatrics, ED, ICU, Cancer treatment, 
oncology, maternity, general medical & elective 
surgery  
Christchurch Women's Hospital  Christchurch Public Maternity 
Darfield Hospital Darfield Public/regional 
Elderly, surgical rehabilitation, medical & 
maternity 
Ellesmere Hospital Ellesmere Public/regional 
Elderly, Surgical Rehabilitation and general 
medical 
Hillmorton Hospital Christchurch Public Psychiatric 
Kaikoura Hospital Kaikoura Public/regional Elderly, general medical & maternity 
Lincoln Maternity Hospital Lincoln Public/regional Maternity 
Lyndhurst Hospital Christchurch Public Elderly 
Nurse Maude Memorial 
Hospital Christchurch Private Elderly 
Rangiora Hospital Rangiora Public/regional Elderly & maternity 
Oxford Clinic Hospital  Christchurch Private Elective surgery 
Oxford Hospital Oxford Public regional Elderly & general medical 
Princess Margaret Hospital  Christchurch Public Geriatrics/ Psychiatric 
Queen Mary Hospital  
Hamner 
springs Public Elderly 
Southern Cross Hospital  Christchurch Private Elective surgery, Cancer treatment & maternity 
St. George's Hospital Christchurch Private Elective surgery, Cancer treatment & maternity 
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Hospital name Location Type  Function 
St. John of God Hospital  Christchurch Private Elderly 
St. Nicolas Medical Hospital Christchurch Private Elderly 
Talbot Hospital Timaru Public  Elderly 
Timaru Hospital Timaru Public 
Paediatrics, ED, ICU, oncology, rehabilitation, 
maternity & elective surgery  
Tauranga Home  Ashburton Public/regional Elderly, dementia 
Waikari Hospital Waikari Public/regional 
Elderly, rehabilitation, general medicine & 
maternity 
 
The hospitals are structured to provide different specialities and centralise resources such as food and 
laundry in order to achieve maximum population cover and efficiency. For example, Ashburton 
Hospital mainly performs lab work, radiology, maternity and physiotherapy services whereas 
Burwood Hospital (Section 3.4.1.3) specializes in rehabilitation and elective surgery. Princess 
Margaret Hospital accounts for the majority of the CDHBs geriatric and psychiatric care. Hillmorton 
Hospital provides most of Christchurch’s mental health care and St Georges and Southern Cross 
hospitals provide private elective surgery and maternity care. Med laboratory, Canterbury laboratory 
and Christchurch Hospital laboratory complete most of the blood tests from GPs and hospitals within 
Canterbury (MHO 2010).   
Five patients with minor to moderate injuries were driven to the Timaru Hospital Emergency 
Department by their families on the night of 22
nd
 of February, 2011. Timaru Hospital cancelled 
elective surgery and freed a total of 76 beds as well as 17 beds at nearby Bidwill Hospital. The first 
patient to be transferred to Timaru Hospital was recovering from non earthquake related surgery and 
needed a high level of care (SCDHB 2011). 
3.4.1 The Christchurch hospital network excluding Christchurch Hospital 
3.4.1.1 Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) 
Princess Margaret Hospital (Figure 3.1 & 3.7) lost main water for 12 hours and full water pressure 
was not restored for one week (Table 3.2).  The small backup water bore could not pressurize the 
showers or be used for drinking because of E coli contamination; it took one week till the water 
system was back to normal.  The sewage systems were also damaged and were inoperable for up to 
two weeks due to pipeline damage. Most plastered walls and separation joints were damaged albeit to 
a non life threatening degree. The Princess Margaret Hospital buildings were constructed with 
concrete frame, the outside walls were clad with brick veneer, the veneer had vertical, diagonal and 
horizontal cracking ranging from 1-4 mm and some areas of the Princess Margaret Hospital were 
yellow stickered (limited access and needs further evaluation) as a result of the damage. However, the 
concrete structure sustained no damage. The power was lost for 4 hours (Table 3.2) immediately after 
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the earthquake because diffusers popped out. The acceleration within the building also caused 
nonstructural damage to contents on shelves and in the supply rooms and drugs rooms. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Map of Princess Margaret Hospital (CDHB 2012g). 
The ALOS for patients at Princess Margaret Hospital is 26 to 30 days, the average age of patients is 
83.6 years and the average occupancy is 97%. Immediately after the earthquake the hospital was 
operating at 100% occupancy with 109 patients in the general wards. In order to free up capacity they 
cancelled outpatient services for 2 weeks and operated a triage area in front of the hospital for 72 
hours. Patients from Christchurch Hospital were transferred to Princess Margaret Hospital on the 
night after the earthquake via furniture trucks (Section 3.3.1); the ambulance bay was too low to fit 
trucks so staff used milk trays to create a bridge in order to off load the patients.  Thirty three patients 
were transferred from a closed rest home at 9pm on the 22
nd
 of February, 2011. The patients were kept 
in lounges for 48 hours before being redistributed by buses and fixed wing military flights.   
 
One patient had a heart attack and one staff member twisted their ankle otherwise there were no 
injuries or fatalities related to the earthquake. However, the hospital received a lot of crush injuries, 
fractures and broken wrists from the community.  Immediately after the earthquake a crush victim 
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came to Princess Margaret Hospital in a van followed by an MI patient, they also had to treat some 
patients in the car park.  
 
The loss of water meant staff could not wash patients for two days or shower patients for a week, 
however patients were hand washed. The toilets where inoperable immediately after the earthquake, 
instead kimonos were used for patients and staff shared three portable toilets. The Princess Margaret 
Hospital laundry service was lost for one week because of the loss of mains water. Ashburton 
Hospital helped source clean linen. Hillmorton hospital supplied Princess Margaret Hospital with food 
prior to the earthquake but was disrupted during the emergency response. However, there was a 
couple of day’s worth of food on site which was enough to last until the food services were restored.     
3.4.1.2 St George’s Hospital 
St. Georges Hospital (Figure 3.1& 3.13) dominantly performs elective surgery, Cancer treatment and 
maternity care. The hospital was closed completely from the 22
nd
 of February, 2011 till the 7
th
 of 
March, 2011 due to structural damage to the reinforced masonry maternity ward, nonstructural 
damage to the surgical wards and the loss of services. The Maternity building which has subsequently 
been demolished (Figure 3.10) also housed all the hospitals administrative functions.  The medical 
records kept in the administrative area of the maternity building were damaged when air conditioning 
units dislodged and fell through the roof. Water from earthquake damaged pipes came in through the 




Figure 3.8: Map of St George’s Hospital, the Maternity building is labeled as the Heritage 
building (St Georges) 
The Cancer Centre (St Georges Hospital) (Figure 3.14) was damaged when liquefaction induced the 
unbalanced and insufficiently anchored structure to tilt. The liquefaction (Figure 3.11) also caused 
damage to the buildings foundations and the lowest floor to flood. The unbalanced mass was a result 
of a 1.5 meter thick concrete ceiling required for the Linear accelerator located in the basement of the 
building. This disproportionally weighted the buildings mass on one end of the building and caused 
the building to behave asymmetrically. 
The main recovery wards and operating theatres in St George’s Canon Wilford wing (Figure 3.10) 
were closed because of the loss of services and widespread nonstructural damage to walls (Figure 
3.12) (Table 3.9). Central suction was one of the services immediately lost; however, it was one of the 
first things to be repaired. The entire hospital was evacuated in different stages; it took 20 minutes to 
get 17 mothers and 17 babies out of the maternity building. As well, 35 patients from the adult wards 




Figure 3.9: St George’s Hospital Cancer Care Centre  
 
Figure 3.10: (A) The north side of St George’s Hospital Canon Wilford wing (B) The wall 
adjacent to the Canon Wilford wing following the demolition of to the maternity building. 
 





Figure 3.12: (A) Separation Joint in the Canon Wilford wing adjacent to lift shaft. (B) Cosmetic 
damage to columns adjacent to a vertically displaced separation joint 
3.4.1.3 Burwood Hospital 
Burwood hospitals Allan Bean Centre for rehabilitation learning and research suffered major 
structural damage and slumped despite being one of the newest buildings on site. The spinal unit tilted 
and the old mortuary has subsequently been demolished. The less severe nonstructural damage has 
required disruptive repairs and bed closures. The orthopaedic rehabilitation unit and the brain injury 
units also required significant and disruptive repairs. The Burwood Hospital Spinal Unit treated 
paralysed and major trauma earthquake casualties following the Christchurch earthquake. The 
birthing unit suffered minor damage in the Christchurch earthquake and was closed for two months 
to decrease the sewerage, power and water demand (The Press 2012). The Burwood Orthopaedic 
Rehab Unit (ORU) was operating below capacity (10-20 beds out of a normal 28) as of the 17
th
 of 










Table 3.9: Number of Days services Lost or Reduced, Canterbury Province, New Zealand, 2011 
(Kirsch et al) 
    
Hospital  









































 Inpatient wards 14 d - 14 d Normal Normal Normal 
Surgical 
 
14 d NA 30 d NA NA NA 
Obstetrics- Gynecology 14 d NA 30 d Normal Normal NA 
Pediatric 
 
14 d NA NA NA NA NA 
    
Psychiatric 
 
- Normal NA NA NA NA 
Dialysis 
 
- NA NA NA NA NA 
Outpatient Services  
 ED Normal - NA NA Normal NA 
Outpatient clinics 2 d 14 d NA NA Normal NA 
   
Psychiatry 
 
- NA NA NA NA NA 
Rehabilitation 7 d NA NA NA - NA 
Support services 
 Plain radiographs Normal Normal 14 d Normal CHCH NA 
Computed Tomography 11 hr NA 30 d NA CHCH NA 
   
Ultrasound 
 
Normal NA 14 d NA - NA 
   
Laboratory 
 
Normal Normal 7 d Normal CHCH NA 
Blood bank Normal 1 d Normal Normal 3 d NA 
Nonclinical services 
 Administration Normal Normal Reduced Normal Normal Normal 
Medical records Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Food Preparation Normal 3 d Off site Normal Normal Normal 
Laundry Services 2 d 7 d Off site Normal Did own Normal 
3.4.1.4 Hillmorton Hospital 
Hillmorton Hospital was severely disrupted following the Christchurch earthquake. The disruption 
was a result of the hospital having to increase the mental health capacity to accommodate an extra 180 
displaced staff from Christchurch. The staff had to be accommodated because there mental health 
treatment facilities were badly damaged during the Christchurch earthquake. The Five CDHB mental 
health service buildings were unusable as of the 20
th
 of July, 212, three were scheduled for demolition 
and two were in the process of repairs. Staff resignations have significantly increased since the 
Christchurch earthquake. The Hillmorton Hospital chapel was closed due to earthquake damage. The 
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Lincoln Green rehabilitation services building was also badly damaged but was unused before the 
earthquake (The Press 2012). 
3.4.2 Regional Hospitals which sustained damage 
3.4.2.1 Ashburton Hospital 
The surgical theatres in Ashburton were closed on the 31
st
 of January, 2012 following the structural 
assessment of unreinforced masonry buildings, the buildings were found to be at risk of collapse 
during a significant earthquake. The surgical facilities were subsequently relocated to Christchurch 
Hospital. Prior to this there were no facilities closures (CDHB 2012d). 
3.4.2.2 Akaroa hospital 
Akaroa Hospital (Figures 3.1 & 3.13) lost electricity and water but had sufficient backup systems 
(Table 3.2). The facilities only suffered minor nonstructural cracking following the Christchurch 
earthquake; however, after the Darfield earthquake the hospital was closed for one week due to 
damage to the chimneys, which were subsequently removed. Akaroa Hospital was closed at the end of 
January 2012 after engineering inspections deemed the building unsafe, as of the 16
th
 of July, 2012 
the earthquake damaged hospital facilities have yet to be reopened (CDHB 2012). A new reduced 
capacity Akaroa Hospital was opened following the closure of the old facilities at Heartlands 
Community Centre Rue Lavaud road.  The services located at Akaroa hospital include:  
- Medical and surgical Rehabilitation (five beds). 
- Maternity (two beds). 
- Physiotherapy. 
- Medical centre. 
- Day patient care. 
The preliminary structural investigations were conducted by the 10
th
 of July, 2011 the initial 
investigation didn’t find any reason to close the facilities. However, the detailed structural 
observations completed between the 19
th
 of July, 2011 and the 6
th
 of  December, 2011found faulty 
connections of the diaphragms to the walls at roof and floor levels (Figure 3.14), this deemed the 
building to be to be earthquake prone under Section 122 of the Building Act. The Building act 
requires buildings to be closed if they do not have the strength to resist a moderate earthquake. A 
moderate earthquake is defined as an earthquake that would generate loads one third as strong as 




Figure 3.13: (A) The main Akaroa Hospital building in 1926. (B) The main Akaroa Hospital 
following closure in December 2011 with chimneys removed. Source (Stylianou. 2012, April 11). 
Source (KeteScap. 2010).  
  
Figure 3.14: (A) Akroa Hospital Structural cracking (B) Akaroa Hospital Structural damage 
roof wall conection 
3.5 Summary of Functional Loss and Deployed Residual Capacity in the 
Aftermath of the Earthquake for the CDHB Public and Private 
Hospital System 
Following the Christchurch earthquake all of the hospitals in Canterbury were disrupted to varying 
degrees even if the facilities did not sustain physical damage. Two weeks after the 22
nd
 of February, 
2011 St Georges Maternity and Burwood Birthing unit were both closed. The regional hospitals were 
able to perform their own services such as laundry (usually done at Hillmorton Hospital) and food 
preparation in the aftermath of the earthquake (Table 3.9) and in some cases perform services for 
Christchurch’s’ hospitals. When Christchurch Hospital lost its services Timaru Hospital needed 
additional staff to provide Christchurch hospital with clean laundry, it handled 3 tonnes in the first 
delivery. Ashburton Hospital helped supply and source the Princess Margaret Hospital clean linen for 
7 days after the 22
nd
 of February, 2011. However, the existing linen stock had to be rationed and 





Canterbury’s regional Hospitals also helped redistribute the capacity from damaged Christchurch 
hospitals’. Elderly care and/or maternity patients were transferred from Christchurch to the regional 
hospital’s in the days after the earthquake (Table 3.5), even though in some cases the regional 
hospital's sustained damage, as in the case of Akaroa hospital (Section 3.4.2.2). 
3.6 Conclusion  
The damage that impacted the Christchurch Hospital following the Christchurch earthquake included 
minor structural damage to both clinical and support buildings, nonstructural damage to ceiling tiles 
and light fittings, outages of all the city lifelines systems, and damage to internal services and back-up 
generators. For all the CDHB and private hospital facilities, the widespread nonstructural damage was 
more disruptive than the minor/moderate structural damage sustained by the buildings. All buildings 
had been built or retrofitted to comply with the requirement of NZ Seismic Design Standards (SNZ 
2004). In Christchurch Hospital, nonstructural damage to suspended ceilings, light fittings, and water 
piping forced wards to be evacuated during the emergency phase and to remain closed in the longer-
term, as well as requiring lengthily disruptive repairs to be carried out in the following months. The 
loss of short term and long term capacity at Christchurch Hospital has been accommodated by 
outsourcing elective surgery and relocating wards to other hospitals. The loss of; water, sewage, 
power, caused disruption to the Canterbury Hospital network’s functionality and to the delivery of 
health care in the days and weeks following the earthquake. The Christchurch earthquake indicated it 
would be beneficial for organizational planning in modern hospitals to focus on identifying 
nonstructural and functional vulnerabilities within critical facilities. As well as mitigating their 
possible impact by introducing anti seismic engineering measures, redundancy systems and back up 
resources. 
Some Christchurch hospitals that were not equipped to deal with emergency casualties received 
earthquake casualties in the immediate hours after the earthquake. It would be beneficial for 
specialised hospitals to have some emergency treatment capacity. However, the more socialised 
Canterbury health system was able to integrate and redistribute capacity more effectively than the 
more privatised US healthcare system would have been able to following Hurricane Katrina.  
The influence of individuals within the post Christchurch earthquake hospital network was 
pronounced during the emergency phase. A small amount of maintenance staff working overtime 
insured that the Christchurch Hospital backup power system continued to operate during the 
emergency phase. The majority of the clinical and nonclinical staff performed duties beyond the level 
required by their employers, a maintenance staff member responsible for re-priming a blocked 
generator siphoned fuel from their own vehicle. The staff wellbeing was hugely important following 
the earthquake. Clinical staff were willing to work after hours in the emergency phase. However, in 
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4. Chapter Four: Review and implementation of hospital 
functionality/fragility assessment methodology 
4.1Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter Four is to analyze a variety of hospital risk assessment approaches, and 
determine their applicability for use within the post Christchurch earthquake Christchurch hospital 
network. The chapter’s content covers methodology for individual hospital assessment and for holistic 
hospital network assessment. The data collated in Chapter Three is utilized within Chapter Four to test 
the methodology which is also presented and critiqued within Chapter Four. The final objective of 
Chapter Four is to define which areas of the hospital risk assessment methodology were affective and 
the areas which were ineffective at identifying vulnerability.  
De Boer et al. (1989) defined the Medical Severity Index (MSI) to provide a framework for the 
required holistic response by the healthcare network after a large earthquake (De Boer et al., 1989). 
The scale uses the following three factors to describe the health-care system; 
- “Medical rescue capacity”  
- “Medical transport and network capacity” (holistic assessment)  
- “Hospital treatment capacity”. 
The MSI can be used to categories the methodologies covered in this chapter with the exception of the 
“medical rescue capacity” which has little to do with the hospital and transport network and therefore 
is not included. The “Hospital treatment capacity” covers the physical and organizational components 
of individual hospitals. The methodology critiqued in Section 4.2 is: Hossain et al., (2012), Kafali et 
al., (2003), and the World Health Organizations (WHO) Nonstructural vulnerability, Structural 
vulnerability and the administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluations (2006).The “Medical 
transport and network capacity” covers the hospital networks availability of transport resources and 
residual capacity of the facilities. The methodology provided by Cimellaro et al., (2010), Masi et al., 
(2012) and the PDNA (2010) (critiqued in Section 4.3) are encompassed in the “Medical transport and 
network capacity” category.  
The WHO (2006) methodology defines risk evaluation as either qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative 
methods are used to evaluate the safety of a large quantity of hospitals. This is achieved by utilizing 
score assignment methods which are structured to expose deficiencies in seismically hazardous 
buildings in order to define upgrading strategies (WHO 2006). Quantitative methods are better used to 
define the important specific aspects of building resilience; the Kafali et al., (2003) method (Section 
4.2.1) outlines a quantitative fragility evaluation for individual nonstructural components and then 
generates an average for the entire nonstructural system (Kafali et al., 2003).  
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The Hossain et al., (2012) method (Section 4.2.5) outlines a framework for the quantitative evaluation 
of post earthquake emergency department (ED) functionality by defining it as a system comprised of 
coordinated processes from the arrival of patients, ED triage, waiting time to see clinical staff, 
recording of personal details and the patients wait time to be treated by clinical staff (Hossain et al., 
2012). While Cimellaro et al., (2010) (Section 4.3.1) also uses quantitative patient waiting time, as 
well as the transportation network travel time values to define the earthquakes affect on the ability to 
transport and treat patients (Cimellaro et al., 2010). Masi et al., (2012) (Section 4.3.2) is perhaps the 
most holistic assessment covered in this chapter it uses elements of quantitative and qualitative 
assessment to define areas of hospital and hospital network risk with the overall outcome of a priority 
list for seismic upgrades in facilities (Masi et al., 2012).  The PDNA incorporates external factors 
such as the epidemiology of the burden of disease (BoD). As well, the assessment includes the 
performance of six interdependent ‘building blocks’ that encompass all the physical and 
organizational components that make up an individual hospital. The influence of assets, stakeholders, 
hospital processes’ and the recovery/emergency preparedness plans are also taken into account. The 
methods mentioned above are scored in Table 4.1 in order to define the method to implement. 
Table 4.1: The net scores given to the assessment methodology based on the coverage, time taken to 












































Kafali et al., (2003)  1 4 4 5 14 
WHO (2006) Structural 1 4 5 5 15 
WHO (2006) Nonstructural 0.5 3 2 5 10.5 
WHO (2006) Organizational 1 4 2 5 12 
(Hossain et al., 2012) 0.5 3 1 5 9.5 
Cimellaro et al. (2010) 2 2 1 5 10 
(Masi et al., 2012). 1.5 3 1 5 10.5 
(PDNA 2010) 2 2 2 5 11 
(Miniati et al., 2012) 2 2 1 5 10 
 
The scores depicted in Table 4.1 are out of 5, with the best possible score being 5. The “Coverage” 
indicates how much the methodology includes (a score of 5 indicates the method includes all the 
elements that influence hospital vulnerability). The “Time” is a score given to the time taken to use 
the method, 5 being relatively quick and 1 being relatively slow. A value of 5 for the “Ease of 
obtaining data” means that method is relatively easy to obtain data for. The “Applicability to 
Christchurch” scores the methods on whether or not the methods are applicable to be used in the 
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Christchurch Hospital network, 5 being applicable and 1 being not applicable. The Scope, Inputs, 
Outputs and Limitations for the methods in Table 4.2 are defined below in Section 4.2.  
4.2 Assessment Methodology 
4.2.1 Hospital treatment capacity  
 Kafali et al., (2003) Fragility Analysis for Nonstructural Systems in Critical Facilities 
 
- Scope: Nonstructural systems. 
- Inputs: Moment magnitude, source to site distance and spectral density of ground 
acceleration. 
- Outputs: Approximate system fragility, the state of each component and whether or not the 
nonstructural system will fail for a given force (Appendix B). 
- Limitations: Only includes the nonstructural system. 
 WHO (2006) Nonstructural vulnerability evaluation HNVE-001/1, HNVE-001/2 and 
HNVE-001/3 
 
- Scope: Nonstructural elements for individual hospital buildings 
- Inputs: The number of buildings, nonstructural elements, seismic intensity, type of risk and 
the priority of the nonstructural elements. 
- Outputs: Qualitative measure of probability for; Loss of function (LF), Property loss (PL) 
and Life safety (LS) outputs (Appendix C). 
- Limitations: Only includes the nonstructural system and provides a qualitative output.  
 WHO (2006) Structural vulnerability assessment HSVE-001 and HSVE-002  
 
- Scope: Structural components in individual hospital buildings. 
- Inputs: Structural design characteristics, land characteristics, year of construction, Modified 
Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI) number of stories and the building materials used. 
- Outputs: Quantitative risk vulnerability value for individual facilities (Appendix D). 
- Limitations: Only includes the structural system, provides a qualitative output reliant on 
MMI. 
 WHO (2006) Administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluation assessment HOVE-
001/1 and HOVE-001/2 
 
- Scope: Organizational structure of individual hospital facilities. 
- Inputs: Assigned personnel, emergency supplies, medical equipment and backup systems. 
- Outputs: A Qualitative rating of the administrative/ organization vulnerability. The capability 
assessment considers the allocation of resources and personnel to the various medical services 
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existing at the health facility. Four parameters define the capability of each of the medical 
services; assigned personnel, medical equipment, emergency supplies and backup systems 
(Appendix E). 
- Limitations: Only includes the organizational environment. 
 Modeling coordination in hospital emergency departments through social network 
analysis following disasters (Hossain et al., 2012) 
-  
- Scope: The Emergency Department of an individual hospital. 
- Inputs: Time taken for the full diagnosis of a patient, Time taken for diagnosis, Average 
waiting time, the Average Length of Visit (ALV), the number of patients who have revisited 
the ED within 72 hours, the ratio of deaths in the ED to the number of people seen in ED and 
the number of undiagnosed patients who have left the hospital. 
- Outputs: Testing of predefined hypotheses regarding the performance of a hospitals ED 
(Appendix F). 
- Limitations: Does not include any other departments but the ED. 
4.2.2 Medical transport and network capacity (holistic assessment) 
 Organizational model of a hospital system, Cimellaro et al. (2010) 
 
- Scope: The city wide hospital and transport network. 
- Inputs: ED waiting time (saturated or unsaturated), Number of spare beds, Operating rooms, 
Waiting time (normal unsaturated conditions), Waiting time during saturated conditions, 
Number of patients treated (saturated conditions), Number of patients requiring treatment and 
Total number of patients not treated. 
- Outputs: A quantitative measure of the hospital’s emergency department and the functional 
ability of the network to quickly transport patients to the ED (Appendix G). 
- Limitations: Does not include any other departments but the ED. 
 Vulnerability assessment and seismic risk reduction strategies of hospitals in Basilicata 
region (Italy)(Masi et al., 2012). 
 
- Scope: Hospital buildings and the nationwide hospital network. 
- Inputs: The financial limit of the organization, probability of spectral ground acceleration of 
a given size and the buildings; capacity to withstand PGA, the demand to withstand PGA, the 
life safety, the average occupancy and the size of the hospital network. 




- Limitations: Does not include the nonstructural system. 
 Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA 2010) 
 
- Scope: The assessment aims to cover the causes of a disaster affecting the health sector 
including the vulnerability of the sectors, the community and the assets to hazard.  
- Inputs: The service delivery, health workforce, information, medical products, financing, 
leadership and the national epidemiological profile. 
- Outputs: A plan for the further assessment of the health sector and a budget for upgrading 
facilities (Appendix I). 
- Limitations: Does not include any physical elements. 
 Methodology for rapid seismic risk assessment of health structures: Case study of the 
hospital system Florence, Italy (Miniati et al., 2012) 
 
- Scope: Holistic assessment of the hospital network facilities. 
- Inputs: Emergency department, Intensive care unit, Hospital beds, Morgue, Laboratory, Fire 
suppression system, Accessibility and internal viability, Power network, Gas network, 
Diagnostic, Surgical operation Back-up generator, Other equipment. 
- Outputs: An Estimation of the reduction of hospital treatment capacity (Appendix J). 
- Limitations: Does not include the Structural and nonstructural systems. 
4.3 Application and Discussion  
 
The application of each methodology within the post Christchurch earthquake Christchurch hospital 
network is constrained by the scope and availability of data able to be collected and collated, and the 
scope of the assessments (Table 4.2). The WHO structural vulnerability assessment was found to be 
the most applicable method considering the available data. However, the preliminary data suggests 
nonstructural damage was more common and disruptive within Christchurch following the 
Christchurch earthquake, this is similar to findings from other modern earthquake stricken hospitals. 
So in this instance, Masi et al. (2012), Kafali et al. (2003) and WHO (2006) Nonstructural 
vulnerability evaluation methods were more applicable, as they focus on the affect nonstructural 
components have on the ability of the hospital system to provide continued healthcare. Masi et al. 
(2012) interprets the outputs and prioritizes the mitigation techniques identified by incorporating the 
organizations available finance. Kafali et al. (2003) provides a quantitative measure of the 
nonstructural damage averaged over the entire facilities. Whereas, the WHO (2006) nonstructural 
vulnerability evaluation method provides broad quantitative measures to categories the nonstructural 
damages affect on “loss of function”, “property loss” and “life safety”. 
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Cimellaro et al. (2010) and Hossain et al. (2012) do not asses the fragility of the hospitals physical 
components, but instead provide measures of post earthquake ED functionality, in order to quantify 
the deference in the pre earthquake and post earthquake quality of healthcare. Cimellaro et al. (2010) 
is more applicable in the post earthquake Christchurch environment as it aims to quantify the affect 
the transportation network plays in delaying the treatment of patients in the ED. The WHO (2006) 
administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluation also aims to assess the hospitals organizational 
processes but from a qualitative pre earthquake tense and with focus on the entire hospitals 
administrative/organizational vulnerability rather than just the ED. The PDNA and Miniati et al. 
(2012) both aim to assess all the components of an individual hospital including both physical and 
organizational components. The PDNA and Miniati et al. (2012) data demands and scope make them 
to difficult to implement in the course of this study, however given the resources and time the 
assessments would be highly effective in quantifying the seismic hazard to the entire hospital. 
The best application of methodology for the assessment of the Christchurch hospital network would 
be the combination of four methods. The first, Cimellaro et al. (2010) in order to define the 
earthquakes affect on patient care and the transport network. The second and third, the WHO’s (2006) 
structural and nonstructural vulnerability assessment’s which quantify the extent of physical damage 
(structural and nonstructural). And lastly Masi et al. (2012) which extends on the WHO’s (2006) 
structural vulnerability assessment by defining the appropriate threshold to mitigate damage. 
However, simply measuring the affect of the earthquake induced physical damage and ED 
functionality will exclude the importance of the organizational environment. Ideally the 
organizational environment must be assessed. However collecting data from the organizational 
environment involves invasive interaction with staff. Excessive disruption isn’t appreciated in hospital 
networks where staff are often strained, particularly in the aftermath of a major disaster. 
The WHO (2006) administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluation method may also be of 
importance even though it provides a general qualitative assessment, it is important to gage the 
adaptive ability of the organizational environment. The organizational environment can influence the 
impact the earthquake damage has on the physical environment by influencing the classification of 
damage and the level of maintenance. As well, the organizational environment affects the running of 
the ED by influencing the staff-patient interaction processes and to a certain extent the capacity and 
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PDNA (2010):                      
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Kafali et al. (2003):                      
WHO Nonstructural 
vulnerability (2006)                     
WHO Structural 
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vulnerability (2006)                     
Miniati et al. (2012)  
 





    
Taking into account the time taken to implement the methodology, the ease of obtaining data, the data 
availability displayed and the applicability to Christchurch (Tables 4.1 & 4.2) the following list ranks 
the importance of the evaluated methods for application within the post Christchurch earthquake 
Christchurch hospital network. The list is structured to cover all the factors that influence seismic 
vulnerability. The easiest methods (based on the scores calculated in Table 4.1) are prioritized: 
1. WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment  
2. WHO (2006) nonstructural vulnerability assessment  
3. Cimellaro et al. (2010) Organizational model of a hospital system  
4. Masi et al. (2012) Vulnerability assessment and seismic risk reduction strategies of hospitals 
in Basilicata region  
5. WHO (2006) administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluation  
Ideally all the methods would be implemented to capture the entire healthcare systems vulnerability 
including the physical elements, the ED, the inter-hospital transport network and the 
organizational/financial environment. However the large quantity of indicators for the five 
assessments as well as the difficulty in obtaining data from busy clinical and nonclinical persons 
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within the hospital network requires time and willingness within the organization to achieve correctly. 
In the course of this thesis there was insufficient time to generate results from all the methods listed 
above. Therefore, in order to conduct a detailed and complete assessment of all the components that 
influence hospital/hospital network seismic vulnerability, a considerable amount of time is needed. A 
key weakness of hospital seismic assessment methodology is the difficulty of assessing all the 
components. 
WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment has 14 indicators compared to 21 for the 
nonstructural assessment and 29 for the organizational assessment. The difficulty in implementing the 
ED functionality assessments is not due to the number of indicators but the invasive process of data 
collection; specifically the waiting time (WT). The WHO (2006) administrative/organizational 
vulnerability evaluation also requires intrusive data collection in the form of expert opinion from 
professionals within the organization to obtain the qualitative grades of performance.   
4.4 WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment implementation 
 
The WHO (2006) Structural vulnerability assessment was chosen based on the scores calculated in 
Table 4.1. The scores were calculated based on the coverage of the methodology, the time required to 
implement the method, the ease of obtaining data and the applicability of the method to the 
Christchurch hospital network.  
The WHO (2006) Structural vulnerability assessment is based on the Macro seismic vulnerability 
method (Giovinazzi 2005, Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi 2006). This method assesses the seismic 
vulnerability in terms of a vulnerability index (V), and of a ductility index (Q), both are evaluated 
taking into account the building typology and its constructive features. According to the Macro 
seismic method, and therefore the WHO Structural vulnerability assessment method, the correlation 
between the seismic input and the expected damages to building structures (either a single building or 
group of buildings) is expressed in terms of vulnerability curves described by a closed analytical 




















where I is the seismic input described in terms of a Macro seismic Intensity measure,  according to the 
Modified Mercalli Intensity scale or European Macro seismic Scale, EMS-98 (Grunthal 1998). The 
Macro seismic Intensity measure I is considered, in the framework of the macro seismic approach, as 
a continuous parameter evaluated with respect to rigid soil conditions; possible amplification effects 
due to different soil conditions are accounted for within the vulnerability parameter (V). 
88 
 
V and Q are respectively, the vulnerability index and the ductility index summarizing the structural, 
constructive and geometrical features of buildings that might influence the seismic response and 
performance when subjected to earthquake forces. It is worth highlighting that the WHO (2006) 
method assumes Q=2.3 for all the building typologies.    
D is the expected mean physical damage for the building or building groups’ described according to a 
five damage grade scale (EMS-98 damage grades scale, Grunthal 1998), namely: D1 slight damage; 
D2 moderate damage; D3 heavy damage; D4 extensive damage, D5 collapse/destruction; plus the 
absence of damage D0, no damage. The WHO (2006) method used a simplified three grade damage 
scale, distinguishing between: “Low Damage” when D<1.5; “Moderate Damage” 1.5<D<3.5; “High 
Damage” when D>3.5.  
4.4.1 Seismic vulnerability assessment of Christchurch hospital buildings 
According to the WHO (2006) Structural vulnerability assessment method, the seismic vulnerability 
of hospital buildings can be assessed in term of a vulnerability index V. The vulnerability index V 
accounts for the typological vulnerability, V
*
 (e.g. a different seismic behavior is expected for 
unreinforced masonry building compared to the seismic performance of seismically designed 
reinforced concrete buildings) and the influence of a few further factors which are based on the 
seismic response, including soil conditions, the building construction age, the building construction 
type and geometrical features and its maintenance conditions.  
The WHO (2006) structural model incorporates vulnerability indices for the following buildings 
typologies: 
  Simple stone masonry (M1.2) 
 Unreinforced masonry with wooden floors (M3.1) 
 Unreinforced masonry with reinforced concrete floors (M3.4) 
 Strengthened masonry (M5) 
 Reinforced concrete moment-resistant frame (RC1) 
 Reinforced concrete shear wall (RC2) 
 Reinforced concrete frames with regularly distributed unreinforced masonry infill walls 
(RC3.1) 
 Irregular reinforced concrete frames (RC3.4) 
 Reinforced concrete dual-system (RC4) 
 Precast concrete tilt-up walls (RC5) 
 Precast concrete frames with concrete shear walls (RC6). 
 
Timber and steel building types are not included in the WHO method.  
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The WHO (2006) structural model incorporates vulnerability index modifiers Vm for building 
height, maintenance conditions, construction year and few other geometrical and constructive 
features.   
 
The necessary data to implement the WHO structural vulnerability assessment for Christchurch 
hospital buildings, were made available by the Rhise Group and by the CDHB, and are presented in 
Table 4.4. The standard of maintenance for all the CDHB and the private facilities is regarded as 
being “good” based on information provided by Christchurch Hospital’s facilities manager Alan 
Bavis. The methodology states that long buildings are usually exposed to torsion or horizontal rotation 
during ground movement. The methodology does not include dimensions for lengthy buildings 
therefore all buildings with lengths twice as great as their height are considered to be subject to 
torsion during strong ground motion. 
The resulting typological index V* for each single building of the Canterbury network and the total 
vulnerability index V= V* +Vm are presented in Table 4.5.     
4.4.2 Hazard Intensity Measures 
MMI, which is a subjective qualitative measure of earthquake intensity, was chosen as the Hazard 
Intensity measure for implementing the WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment method.  The 
following three sources of MMI measurements were available for the Christchurch earthquake;  
- USGS MMI; 
- GNS felt reports;  
- GNS MMI isoseismal map 
 
The USGS MMI shake map is an automatically generated map which combines instrumental 
shaking measurements, the local geology, the location of the earthquake and the magnitude to 
estimate the MMI (USGS 2012). The MMI values derived from the GNS felt reports were generated 
by averaging the felt report values that were created by citizens who felt the earthquake (Geonet 
2012). The felt reports are created on a webpage (Geonet) and grouped in the suburbs were the 
citizens were located during the Christchurch earthquake. The GNS isoseismal map was generated 
using MMI values from the felt reports and the interpolated PGA. 
 
The GNS isoseismal MMI data was not used for this study because it was not available at the time 
the assessment methodology results were calculated (Section 4.5.2). Both the USGS MMI values 
and the GNS felt reports were used in this study in order to understand the sensitivity of the method 
to the hazard definition, or in other words to what extent the WHO (2006) structural vulnerability 
assessment methodology generates different outputs for different MMIs.  
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4.5 Predicted physical damage according to the WHO (2006) method and 
comparison with observed damage 
The WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment is calculated twice using, the resulting 
vulnerability indexes presented in Table 4.5 and different MMI value sources; 
1. The GNS felt reports MMI (Section 4.5.1) 
2. The USGS MMI shake map (Section 4.5.2) 
The WHO (2006) Vulnerability values which are presented as vulnerability curves below for the 
buildings are compared with the post Christchurch earthquake damage which those buildings 
sustained in order to define whether or not the buildings vulnerability and predicted physical damage 
was correctly identified in the WHO (2006) assessment methodology. 
4.5.1 Predicted damage when using GNS felt reports MMI  
The GNS MMI data used for this analysis was compiled by calculating the weighted average of the 
GNS felt reports for the areas where the Hospitals are situated (Figure 4.1). The felt reports are 
created by members of the public who complete on line surveys of their interpretation of the shaking 
intensity.  The MMI source is used because the data is the most conservative of all the MMI data for 
the Christchurch earthquake and therefore is considered to be the minimum MMI for the WHO 
structural vulnerability assessment.  
The predicted levels of damage are outlined in Table 4.2. All but 45 St Asaph Street (Christchurch 
hospital) and St Georges Hospital maternity building were classed as having “Low damage” the two 
exceptions were both classed as having “moderate and high damage respectively”. Analysis of the 
results suggests that the methodology underestimates the Canterbury hospital network earthquake 
hazard. This is evident because Akaroa Hospital and St George’s Cancer centre sustained damage 
rendering the facilities inoperable during the Canterbury earthquakes. However, Akaroa Hospital was 
closed as a result of the delayed identification of structural damage most likely caused by the 




Figure 4.1: Expected damage grade and vulnerability vs total vulnerability index of Canterbury 
Hospitals for the GNS felt report weighted average (minimum) MMI data (WHO 2006). 
4.5.2 USGS MMI data 
For the purpose of this study the USGS MMI data is considered to be the maximum MMI. The USGS 
MMI data was created by interpolating the PGA in order to define the affect the acceleration had on 
the physical environment.  The USGS was the largest of any of the other MMI sources which were 
available at the time of the analysis. Therefore the values are referred to as the max MMI.  Using the 
USGS MMI data, the St Georges Maternity building was the only building to be classified as having a 
High expected level of damage. The buildings where a Moderate level of damage was predicted are 
included below (Figures 4.3 & 4.5);  
- Princess Margaret’s Hospitals Main Wards A,B,E,F,H&J (Figure 4.2) , the Maintenance building 
and the Recreation Hall.  
- Christchurch Hospitals Parkside building, Riverside building and the Food services buildings.  
- St Asaph Streets 33, 41 and 45 buildings. 




Figure 4.2: (A) Princess Margaret’s Hospital Main Ward -A,B,E,F,H &J. (B) Princess 
Margaret’s Hospital  K wards 
The St George’s Hospital Maternity building was close to being classified with a “moderate” damage 
level (D<3.5).  As structural damage closed the St Georges maternity building immediately after the 
Christchurch earthquake and the 45 St Asaph street building (Christchurch hospital) (upper moderate 
damage level of 3.19) a month after the earthquake. Using the max MMI is more reflective of the 
observed damage in Christchurch. However the USGS data still categorised the Akaroa Hospitals 
Christchurch earthquake MMI as 6 (the same as the GNS felt reports), therefore the Akaroa Hospital 
was still classed as having a low expected damage level when the building was closed as a result of 
structural damage. The St Georges Cancer centre was still classed as having a low expected damage 
using the max MMI. The mis-categorisation of the Cancer centre (St Georges Hospital) was more 
than likely due to the low vulnerability index of 24 (Table 4.5). Because the method doesn’t include a 
soil modifying index or an index that covers disproportionately balanced mass in buildings (Section 
3.4.1.2). The 235 Antigua street Building (Christchurch hospital) was correctly categorised as having 
moderate damage level using maximum MMI (Table 4.5) as cracking to structural reinforcing were 





Figure 4.3: Expected damage grade and vulnerability vs total vulnerability index of Canterbury 
Hospitals for the USGS (maximum) MMI data (WHO 2006). 
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Akaroa  Main building 1928 A A Reinforced masonry M5 2 6 6 
St George's   Maternity building 1928 A C RM/URM M5 3 7.3 9 
 
 Canon Wilford wing 1990 C C Concrete shear wall RC2 5 7.3 9 
 Cancer Centre 2000 C C Concrete frame RC6 3 7.3 9 
PMH  Main Ward -A,B,E,F,H &J 1960 A A Concrete frame RC1 7 7.3 9 
 
 C Block 1975 B A Concrete frame RC1 7 7.3 9 
 Chapel 1970 B A Concrete frame RC1 1 7.3 9 
 K Block 1973 B A Concrete frame RC1 6 7.3 9 
 PSE 1973 B A Concrete frame RC1 - 7.3 9 
 Day Hospital 1984 B A Concrete frame RC3.1 1 7.3 9 
 Maintenance 1964 A A Concrete frame RC1 2 7.3 9 
 Boiler house 1982 B A Concrete frame RC3.1 1 7.3 9 
 The Heathcote Building 1960 A A Concrete frame RC1 7 7.3 9 
 Recreation Hall 1964 A A Concrete frame RC1 1 7.3 9 
Christchurch   Parkside 1991 B C Concrete RC6 5 7.4 9 
 
 Riverside 1980 B C Concrete RC6 9  7.4 9 
 Food Services 1970 B C Concrete RC6 5 7.4 9 
 Oncology 1990 C C Concrete RC6 4  7.4 9 
 Professional Development Unit 1958 A C Steel Trusses - 1 7.4 9 
 Whanau 2002 C C Timber - 1  7.4 9 
 Health Labs 1991 C C Concrete RC6 5 7.4 9 
 21 St Asaph Street 2002 C C Timber Trussed - 1  7.4 9 
 33 St Asaph St (Sexual health centre) 1955 A C Concrete RC6 2 7.4 9 
 41 St Asaph St (sterile services) 1955 A C Concrete RC6 3  7.4 9 
 45 St Asaph St ( Orthotics South island ltd) 1955 A C Concrete RC6 4 7.4 9 
 235 Antigua St 1955 A C Concrete RC6 2  7.4 9 
 Christchurch Women's 2004 C C Concrete RC6 10 7.4 9 
 Diabetes Building 2006 C C CP and C Beams RC6 4  7.4 9 
 Avon Generator 1978 B C Concrete RC6 1 7.4 9 
 Staff Car park building 2003 C C Steel Bracing/Concrete - 3  7.4 9 
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Table 4.5: Canterbury Hospital modifiers and net vulnerability indices (Rhise network). 



































































































































Akaroa Main building -1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 -1 0 35 37 6 6 0.52 Low  0.52 Low 
St George's  Maternity building 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 35 41 9 7.3 1.79 Mod 3.50 High 
 
Canon Wilford/ Radiology 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -8 17 11 9 7.3 0.10 Low  0.43 Low 
Cancer Centre 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -8 25 16 9 7.3 0.18 Low  0.69 Low 
Princess Margaret's Main Ward A,B,E,F,H &J -1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 8 20 30 9 7.3 0.72 Low  2.12 Mod 
 
C Block -2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 20 19 9 7.3 0.24 Low  0.91 Low 
Chapel -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 20 16 9 7.3 0.18 Low  0.69 Low 
K Block -2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 20 19 9 7.3 0.24 Low  0.91 Low 
PSE -2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 20 19 9 7.3 0.24 Low  0.91 Low 
Day Hospital -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 20 16 9 7.3 0.18 Low  0.69 Low 
Maintenance -1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 -2 8 20 27 9 7.3 0.54 Low  1.74 Mod 
Boiler house -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 20 16 9 7.3 0.18 Low  0.69 Low 
The Heathcote Building -1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 20 22 9 7.3 0.33 Low  1.18 Low 
Recreation Hall -1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 -2 8 20 28 9 7.3 0.60 Low  1.86 Mod 
Christchurch  Parkside 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 26 9 7.4 0.56 Low  1.62 Mod 
 
Riverside 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 25 30 9  7.4 0.82 Low  2.12 Mod 
Food Services 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 26 9 7.4 0.56 Low  1.62 Mod 
Oncology 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 25 18 9  7.4 0.25 Low  0.83 Low 
Health Labs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 25 18 9 7.4 0.25 Low  0.83 Low 
33 St Asaph St 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 -2 8 25 36 9  7.4 1.37 Low  2.93 Mod 
41 St Asaph St 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 -2 8 25 36 9 7.4 1.37 Low  2.93 Mod 
45 St Asaph St 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 8 25 38 9  7.4 1.60 Mod 3.19 Mod 
235 Antigua St 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 -2 8 25 36 9 7.4 1.37 Low  2.93 Mod 
Christchurch Women’s 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -8 25 20 9  7.4 0.31 Low  1.00 Low 
Diabetes Building 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8 25 18 9 7.4 0.25 Low  0.83 Low 




4.6.1 Most effective MMI 
 The MMI values that were used for the WHO (2006) vulnerability assessment are as follows:  
1. The GNS felt reports MMI (Section 4.6.1). 
2. The USGS MMI shake map (Section 4.6.2). 
The vulnerability values calculated with the USGS MMI data (maximum) and the GNS felt reports 
MMI data (minimum) for the St Georges Maternity building is depicted in Figure 4.4. St Georges 
maternity Wing was structurally damaged beyond the point it could be safely occupied. The level of 
damage is consistent with the WHO (2006) predicted damage value of 3.55 (Table 4.5) (“high 
damage level”) which was calculated with the maximum USGS MMI.  However, the damage 
following the Christchurch earthquake is not consistent with the WHO (2006) vulnerability value of 
1.79 (“low damage level”) that was resulting with the use of GNS felt reports MMI data (minimum) 
(Figure 4.4).  
When the damage factors responsible for the buildings closure are covered in the WHO structural 
vulnerability assessment using the maximum MMI is more affective. Because the maximum MMI 
retrieved from the USGS shake maps is more representative of the observed damage. For the purpose 
of the rest of the study the Maximum USGS MMI data is therefore used to analyse whether or not the 
WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment identified vulnerable buildings (Section 4.6.2). 
 
Figure 4.4: The maximum (USGS MMI) and minimum (GNNS felt reports MMI) vulnerability 




4.6.2 Overall effectiveness and limitations of the WHO (2006) methodology 
 
The WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment methodology was successful in most cases. Of 
all the structurally compromised buildings in the Christchurch hospital network following the 
Christchurch earthquake the method identified the 11 out of the 13 buildings were expected to 
experience “moderately” or “highly” damage levels (Section 4.6.2). The two buildings that were 
structurally compromised following the Christchurch earthquake that the WHO (2006) assessment 
methodology did not classified  as expected to experience “moderate” or “high” level of damage were 
the St Georges Cancer care centre and the Akaroa Hospital building (Section 4.6.2).  
Akaroa Hospital may have been classed as having a low damage because the methodology does not 
include the cumulative effect of aftershocks. The cumulative effect of aftershocks has an important 
influence upon the fragility of structural systems. Especially after rich aftershock sequences 
comprised of many earthquakes such as that of the Canterbury earthquakes, with each event structural 
systems are likely to be weakened further. The structurally damaged St George’s cancer care centre 
was classed as having a “low” vulnerability to seismicity because the WHO (2006) assessment 
methodology does not include modifiers for the soil the building is built on and the balance of mass in 
the building (Section 3.4.1.2) (Figure 4.2). 
It is worth highlighting that the WHO (2006) does not define what is meant by high, moderate or low 
level of damage. For example it is not clear whether a “high” level of damage refers to high 
susceptibility of collapse or high susceptibility of permanent closure.  
The vulnerability values for the professional development unit (Steel Trusses), Whanau (Timber), 21 
St Asaph (Timber Trussed) and car packing building (Steel Bracing and Concrete) are not included in 
the application of the WHO (2006) structural assessment methodology. The buildings could not be 
calculated because the construction types were no included in the methodology. However, with the 
exception of the Christchurch Hospital car parking building none of the buildings not included in the 
application of the WHO (2006) methodology were structurally damaged (Figure 4.2). 
The St Georges Cancer centre was built with two of its three stories beneath ground level, it was 
severely disrupted when soft sediment liquefied and flooded the lowest floor. The liquefaction 
combined with the buildings disproportionately balanced mass caused the building to tilt (Section 
3.2). The Soil modifying indice in the WHO (2006) Structural assessment does not define separate 
categories for the depth buildings storeys are situated in soils classed C (soft). In some cases facilities 
had un-determinable modifiers; St Georges Hospital Radiology building which contains the 
radiological services has areas with soft stories.  
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Figure 4.5: The expected damage grade and vulnerability vs total vulnerability index of the 
structural damaged hospitals in the Canterbury Hospital network for the maximum USGS 
MMI data (WHO 2006). 
4.7 Conclusions 
The WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment does not incorporate all the factors that influence 
hospital network seismic vulnerability. The WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment 
underestimated the structural seismic vulnerability of certain buildings’ in the Christchurch hospital 
network. The seismic vulnerability of the buildings was underestimated because the factors that 
caused the buildings to be damaged were not included in the WHO (2006) methodology.  However 
the method did assess 11 of the 13 buildings that were structurally compromised in some way as 
having a “high” or “moderate” expected damage levels. The variability in MMI data creates 
significantly different predicted damage levels for buildings when the method is implemented in 
Christchurch (Figure 4.5). 
The nonstructural systems within the Canterbury hospital network are not assessed in this chapter 
because the complexity of nonstructural systems also makes them more challenging to quantify and 
thus assess. The exception of the nonstructural assessment in this study is a major limitation. 
However, it could not be avoided because the time available to collect the data was too limited to 
capture the large number of nonstructural indicators needed for the nonstructural vulnerability 
methodologies. The more complicated nonstructural and organizational assessment methodologies 
may be more successfully implemented by the hospital or hospital networks controlling organisations 




5. Chapter Five: Analysis of the inter-hospital patient transfers post 
Christchurch earthquake 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter Five is to analyze the Christchurch hospital network’s holistic response to the 
Christchurch earthquake using knowledge drawn from the review of assessment methodology 
presented in Chapter Four. The holistic assessment methodology is used to define the areas of the 
Canterbury hospital network that increased resilence and the areas that hindered the response. The 
principle focus of the hospital network response assessment is the inter-hospital patient transfer and 
capacity redistribution. This was chosen because it is an effective indicator of the ability of hospitals’ 
ability to operate as an integrated network. Following a disaster it is an effective indicator because the 
ability to quickly and easily transfer patients within a partially damaged hospital network is indicative 
of a network integrating to insure patients are adequately treated. The methodological approach to 
achieve this is as follows.   
Firstly; physical damage, source of casualties, Christchurch Hospital network capacity, transport 
resources, patient transfer and ALOS data for the period immediately after the Christchurch 
earthquake is presented for Christchurch Hospital.  This data is then used to analyze the redistribution 
of capacity within the Christchurch hospital network.  Secondly a methodological approach is 
generated for calculating the inter-hospital transfer time based on the holistic assessment methodology 
previously reviewed. The intention of this approach is to constrain what influences the speed and 
distance of patient transfers in a hospital network and the characteristics of hospital networks and 
earthquakes that cause the need for inter-hospital transfer.  
5.1.1 Data requirements 
Effective holistic assessment methodology for hospital network functionality and capacity 
redistribution is dependent on all the components that enable a hospital network to function 
adequately being incorporated. They include the; local built environment (structural components, 
nonstructural components, the external built environment (internal and external supply, lifelines and 
transport network), the natural environment (PGA, Liquefaction Resistance and land characteristics) 
and the organizational environment (financial organization, organizational structure and staff) 
(Section 2.1). 
Defining how a hospital network performed in post disaster tense and assessing pre disaster 
vulnerability is limited by the availability of data and the time available to collect it. Based on the 
findings from the literature review (Chapter Two) and Chapter Four, the principle data requirements 
for holistic assessment methodology are; 
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1. Casualties. The input of patients to facilities (where the casualties will likely come from, the 
types of injuries and the background patient input from non earthquake related injuries and 
illnesses’) (Section 5.2.1). 
2. Physical damage. The physical damage to the hospital network (hospitals, lifelines and 
transport network) (Section 5.2.2). 
3. Functional impact. The ALOS at the facility and the likely ALOS for casualties (Section 
5.2.3). 
4. Capacity redistribution. The availability and location of network capacity (at a national, 
regional and local level) (Section 5.2.4).  
5. Mode of patient transfer. The required transport time and available transport resources for 
transfer between hospitals (Section 5.2.5). 
All the factors that influence the flow and treatment capacity of patients should ideally be considered 
in a holistic assessment, or at least the factors that are the most influential.  
The location of the receiving facilities is determined by whether or not the hospitals in the entire 
region or city must be evacuated or just an individual hospital. If one hospital has to be evacuated 
patients can be more easily transferred to undamaged hospitals which are close by, using road 
transportation or helicopter. If there is little residual capacity in the surrounding city or region patients 
will have to be transferred by fixed wing or helicopter to other regions (Section 2.7.1.1) (HHS 2011).  
Inter hospital transfer is dependent on a variety of transport modes in order to transfer patients. 
Transfer by road is the most common mode of transfer for short distance transfers, fixed wing and 
helicopter transfers are more common for longer distances. Prior earthquake based case studies in the 
published literature confirm traffic congestion is common following earthquakes that impact urban 
areas (Ukai 1996). The resulting traffic congestion can greatly increase the time taken for patients to 
be transferred by road between hospitals.  In order to predict the transit time within a transport 
network following an earthquake the; roads (including individual lanes), bridges, airports and ports 
that are likely to be closed must be identified and the effect of the increased demand on the 
operational areas of the transport network must be estimated. 
The location and quantity of hospital to hospital transfers that will be required is dependent on; the 
estimated number of casualties, the severity of casualties, the epidemiological profile, the ALOS 
(background and earthquake casualties), the hospital capacity and the hospital functionality. The ease 
which individual organizations can redistribute capacity by transferring patients is dependent on the 
national, regional and local organizational structure which the individual hospitals operate within.  
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5.2 Patient treatment at hospitals following the Christchurch earthquake 
5.2.1 Casualties following the Christchurch earthquake  
A total of 185 people died and 7171 were injured during the Christchurch earthquake.  The median 
age of the Christchurch earthquake casualties was 48.8 years (Johnston et al 2013). Of the 7,171 
injuries reported following the earthquake 64.8 percent were female and 35.2 percent were male 
(Johnston et al 2013). The injuries were mainly a result of falling objects such as; collapsing roofs, 
rock falls and other falling physical objects (Johnston et al 2013). 169 of the 181 fatalities identified 
through the police disaster victim identification process were located in Christchurch’s CBD (further 
expanded in section 3.3.1) (New Zealand Police 2011). A large number of the estimated 7171non fatal 
injuries were also caused within the CBD (Figure 5.1). The most common types of injuries caused by 
the Christchurch earthquake are depicted in Table 5.1.  
Figure 5.1: The confirmed location of Christchurch earthquake fatalities (Source: New Zealand 
Police 2011). 
Table 5.1: The five most common types of injuries caused by the Christchurch earthquake (from 































5.2.2 Physical damage to the Canterbury hospital network 
The physical damage following the Christchurch earthquake was limited to Christchurch’s hospitals 
and some of the hospitals in the other areas of Canterbury. The remaining South Island and North 
Island hospitals were largely unaffected by the earthquake.  Structural and non structural damage was 
the main form of damage that caused functionality loss in Christchurch’s hospitals (examined in detail 
in Sections 3.2.1 & 3.2.2). The loss of lifelines and utilities also afflicted all of Christchurch’s 
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hospitals to varying degrees (Section 3.2.3). St Georges Hospital (Section 3.4.1.2) was completely 
closed in part as a result of the loss of power and water. The functionality of the Princess Margaret 
Hospital (Section 3.4.1.1) was also reduced for a number of weeks as a result of water loss. 
Even though all the hospitals in Christchurch were physically damaged to varying degrees, the larger 
hospitals still received transferred patients from Christchurch Hospital. The severity and type of 
functionality loss in Canterbury’s hospital network is summarized in detail in Chapter Three. The 
Liquefaction resistance (LRI), PGA and MMI for all the Hospitals Canterbury are summarized in 
Table 5.2. The high PGA, LRI and MMI values are mostly restricted to the Hospitals in Christchurch 
or near to Christchurch (Table 5.2). The net loss of hospital functionality impacted how patients were 
treated in the Christchurch hospital network following the Christchurch earthquake and in some cases 














Table 5.2: Construction type, latitude and longitude, Liquefaction resistance Index (LRI), PGA, USGS MMI, GNS MMI and location for hospitals in 


























































Burwood Hospital   43°28'51.80"S-172°41'2.14"E 3 0.32 (SD 0.385) 8 7.3 
  







Christchurch Women’s Hospital Concrete sheer wall 43°32'2.60"S-172°37'31.09"E 2 0.4 (SD 0.1925) 9 7.48 
Hillmorton Hospital Concrete sheer wall 43°33'9.62"S-172°35'41.48"E 3 0.31 (SD 0.33) 9 7.3 
Nurse Maude Memorial Hospital  Concrete sheer wall  43°30'39.77"S-172°37'20.60"E 2 0.34 (SD 0.33) 9 4-7 
Parklands Hospital   43°30'5.85"S-172°36'42.14"E 3 0.27 (SD 0.33) 9 7.3 
Princess Margaret Hospital       Concrete frame 43°34'15.99"S- 172°37'16.18"E  0 0.45 (SD 0.3025) 9 7.3 
Rosewood rest home Timber/RM 43°31'31.85"S-172°40'50.90"E 1 0.62 (SD 0.1925) 9 3-7 
Southern Cross Hospital Concrete sheer wall 43°31'12.64"S-172°38'4.70"E 3 0.45 (SD 0.22) 9 7.3 
St Georges Hospital 
Concrete sheer 
wall/RM 
43°30'7.22"S-172°36'39.11"E 3 0.27 (SD 0.33) 9 7.3 
Akaroa Hospital RM 43°48'49.77"S-172°57'39.50"E 0 - 6 6 
  









Darfield Timber 43°29'14.04"S-172° 7'3.66"E 0 - 5 3-5 
Ellesmere Timber 43°45'32.36"S-172°18'11.03"E 0 - 6 3-5 
Kaikoura RM 42°24'14.01"S-173°40'55.61"E 0 - 3 2-3 
Lincoln Timber 43°38'6.34"S-172°29'20.36"E 0 0.17 (SD 0.4125) 7 3-5 
Oxford Timber 43°18'10.10"S-172°11'33.83"E 0 - 5 3-7 
Rangiora Timber 43°17'23.47"S-172°35'27.51"E 0 0.1 (SD 0.4675) 6 3-5 
Timaru Concrete sheer wall 44°24'29.71"S-171°15'21.51"E 0 - 4 3-4 
Waikari Timber 42°58'6.52"S-172°41'31.27"E 0 - 4 4-7 
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5.2.3 Functional impact 
Transfers from Christchurch Hospital continued in the weeks after the Christchurch earthquake 
because of the reduced functionality caused by the physical damage and loss of services (Section 3.2). 
There is a loose negative linear trend (R² = 0.0433) between the ALOS for each ward and the number 
of patients transferred from those individual wards (Figure 5.2). This suggests that the wards with a 
lower ALOS are more likely to require patient transfers than wards with a higher ALOS when the 
wards are stressed with capacity loss and an influx of patients requiring treatment. This may be 
because the wards that treated the more severe patients such as the ICU and CICU couldn’t discharge 
patients or transfer them until they were relatively stable. However each ward has different patient 
treatment characteristics that determine whether or not patients are transferred to other wards within 
the hospital to be treated or retained and treated permanently in another ward. The effect of the varied 
patient treatment characteristics for individual wards will likely influence the ALOS for the 
individual wards.  
The ALOS for patients during the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake at Christchurch 
Hospital is collated in Appendices M and N for all the patients at the hospital (Appendix L) 
(Presented in Figure 5.3) and for earthquake patients (Appendix M). The data in Appendix L is for all 
the individual wards in Christchurch Hospital. Appendix M just depicts the ALOS for earthquake 
related injuries (Presented in Figure 5.3), the wards the patients were treated in and the number of 
transfers from those wards. A comparison of the ALOS for the earthquake casualties and for all the 
patients in Christchurch Hospital is presented in Figure 5.3.                     
 
Figure 5.2: The ALOS (days) for individual wards compared with the average number of 
patients transferred from that individual ward at Christchurch Hospital in the two weeks 
following the Christchurch earthquake. 
y = -0.0535x + 0.9405 





































The ALOS for all the wards at Christchurch Hospital in the two weeks following the Christchurch 
earthquake was 2.41 days (Figure 5.4).  The majority of the severe injuries caused by the earthquake 
(Table 5.1) were treated in the wards listed in Table 5.3. The ALOS for these wards was 4.99 days 
(the ALOS includes both earthquake and non earthquake patients). The ALOS for the period between 
the 14
th
 and the 20
th
 February, 2011 (before the Christchurch earthquake) for all the Christchurch 
Hospital wards was 3.3 days. The ALOS for the period between the 11
th
 and the 14
th
 of February, 
2013 for all the Christchurch Hospital wards was 1.6 days. The ALOS for the two weeks following 
the Christchurch earthquake for all the wards at Christchurch Hospital is lower than the two weeks 
prior to the February earthquake. However the ALOS for the wards that treated the severe earthquake 
casualties (Tab le 5.3) is still higher than the ALOS for the two weeks prior to the Christchurch 
earthquake. The lower ALOS following the Christchurch earthquake for all the wards is likely a result 
of transfers and discharges from the Hospital.  
 
Figure 5.3: The ALOS (days) for earthquake injuries and the combined ALOS (days) for all the 
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Figure 5.4: The daily ALOS (days) for all the wards in Christchurch Hospital during the two 
weeks following the Christchurch earthquake for both earthquake and non earthquake patients 
(Appendix L). 
 
Figure 5.5: The daily ALOS for earthquake patients and the daily average number of transfers 
from Christchurch Hospital (all wards) during the two weeks following the Christchurch 
earthquake for earthquake causalities only (Appendix M). 
The ALOS fluctuates largely and there is no observable trend (Figure 5.5). The average number of 
patient transfers for the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake peaks the day after the 
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5.2.4 Capacity redistribution 
5.2.4.1 Location of patient hospitalization following the Christchurch earthquake 
The majority of the Christchurch earthquake casualties were treated at Christchurch Hospital because; 
it was the largest hospital in Canterbury, central to the location of the earthquake casualties and it had 
the only Emergency Department in Christchurch. All of the earthquake casualties that the 
Christchurch Hospital received were treated in the wards presented in Appendix M. The Christchurch 
Hospital wards where the most severe earthquake casualties were treated are presented in Table 5.3. 
The other Hospitals in Christchurch didn’t have the same patient treatment capabilities, as New 
Zealand’s hospital networks are structured so individual hospitals in a given city only provide a 
relatively specialized centralized set of services, but can freely exchange patients’ between hospitals. 
Because each of the hospitals in Christchurch provided relatively unique services the Christchurch 
Hospital network in its entirety was able to provide all the necessary services.  However, the mass 
casualty event wasn’t large enough to overwhelm the Christchurch hospital network capacity. As well 
the hospitals weren’t sufficiently damaged to the point they were overwhelmed with the existing 
casualties. 
Table 5.3: The Christchurch Hospital wards that received the severe earthquake casualties (ALOS for 
both non earthquake related and earthquake related patients) 
Ward Service ALOS  
AMAU Adult Medical Assessment Unit 3.31 
EO Emergency observation 0.76 
ICU Intensive care unit 7.66 
OTU Orthopaedic Trauma Unit 10.6 
SPCU The SPCU is responsible for the treatment of un-well surgical patients  10.9 
Ward 16 
(SARA) 
Ward 16 is a 16 bed General Surgical unit that specializes in the upper GI. 
The SARA is structured to provide an area where patients can be 
clinically assessed by the general surgical team. 2.5 
Ward 18  
The ward exclusively provides services for acute trauma and spinal injury 
patients. 44 
Ward 19 
The ward exclusively provides services for acute trauma and spinal injury 
patients. 4.5 
Ward 28 
Neurology & Neurosurgery for post-operative craniotomy and spinal 
surgery, head injury, neurological patients who must be invasively 
monitored. 0.29 
Average   4.99 
(CDHB. 2012b). 
Because Christchurch Hospital’s functionality was reduced (Section 3.2) patients had to be transferred 
in order to continue to provide healthcare to both earthquake and non earthquake injured patients. 
Severe earthquake casualties were transferred to ICUs as distant as the North Island, along with other 
non earthquake patients including geriatric patients. 
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5.2.4.2 Inter hospital transfer process 
Christchurch Hospital accounted for 387 of the 455 outgoing transfers from Canterbury hospitals in 
the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake. This was because Christchurch Hospital 
received the majority of the earthquake casualties and also sustained physical damage (Section 3.2) 
and therefore had to free up capacity. Ashburton Hospital and Burwood Hospital account for most of 
the remaining out going transfers (Table 4.2). Therefore the Canterbury inter-hospital transfer 
response for the first two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake was dominated by outgoing 
patients from Christchurch Hospital which also received the majority of the earthquake casualties. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study Christchurch Hospital is considered the point source for all the 
Canterbury hospital transfers in the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake. 
5.2.4.3 Cause of inter hospital transfers 
The decision to transfer patients from Christchurch Hospital was made within the hospital’s 
organizational environment in liaison with senior staff from the other hospitals in New Zealand which 
were chosen to receive transferred patients. The transfer and discharge of patients immediately after 
the Christchurch earthquake was largely cautionary in expectation of large numbers of casualties and 
a necessity which was caused by a 19 percent reduction in permanent capacity within Christchurch 
Hospital’s facilities.  
5.2.4.4 The destination of patient transfers  
The destination for all the inter-hospital transfers from Christchurch Hospital in the two weeks 
following the Christchurch earthquake are summarized in Table 5.6. Patients were transferred to 33 
different hospitals throughout Christchurch (Figure 5.8), Canterbury (Figure 5.7) and New Zealand 
(Figure 5.6). The location of the hospitals include; 9 in Christchurch (189 patients transferred) (Figure 
5.8), 10 in the rest of Canterbury (183 patients transferred), 6 in the other regions of the South Island 
excluding Canterbury (33 patients transferred) and 8 in the North Island (38 patients transferred) 
(Table 3.3). Burwood Hospital and Princess Margaret Hospital are the closest large (100 or more 
beds) hospitals to Christchurch Hospital, they accounted for 81 of the 186 received transfers within 




Figure 5.6: The citys outside of Canterbury which recieved the outgoing pateint transfers from 




Figure 5.7: The citys and towns within Canterbury which recieved the outgoing pateint 





Figure 5.8: The citys within Christchurch which recieved the outgoing pateint transfers from 
Chrsitchurch Hospital during the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake. 
 5.2.5 Mode of patient transfer following the Christchurch earthquake 
The mode of inter hospital transfer is dependent on; the severity and scope of the earthquake, the 
number of causalities, the location of the receiving facilities, the availability of transport resources, 
the transport network damage and the state of the individual patient being transferred. The 
Christchurch earthquake was a low casualty localized event. Because the total fatalities only 
accounted for 0.0005 percent of the population of Christchurch and the earthquake damage was 
mostly confined to Christchurch and the neighboring townships. This meant that following the 
Christchurch earthquake there were few casualties and there was adequate residual capacity within 
Christchurch and the neighboring regions. As a result transport resources were relatively abundant 
within Christchurch in the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake.  
The main mode of transfer for the less critical patients within Christchurch and Canterbury was via 
road. The transfer of elderly patients from Christchurch Hospital (wards 29-31) (Table 3.5) to 
Princess Margaret Hospital on the night of the Christchurch earthquake was via furniture trucks. 
However, transfer by road (Table 5.7) to the hospitals in the rest of the South Island and the North 
Island would have taken too long. Fixed wing flights and helicopters were used for the long distance 
transfers in order to reduce the transfer time (Table 5.5 & 5.6). 
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The Christchurch Airport handled all the fixed wing transfers from Christchurch Hospital.  The 
airports functionality was not impeded by the Christchurch earthquake except for an immediate 30 
minute closure of the runway for a damage assessment following the Christchurch earthquake (Stuff. 
2011).  
The transport services responsible for the patient transfers by fixed wing and helicopter to the 
receiving hospitals following the Christchurch earthquake are provided in Table 5.4. The data does 
not have a constrained time period and therefore is not consistent with the other patient transfer data 
presented in throughout Chapters 3, 4 and 5. There were 12 different fixed wing and helicopter 
providers (excluding the New Zealand Air Force) that transferred patients following the Christchurch 
earthquake. The Canterbury Air Retrieval service (fixed wing), Life flight Auckland (fixed wing) and 
Life flight Wellington (fixed wing) account for most of the transfers.  55 of the 65 transfers were by 
fixed wing; just 10 patients were transferred by helicopter (Table 5.4).   
Table 5.4: The transfers by Helicopter and fixed wing from Christchurch’s hospitals’ within the first 
days after the Christchurch earthquake (Rhise network) 




Canterbury Air Retrieval service (fixed wing) 26 Canterbury 
Life flight Auckland (fixed wing) 9 Auckland 
Life flight Wellington (fixed wing) 9 Wellington 
Hawke’s Bay (fixed wing) 5 Hawke’s Bay 
Helicopters NZ 2 Canterbury 
Waikato Air Ambulance (fixed wing) 3 Waikato 
Westpac Helicopter (Wellington) 1 Wellington 
Otago Helicopters 6 Dunedin 
Nelson Helicopters 1 Nelson 
Mainland Air (Otago) fixed wing 1 Dunedin 
Tauranga (fixed wing) 1 Tauranga 
Nelson Air Ambulance (fixed wing) 1 Nelson 
Total 65   
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Table 5.5: Estimated transfer time by fixed wing for patient transfers from Christchurch Hospital in 



























































































































































































































































city  10 18 746.33 80 18.6 25 123 2 Fixed wing 
HAS 10 18 - - - - - 1 - 
Hawke’s 
Bay  10 18 552.72 90 22.5 25 133 1 Fixed wing 
Middlemore 10 18 746.33 80 10.1 16 114 2 Fixed wing 
Napier 
(Atawhai) 10 18 575.24 90 10.8 13 121 1 Fixed wing 
North Shore 10 18 746.33 80 30.6 36 134 2 Fixed wing 
Tauranga 10 18 715.9 115 8.7 15 148 2 Fixed wing 
Waikato 10 18 666.92 100 13.2 17 135 2 Fixed wing 
Wellington 10 18 304.42 55 4.9 9 82 13 Fixed wing 
Table 5.6: Estimated transfer time by helicopter for patient transfers from Christchurch Hospital in the 


































































Timaru 48 14 Road/helicopter 
Kaikoura Hospital  46 0 Road/helicopter 
Grey Base 53 3 Road/helicopter 
Wairau 71 1 Helicopter/Fixed wing 
Buller - 1 Helicopter 
Dunedin 92 11 Helicopter 
Southland 69 2 Road/helicopter 
Nelson 71 7 Helicopter/Fixed wing 
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Table 5.7: Estimated transfer time by road for patient transfers from Christchurch Hospital in the two 
weeks following the Christchurch earthquake 































































































Southern Cross  4.1 13 Road 
Hillmorton 3.3 13 Road 
St Georges  4.9 13 Road 
Parklands hospital 6.1 15 Road 
PMH  5.2 19 Road 
Rosewood rest home 7.2 29 Road 
Burwood Hospital  15.7 27 Road 
Lincoln 19.8 38 Road 
Rangiora 32.6 49 Road 
Ellesmere 40.3 58 Road 
Darfield 44 52 Road 
Oxford 57.9 61 Road 
Waikari Hospital  73.9 82 Road 
Akaroa Hospital  81.4 83 Road 
Ashburton Hospital  84.7 87 Road 
 
5.3 Conceptual model for patient transfers based on key statistics 
Models for complex integrated systems like hospital networks are rare because of the extensive data 
requirements that are needed to generate outputs (Section 4.4). The purpose of Figure 5.9 is to define 
the connections between the components necessary for the assessment of the network wide inter-
hospital transfer process. The spatially extensive transport network (road, air and sea transport 
networks’) respond in a unique way geographically to seismicity and traffic congestion. Therefore, 
predicting how the transport network will be impeded depends on the characteristics of the underlying 
land, how the seismicity interacts with the land, the built environment (seismic performance of the 
system), the rate which damage can be repaired and the likely flow of people within the transport 




Figure 5.9: Holistic model for hospital networks following a local disaster  
Similarly the lifelines and services networks are exposed to spatially variable land characteristics and 
ground acceleration following earthquakes and thus will be affected in a varied nature. Hospitals 
outside the disaster zone may have reduced functionality if they depend on lifelines or services 
situated or provided within the disaster zone (Figure 5.9). The functionality of hospitals situated 
outside the disaster zone may be reduced by the secondary effects of the earthquake in order to surge 
capacity and provide services such as laundry, food or lab work for hospitals within the disaster zone 
(e.g. Timaru Hospital, Section 4.6) or if the services they rely on are provided in the disaster zone.  
For example Timaru Hospital is located 147 km south of the Christchurch earthquake epicenter and 
neither the hospital nor its lifelines were damaged. However, it immediately reduced its capacity in 
expectation of transfers (which the hospital received) and provided laundry services for Christchurch 
Hospital (Section 4.3). The disaster zone in Figure 5.9 is limited to the area that has primary physical 
earthquake damage.  For the purpose of this study primary physical earthquake damage is classed as 
physical damage which was caused directly by the ground acceleration. 
5.4 Inter-hospital patient transfer time calculation 
An appropriate method for determining the probable travel time of an inter hospital patient transfer 
following a destructive but localized earthquake with relatively few casualties in a city with plentiful 
transport resources would include the following variables: 
 The destination  
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 Mode of transfer 
 The availability of network capacity  
 The (state) condition of the patient.  
Estimating the transfer time is dependent on the: available exit routes within the hospital, available 
staff, available transportation resources, location of receiving care sites, number of patients and mix of 
patient acuity, patient transportation requirements and the road and traffic conditions. The mode of 
transfer is critical in determining how long patient transfers take. In order to be effective the means of 
transfer must be properly equipped and staffed (Section 2.7.1.1) (HHS 2011). 
The distance to the hospital chosen for transfer is the main variable (destination). It is modified by the 
availability of capacity in the network (residual capacity). The road condition is vital in determining 
the time of transfer for road transfers. However the state of the patient and destination determines the 
mode of transfer (road, fixed wing or helicopter). The state of the patient modifies the mode of 
transfer because patients in a severe state are most likely to be transferred by the fastest means such as 
helicopter or fixed wing. The connections between the factors described above are summarized in 
Figure 5.10.  
 
Figure 5.10: The components that determine transfer time; the state of the patient, residual 
capacity, destination, mode and the factors that influence the components. 
5.5 Results and Analysis  
The results which are analyzed in Section 5.5 are comprised of data derived from Section 5.2 and 
Chapter Three and framed with the conceptual methodology proposed in Sections 5.4 and 5.  
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5.5.1 Implementation of conceptual model for predicting the location of patient transfers  
 
The conceptual model which is implemented is in this section is outlined in detail in Section 5.4. The 
data which is interpreted within the conceptual model is drawn from the post Christchurch earthquake 
Christchurch hospital network data presented in Chapter Four. The level of functionality loss ( Figure 
5.9) in Canterbury’s hospitals and the influence functionality loss had on inter hospital transfers can 
be calculated quantitatively if the number of functions lost are known (defined further in Section 
5.1.1) (Table 5.8). For the purpose of this study the functionality loss is calculated as a percentage of 
hospital functions which were reduced at some point during the two weeks following the Christchurch 
earthquake. The following functions were used for the calculation (Table 3.2): 
 Electricity 





 Medical gases 
 Suction  
If the loss of functionality was not known then it was estimated to be 50% for category 1 hospitals 
(Figure 5.9), 10% for category 2 hospitals (Figure 5.9) and 0% for category 3 hospitals (Figure 5.9). 
The estimates are based on the known values from other hospitals in the same category. The ALOS is 
only known for Christchurch hospital because the data is too difficult to obtain for each individual 
hospital that received Christchurch Hospital transfers. The hospital capacity is depicted as a ratio of 
the post Christchurch earthquake bed capacity and the capacity immediately prior to the Christchurch 
earthquake. 
Category 1 hospitals are classed as being completely within the disaster zone, category 2 hospitals are 
classed as being partially within the disaster zone and category 3 hospitals are classed as being 
completely outside the zone of primary physical earthquake damage (Figure 5.9). 
The category 1 hospitals were only located in Christchurch, the category 2 hospitals that were on the 
edge of the zone of primary physical earthquake damage were located in the towns that are adjacent to 
Christchurch. All the hospitals in category 3 are located in either in areas in Canterbury far away from 
Christchurch or the other regions in the South Island or in the North Island. The reduction in hospital 




Table 5.8: The capacity of the receiving hospitals, Maximum functionality loss, estimated transfer 
time and number of patient transfers received for the Hospitals that received patient transfers from 























(fully in the 
disaster zone) 
Christchurch Hospital 522:650 50% - - 
CWH 148:148 -  -  - 
Southern Cross Hospital 87:87 50% (estimated) 13 - 
Hillmorton Hospital 159:159 50% (estimated) 13 4 
St Georges Hospital 80:101 50% 13 1 
Parklands hospital - 50% (estimated) 15 1 
PMH Hospital 109:109 50% 19 41 
Rosewood rest home 24:24 50% (estimated) 29 1 





Lincoln Hospital 7:7 10% (estimated) 38 24 
Rangiora Hospital 13:13 10% (estimated) 49 29 
Ellesmere Hospital 10:10 0% 58 0 
Darfield Hospital 8:8 10% (estimated) 52 2 
Oxford Hospital 15:15 10% (estimated) 61 1 
Waikari Hospital  11:11 0% 82 3 
Akaroa Hospital  8:8 38% 83 4 
Ashburton Hospital  74:74 10% (estimated) 87 20 
Hospital 3 
(outside of the 
disaster zone) 
Timaru Hospital 131:131 0% 48 14 
Kaikoura Hospital  26:26 0% 46 0 
Grey Base Hospital - 0% 53 3 
Wairau Hospital 91:91 0% 71 1 
Buller Hospital 55:55 0% - 1 
Dunedin Hospital 388:388 0% 92 11 
Southland Hospital 181:181 0% 69 2 
Nelson Hospital 173:173 0% 71 7 
Auckland city Hospital 710:710 0% 123 2 
Hawke’s Bay (Royston) 400:400 0% 133 1 
Middlemore Hospital 97:97 0% 114 2 
Napier Hospital 41:41 0% 121 1 
North Shore Hospital 307:307 0% 134 2 
Tauranga Hospital 349:349 0% 148 2 
Waikato Hospital 600:600 0% 135 2 
Wellington Hospital 434:434 0% 82 13 
  Average 1.8 17% 69.3 7.64 
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5.5.2 Inter-hospital patient transfer time estimation for the patient transfers from Christchurch 
Hospital in the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake 
 
The average transfer time for all transfers from Christchurch Hospital in the two weeks following the 
Christchurch earthquake was not available from Canterbury DHB.  Therefore estimated transfer times 
were calculated using the data presented in Appendix M and Appendix K. The inter Christchurch 
hospital road transfer time and distance data in Appendix K is based on the April 2011 peak PM 
traffic data (Blyleven 2012) and the road and bridge closure data (Figure 5.6) from Land Information 
New Zealand (Koordinates). The April, 2011 peak PM travel data was the best detailed traffic 
congestion data because it is the first available data following the 22
nd
 of February, 2011. The transfer 
time in Appendix K was calculated using the following equation. 
              2. Time of transfer = Distance (km)/ the road speed (km/h) 
The distance incorporates roads and bridges that were closed in the two weeks following the 
Christchurch earthquake (Figure 5.11). And the road speed is the median of the value range presented 
in the April 2011 traffic data (Blyleven 2012). The time of transfer for the individual roads that are 
assumed to be used for inter-hospital transfer were calculated separately because the road speed varies 
between the different roads. The time for inter-hospital road transfers in Christchurch for the two 
weeks following the Christchurch earthquake is the sum of all road transfer times’ (calculated using 
equation 2) for the individual roads that were used. The estimated patient transfer time by road is 
depicted in Table 5.7.  
The data in Appendix O, Table 5.6 Table 5.7 incorporates travel time data for road, fixed wing and 
helicopter flights to the more distant hospitals. The travel times by road for transfers to hospitals 
outside of Christchurch were calculated using Google Earth. The quickest mode of transfer was 
assumed if the mode of transfer was not known (Table 5.5). Plotting the travel time verse travel 
distance (Figure 5.12) shows that there are three distinctive groups for transfers by road (Table 5.7), 




Figure 5.11: Map of road closures and traffic times in Christchurch in the two weeks following 
the Christchurch earthquake (Google Earth) (red roads were closed for the entire two weeks).
  
 
Figure 5.12: The transfer time verse transfer distance for the patient transfers by Road, Fixed 
wing and Helicopter. 
The road network travel times depicted in Figure 5.11 are used to calculate the travel times and 
distances in Appendix K and Table 5.11. Figure 5.11 was created using PM peak travel time data for 
April 2011. The road network travel times for transfers by road to areas outside of Christchurch were 
calculated using Google Earth. As well the road transfer times between the receiving facilities in 
centers outside of Christchurch and the nearest airport were calculated using Google Earth for the 































2011 are the same as the travel time for the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake. As 
well, the road/bridge closures and the CBD cordon are assumed to be the same throughout the two 
weeks following the Christchurch earthquake. The Road and bridge closure data was obtained from 
Land Information New Zealand (Koordinates) and the April 2011 traffic data was obtained from 
Blyleven et al. (2012).  
The fixed wing and helicopter transfer times presented in Table 5.6 and Table 5.5 were calculated by 
firstly using Google Earth to obtain the shortest possible distances from Christchurch Airport 
(assuming the shortest distance is taken) to the nearest airport to the receiving facility. And secondly, 
the average speed for the fixed wing and helicopters used for the transfers were obtained. The speeds 
used are 225 km/h for the BK-117-B2 helicopter (CWCART 2013) and an average of 540 km/h for 
The Cessna 421C (NZAAS 2013) and C-130H Hercules fixed wing aircraft (NZRAF 2013) 
(assuming the entire trip is at average speed). Thirdly the transfer times are calculated using the 
following formula (equation 3):  
                  3. Distance of transfer (D) /Average speed for the mode of transfer (Av) 
The average transfer time using the assumptions and data mentioned above for all the patients 
transferred from the Christchurch Hospital over the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake 
was 69.3 minutes per patient (Appendix O). The study is limited by only having road network 
congestion data from April, 2011, ideally the data would be from the two weeks after the Christchurch 
earthquake. However, it is difficult to collect traffic congestion data immediately after an earthquake 
due to the extensive logistics required. The study is also limited by assuming that the air travels were 
by the shortest distance and with an average speed for the specific mode of transfer the entire time. 
Not knowing the exact transfer route for the road transfers is also a limitation of this study. The 
estimated times for transfers (Appendix O) are based on the assumption that the flights were not 
delayed and there was no additional time between the road transfer and the fixed wing flight.  
The use of helicopters and fixed wing flights to move patients within Christchurch and between cities 
greatly reduced the transfer travel time.  This was possible because of the low number of patients 
requiring transfer and air resources were not stressed beyond the point where patients that needed to 
be transferred could not be.  
Where the transfer time from Christchurch Hospital to the receiving facility was calculated for all the 
three modes of transfer (road, fixed wing and helicopter), the transfer time was on average; 
 240 percent greater for road transfers than fixed wing transfers  
 340 percent greater for road transfers than helicopter transfers 
 160 percent greater for fixed wing transfers than helicopter transfers 
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The helicopter transfers for the estimated average speeds used to calculate the transfer times 
(Appendix O) were the fastest followed by fixed wing transfers and then lastly transfers by road. 
However the BK-117-B2 helicopter only has a range of 540 kilometers. Whereas, the Cessna 421C 
(NZAAS 2013) and C-130H Hercules (NZRAF 2013) have ranges of 2,755 km and 3,800 km 
respectively. This means that most of the hospitals in the North Island are out of range for BK-117-B2 
helicopter (CWCART 2013) transfers from Christchurch Hospital. 
5.5.3 Inter hospital transfer time equations  
 
An estimation of the travel time by road (TtR) (equation 3), helicopter (TtH) (equation 5) and fixed 
wing (TtF) (equation 6) are presented below in equations 3-5. 
                           4. TtR = 0.89d + 14.17 Road 
                           5. TtH = 0.09d + 41.52 Helicopter 
                           6. TtF = 0.093d + 62.81 Fixed wing 
The (Tt) is the time taken to travel from Christchurch hospital to the receiving facility. The TtF 
includes the time taken by road from Christchurch Hospital to the Christchurch Airport and the time 
taken to travel by road from the receiving airport to the receiving hospital (Appendix N). The Tt is 
measured in minutes and the distance (d) is measured in Kilometers. The equations were generated 
with the post Christchurch earthquake Christchurch Hospital transfer data which is presented in 
Appendix N and in Figure 5.12. The calculations are based on the assumptions presented in Section 
5.5.2. The equations are only valid within the transfer distance ranges for road, helicopter and fixed 
wing transfers from Christchurch Hospital, to the receiving hospitals in the two weeks following the 
Christchurch earthquake (Appendix N). The ranges are as follows: 
 Road transfer = 3km - 85km 
 Helicopter transfer = 147km - 466km 
 Fixed wing transfer = 319km – 787km 
5.6 Discussion  
The aim of Section 5.6 is to draw on the results presented above in Chapter Five in order to define the 
factors that increased the short term resilence of the Canterbury Hospital network (Section 5.6.1) and 
the long term resilence (Section 5.6.2) of Christchurch Hospital following the Christchurch 
earthquake. Christchurch Hospital is the primary focus of long term resilence indicators within the 
Canterbury hospital network. This is because throughout this study Christchurch hospital was the 
focus of the long term analysis in order to draw as many conclusions from the most damaged and 
important hospital in the Canterbury hospital network (Section 3.2.1). The process of analysis in 
Section 5.6 is structured with “A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic 
Resilience of Communities” by Bruneau et al (2003). The frame work enables the different 
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components that contribute to the resilience of the physical, organizational, social and economic 
systems to be defined in the following four categories (Bruneau et al., 2003):  
 Robustness: The strength, or the ability of elements, systems and components to withstand a 
given level of stress without suffering degradation or loss of function. 
 Redundancy: The extent to which elements and systems are capable of satisfying functional 
requirements in the event of disruption, degradation, or loss of functionality 
 Resourcefulness: The capacity to identify problems, establish priorities and mobilize 
resources when conditions exist that threaten to disrupt the continued provision of healthcare. 
 Rapidity: The capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner in order to 
contain losses and avoid future disruption. 
(Bruneau et al., 2003) 
 
Table 5.9: The performance criteria for the measures of resilence (Bruneau et al., 2003) 
Performance 
criteria 




Maximize availability of 
buildings and equipment 
(units) and #% of functions 
operational after small 




equipment and supplies 

















Emergency organization and 
infrastructure in place; 
critical 
functions identified 
Alternative sites and 
procedures identified for 
providing medical care 
Plans and 
procedures for 



















All injuries treated in first 
day 
Volunteers were managed 


































Using the definitions for the performance measures and the performance criteria (table 5.9), the 
performance measures and criteria are qualitatively defined and quantitatively scored below in Table 
5.10, for the post Christchurch earthquake Christchurch hospital network. The qualitative measures 
and quantitative scores are based on the results, discussions and conclusions presented in Chapters’ 4 
and 5. The performance measures, criteria and their assigned scores for the post Christchurch 
earthquake Christchurch hospital network (Table 5.10) are discussed below in Sections 5.6.1 and 
5.6.2 and summarized in Section 5.6.3. The discussion is intended to highlight the areas of the 
Canterbury hospital network that account for the post Christchurch earthquake resilence. 
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The social performance measure for the redundancy and resourcefulness criteria in Bruneau et al 
(2003) is defined as “Volunteers encouraged to assist at acute care hospitals”. However the presence 
of volunteers at Christchurch Hospital was identified by clinical staff as a source of disruption 
(Section 3.3.1). Therefore the definition is altered to “Volunteers were managed with limited 
disruption” to be more reflective of the post Christchurch earthquake, Christchurch hospital network 
(Table 5.9).  
5.6.1 Short term resilence of the Canterbury hospital network 
 
For the purpose of this study, the resilence exhibited in the short term is defined as the period starting 
immediately after the Christchurch earthquake and ending 6 months later. The loss of hospital 
functionality in the short term was limited to the category 1 and 2 hospitals (Figure 5.9) situated in 
Christchurch and the surrounding townships (Table 5.2). The functionality of the Canterbury hospital 
network was only reduced by around 50 percent (Table 5.2) for a short period of time. The functional 
loss was caused because the Christchurch hospital network was physically damaged and as a result 
lost essential services, lifelines and back up resources (Table 3.2). However, it was not damaged to 
the point it was not fully functional (Table 5.10).  
Because the functionality loss as a result of physical damage in the Canterbury hospital network was 
only partial, patients could still be transferred between hospitals in order to surge capacity at the most 
important facilities (such as Christchurch Hospital). Patients could still be transferred between 
partially damaged and partially functionally reduced hospitals in Christchurch and treated adequately 
because the functionality was only partial. The reasons’ the Christchurch/Canterbury hospital network 
was able to surge capacity are highlighted in Table 5.10 under the organizational performance 
measure for all four criteria (Table 5.10).  The key reasons are; alternative hospitals were pre -
126 
 
identified, emergency plans were in place and preexisting plans were available to aid the patient 
transfer process (Table 5.10). 
Christchurch Hospital had to free up capacity because it had the only ICU in Christchurch and 
therefore was required to treat the most severe earthquake casualties. 365 out of the 457 patients that 
were transferred from Christchurch Hospital in the two weeks following the Christchurch earthquake 
were transferred to other hospitals in Canterbury. This was made possible because the net capacity for 
all of Canterbury’s hospitals prior to the Christchurch earthquake was 1822 beds, of which only 149 
beds were lost during the earthquake (Table 5.8). As well, the critical emergency equipment for the 
Christchurch hospital network was largely undamaged. This was the result of the relatively strong 
economic performance (Table 5.10) with respect to the mitigation of the seismic hazard. The slight to 
moderate degree of damage to non essential physical components was a result of the underestimation 
of the seismic hazard (Section 1.3.2). 
There were 7171 Christchurch earthquake casualties in total, even considering a number of the 
casualties wouldn’t have required hospital treatment, the Canterbury hospital network still needed to 
transfer patients to other areas of New Zealand in order to relieve strain on the Christchurch hospital 
network. The remaining 92 patients that weren’t transferred to hospitals in Canterbury were 
transferred to hospitals in the other regions in the South Island and the North Island. The transfer of 
patients to other hospitals in New Zealand accounted for the high Social performance measure in 
Table 5.10 for the robustness and rapidity criteria. This was because the quick transfers enabled 
patients to be hospitalized and treated within the first day of being injured. 
The transfers to the other regions of New Zealand were by helicopter and fixed wing (Tables 5.5-5.6). 
The transfers by air were made possible because there was a wide range of transport services available 
that were capable of transferring hospitalized patients long distances (Table 5.4). The availability of 
air transfer resources meant that the Christchurch hospital network was able to maximize the use of 
residual building capacity (Table 5.10). 
The factors responsible for the short term resilence of the Canterbury hospital network are as follows: 
1. Continued partial functionality within the Christchurch hospital network (Table 5.8) (Table 
5.10) 
2. The relatively low amount of casualties requiring hospital treatment compared to the available 
regional hospital capacity (Section 5.2.1) 
3. The availability of residual capacity within the national hospital network (Table 5.8) (Table 
5.10) 
4. The availability of transport resources (Tables’ 5.4-5.7 ) (Table 5.10) 
5. The ability to transfer patients quickly (Appendix N) (Table 5.10) 
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5.6.2 Long term resilence of Christchurch Hospital 
For the purpose of this study, the resilence exhibited in the long term is defined as the period which 
starts 6 months after the Christchurch earthquake and is complete when the functionality of 
Christchurch Hospital is restored to its pre earthquake level. At present (31
st
 March, 2013) this period 
is ongoing because the functionality of Christchurch Hospital has not been fully restored. 
Christchurch Hospital was the most strained hospital in the Canterbury hospital network following the 
Christchurch earthquake as a result of long term capacity loss (Table 3.3) and lengthy earthquake 
repair work (Section 3.2). It is also the largest hospital in Canterbury (Table 5.8) and the most 
important in terms of treating patients in severe conditions.  
The ALOS for the two weeks before the Christchurch earthquake for all the Christchurch Hospital 
wards was 3.3 days (Section 5.2.3). The ALOS for the period between the 11
th
 and the 14
th
 of 
February, 2013 for all the Christchurch Hospital wards was 1.6 days. The lower ALOS for the two 
weeks following the Christchurch earthquake for all the Christchurch Hospital wards (2.41 days) is 
likely a result of transfers and discharges, which were executed in order to surge capacity and relieve 
strain on the hospital. The even lower ALOS (1.6 days) for the period between the 11
th
 and the 13
th
 of 
February, 2013 is likely a result of the efforts made by Christchurch Hospital to reduce the demand on 
in-hospital treatment, with measures such as CREST and MMS (Explained further in Section 3.3.2). 
Christchurch Hospital was able to reduce the demand on in-hospital treatment following the 
Christchurch earthquake, because the provision of healthcare services was maximised for the given 
capacity by the hospitals organizational structure (Table 5.10).  
The functional loss calculated in Table 5.8 was less of an issue in the long term at Christchurch 
Hospital (Section 3.2.4) than the short term. The damage that caused the worst functional loss was 
remedied in the immediate days and weeks following the Christchurch earthquake because the 
damaged services and lifelines that contributed to the loss of the most vital functions were prioritized.  
The long term challenges for resilence were a result of the permanent loss of bed capacity following 
the Christchurch earthquake (Section 3.3.2). As well, the earthquake damage to non essential physical 
elements resulted in partial lost capacity in the long term. Because, the work that was required to 
remediate the cosmetic earthquake damage to the interior of the hospital required areas of the hospital 
to be closed (Section 3.2.3). The repairs were managed with disciplined planning and collaboration 
between Clinical and maintenance staff (Section 3.2.3). However, insurance issues prolonged certain 
areas of the repair work (Section 3.2.2) which are categorized in Table 5.10 as a measure of rapidity 
for the organizational environment.  
The factors responsible for the long term resilence of the Canterbury hospital network are as follows:  
1. Relatively robust buildings, lifelines and services (Sections 3.2.2-3.2.4) 
2. The outsourcing of elective surgeries to other hospitals (Section 3.3.2) 
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3. Community care initiatives (Section 3.3.2) 
4. Well planned cosmetic damage repair work (Section 3.2.3) 
5.6.3 Summary 
Robustness and redundancy are measures of a hospital networks ability to withstand a seismic hazard 
and limit immediate functional loss. Resourcefulness and rapidity are measures which define how 
quickly the hospital network can regain the level of pre-earthquake functionality following an 
earthquake (Table 5.9). The Robustness and redundancy of the Canterbury hospital network following 
the Christchurch earthquake was relatively strong, because strong measures were taken by the 
network to mitigate earthquake damage and remain operational. Although the earthquake damage and 
functionality loss was relatively moderate (Table 5.8), it still required significant work in order to 
reinstate the Canterbury hospital networks original capacity and functionality.  
The resourcefulness of the Canterbury Hospital network is the main contributing factor to the 
Canterbury hospital networks relatively strong rapidity. The rapidity of the functional response was 
strong as all the essential services were restored in the short term (Section 5.6.1). The rapidity with 
regard to the bed capacity wasn’t as strong, because the lost capacity was largely a result of destroyed 
buildings (Section 2.4.1). Replacing lost building capacity is more complicated than repairing 
functionality to services because it requires new building stock to be constructed (Section 3.2.2).   
5.7 Conclusion 
The Christchurch earthquake caused relatively little infrastructure damage and few casualties. The 
physical damage to facilities and transport infrastructure was not severe enough to warrant entire 
hospitals to be evacuated and to seriously impede the inter-hospital transfer process. However, 
because there was some permanent capacity loss and a number of casualties requiring treatment, 
hospital transfers were necessary. The transfers were necessary in order to provide continued 
treatment to the population, but the relatively low volume of required transfers meant that transport 
resources were not constrained.  
The type of inter-hospital transfer process which is required after an earthquake is very unique 
depending on the characteristics of the earthquake, previous transfer planning and the built 
environment. The relative abundance of transport resources, good transfer planning and the relatively 
resilient built environment in Christchurch meant that fixed wing, helicopter and road transfers could 
all be utilized to reduce the time for patient transfers. Because fixed wing and helicopters were 
available patients could be transferred to hospitals situated 300km to750km away in the North Island 
and distant areas of the South Island.  
The estimation of transfer time can be broken down into four components; the State of the patient, 
Residual capacity, Mode and Destination. The four components are all interconnected and influenced 
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by a variety of factors related to the earthquake, previous transfer planning and the built environment. 
Hospital evacuation and transfer is identified in the literature as a source of risk for patients. If the 
transfer process is unplanned and time consuming the patient may be exposed to unnecessary risk. 
Therefore, it would pay for hospitals to evaluate the probable time required to transport patients given 






















6 Chapter six: Conclusions and recommendations 
Earthquakes pose a significant risk to the ability of hospitals and hospital networks to perform 
adequate and continuous healthcare. Hospitals and hospital networks are complex systems because 
they rely on a large quantity of services to provide continuous health care. Hospitals are comprised of 
many physical components and buildings which often have physical components added on following 
construction to accommodate advances in technology. The need to accommodate new technology and 
the wide range of services requires hospitals to constantly evolve; the continually changing nature of 
hospitals makes seismic risk reduction a constant challenge. 
This research aims to identify and recommend ways to increase the resilience of hospitals and hospital 
networks to earthquake induced physical damage and organizational disruption and further define 
ways to provide continued healthcare following large earthquakes. The main objectives are; 
- Prepare a literature review in order to draw common themes from post disaster hospital case 
studies. As well, the review of literature is intended to determine the key components of 
hospitals and hospital networks that increase resilence and impeded post disaster 
functionality. 
- Define how the Canterbury hospital network was prepared in light of the perceived seismic 
hazards in the short term and long term leading up to the Christchurch earthquake and how 
the disaster management strategies, seismic zoning, anti-seismic building codes influenced 
the Canterbury hospital networks seismic resilience. 
- Define how the physical and organizational elements of the Christchurch hospital network 
performed following the Christchurch earthquake. 
- Assess the merit and apply physical and organizational seismic vulnerability assessment 
methodology with data from Christchurch’s post Christchurch earthquake hospital network, in 
order to define gaps in the methodology.  
- Develop a conceptual model in order to predict the location and speed of patient redistribution 
following functional loss to hospitals. 
- Provide recommendations for other hospital networks in seismically active cities by 
highlighting factors that contributed to a resilient response, and the factors that impeded 
functionality.  
6.1 Conclusions drawn from the literature 
Following the review of post disaster hospital literature it is apparent that following large earthquakes 
damage to services and nonstructural components in hospitals and hospital networks is far more 
common than structural damage (Section 2.4.2). Structural damage may be rarer but if facilities are 
structurally compromised beyond the level required for safe occupation the capacity will be 
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permanently lost until the facility is transferred or replaced. Severe nonstructural damage and services 
damage within hospitals is highly disruptive during the emergency response phase and can even cause 
hospital operations to be ceased all together. Slight to moderate nonstructural damage can be 
remediated with continued hospital operation. However, carrying out repair work with continued 
operation of clinical facilities is highly disruptive and adds to staff fatigue. As well, miss-categorising 
nonthreatening nonstructural damage as life threatening structural damage can cause facilities to be 
unnecessarily evacuated (Section 2.7.1). 
Hospital network resilience coincides with strong anti-seismic design criteria for structural, 
nonstructural and service components combined with good knowledge of the local seismic hazard 
(Section 2.3) and affective organisational management. However, the challenge of increasing 
robustness into nonstructural systems is difficult, because nonstructural systems are comprised of 
many unique components with differing interconnecting relationships. The relationships between 
nonstructural components and the structural system in some cases can encourage nonstructural 
damage. Non-structural and structural damage can cause or exacerbate services damage, because 
services are connected to both the structural and nonstructural system (Section 2.4.3). Nonstructural 
components are often water damaged when the complex heterogeneous water services are damaged. 
In summary all the groups that make up the physical components of a hospital are interconnected; the 
consequences of damage can negatively influence another group of components. Backup systems 
need to be regularly tested, seismically braced and maintained. As well they must be assessed with 
regards to the secondary consequences of strong seismicity in order to be resilient (Section 4.2.4).    
The high complexity of hospital systems presents problems for seismic vulnerability analysis, because 
of the many connections between the different components and the nature by which the failures can 
be propagated between components. The large amount of components and their inter-connections can 
potentially produce numerous negative outcomes during strong seismicity.  The emergency phase of a 
mass casualty disaster also adds complexity to hospitals and hospital networks by increasing the 
demand on patient care services. Therefore the emergency phase also adds complexity to seismic 
vulnerability analysis methodology.  
6.2 Conclusions from the Christchurch Hospital network 
The most disruptive damage to the Canterbury Hospital network following the Christchurch 
earthquake included minor structural damage to both clinical and support buildings and nonstructural 
damage to ceiling tiles and light fittings (Section 4.2.3). Within Christchurch there were outages to all 
the cities lifelines for various times, as well as damage to back-up utilities and internal services.  
The nonstructural damage was more widespread and more disruptive than the minor/moderate 
structural damage within the Canterbury hospital network, and was especially severe in the 
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Christchurch hospitals. At the time of the earthquake all the hospitals complied with the current New 
Zealand Seismic Design Standards (Section 2.3.2)  
The loss of short term and long term capacity at Christchurch Hospital was managed by outsourcing 
elective surgery, relocating wards to other hospitals and by reducing the demand for hospital care by 
implementing community care measures such as CREST and MMS (Section 4.5.2). The Christchurch 
earthquake proved it would be beneficial for organizational planning in modern hospitals to focus on 
identifying vulnerabilities in non-structural and service systems within critical facilities.  Similarly to 
what was stated in the literature and observed in international case studies, most of the loss of 
capacity caused by structural damage in the Christchurch hospital network following the Christchurch 
earthquake is still lost 24 months after the 22
nd
 of February, 2011 
The hospital-to-hospital transfers from Christchurch Hospital to receiving facilities were not 
jeopardised by earthquake damage or lack of resources. The use of fixed wing and helicopter transfers 
greatly reduced the time taken for patients that were transferred from Christchurch Hospital. By using 
assumptions on the transfer path and traffic congestion it is estimated that the time of road transfers 
increased on average by 7 minutes per transfer in the first two weeks following the Christchurch 
earthquake (section 5.4). As no patients died during transfer the increase in transfer time had 
negligible impact, however the increase in road transfer time may have increased demand on 
helicopter transfers. As well, the number of earthquake casualties did not over run the regional 
hospital facilities (Section 4.3.1). All though some patients were transferred to other regions they were 
stable. The majority of the transfers from the Canterbury region were from Christchurch Hospital.  
Most of the transfers from Christchurch Hospital were from the Orthopaedic wards (Ward 18 and 
ward 19), Neurology & Neurosurgery (ward 28), the Medical Day Unit (MDU) and the Christchurch 
Women’s Hospital maternity wards. 
The public hospitals within the Canterbury hospital network operated at occupancies’ in the high 90 
percentile range prior to the Christchurch earthquake (which is considered very high internationally). 
All indications show that even with the disruption and loss in capacity the Christchurch hospital 
network has still provided the population with an adequate level of health care following the 
Canterbury earthquakes. This suggests that the Canterbury hospital network had in place or built 
seismic resilience into its network at an organizational level (Section 2.1.5). The consensus from 
individuals within the CDHB and the private sector is that the strong existing relationships between 
the public hospital, private hospital and general care sectors meant that the capacity redistribution and 
demand reducing measures were able to be planned and implemented with relative ease. As well, 
relationships between CDHB staff and emergency operators such as the fire service were beneficial 
during the emergency phase. Another factor, which helped the Christchurch hospital network 
response to the Christchurch earthquake, was the fact that the CDHB planned to accommodate a large 
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increase in patients following the earthquakes, but in the end there was no large increase in patients. It 
was also recognised that the Darfield earthquake helped prepare the Canterbury hospital network by 
way of introducing backup measures and planning for the likely outcomes of another large 
earthquake.  
Strong interconnections between individuals and organizations in the CDHB and the greater New 
Zealand healthcare system were fostered by the social based healthcare structure and likely increased 
the earthquake resilience of the network significantly (chapter 3). Where individuals are more aware 
of an earthquakes affect on the entire health care network rather than just the facility they operate 
within, then they are likely to make decisions that increase the resilience of the entire network and not 
just the individual facility. The positive outcome of strong hospital network connections is to 
streamline the outsourcing of services and redistribute capacity if required during the emergency 
response and recovery phases of a disaster, and ultimately insure a greater chance of continuous post 
disaster healthcare.  
The healthcare assessment methodology which was analysed in the thesis recognises the importance 
of external and internal lifelines and supply networks. The lifelines and supply networks differ from 
the essential components of individual hospitals in that they are spatially extensive and controlled by 
separate stakeholders. The transport network is an essential lifeline required for redistributing 
capacity, wide spread destruction of transport infrastructure and increased traffic are common after 
large earthquakes. Traffic congestion is defined in the literature as a problem for capacity 
redistribution following hospital evacuations (Section 3.3.1).  
Because of their wide extent transport and lifelines networks that supply and connect hospital 
networks respond uniquely in different sectors to seismicity. Therefore, predicting how the transport 
and lifelines network will be impeded depends on the how the seismicity interacts with the likely flow 
of people, the characteristics of the underlying land and the infrastructure. The functionality of 
hospitals situated outside the zone of primary physical earthquake damage may be reduced if they 
depend on lifelines or services situated or provided within the disaster zone (Figure 5.2). The loss of 
functionality caused by the secondary effects of the earthquake may also extend to hospitals beyond 
the zone of primary physical damage, in order to accommodate patients from the disaster zone 
patients may need to be discharged from hospitals nearby but not in the zone of primary damage 
(Section 5.3).  
Closures within the transport network are dependent on the organizational environments’ (Section 
2.1.5) ability to mitigate and plan for damage prior to earthquakes, the perception of the risk posed by 
earthquake damaged infrastructure, the process of post earthquake assessment and the speed which 
damage is able to be repaired following the earthquake (Section 5.3).  
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The size and distribution of hospital to hospital transfers that may be required following an earthquake 
is dependent on; the estimated number of casualties, the severity of casualties, the epidemiological 
profile, the ALOS (under normal conditions and for earthquake casualties), the hospital capacity and 
the hospital functionality. The national, regional and local organizational structure controls how easily 
hospitals can redistribute capacity (Section 5.3). 
The best application of methodology for the assessment of a hospital network is the combination of 
methodology that incorporates all the environments. Simply measuring the affect of the earthquake 
induced physical damage will exclude the importance of the built environment, organizational 
environment, social environment and the natural environment. The organizational environment can 
influence the impact the earthquake has on the physical environment by determining the level of 
maintenance and the seismic design standard criteria for buildings and lifelines. Post earthquake, the 
organizational environment influences how the damage is classified. The organizational environments 
role in post earthquake damage assessment is difficult, because it is highly complicated to quickly 
assemble assessment teams and have them organized after large earthquakes in urban areas. As well, 
the organizational environment influences the social environment by defining the level of care, which 
is available to the community and the sections of the community that have access to the healthcare 
(Section 2.1.5).  
The WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment is structured to provide a vulnerability indexes 
to buildings using their structural characteristics and to provide the likelihood of damage to be 
expected in the event of an earthquake (described in terms of MMI). In this research the seismic 
vulnerability assessment for hospital systems proposed by WHO (2006) was applied to the 
Canterbury hospital network and the results were compared with the post Christchurch earthquake 
damage observations. The WHO (2006) methodology underestimated the seismic vulnerability of 2 
out of the total of 13 buildings that were structurally damaged when the maximum MMI was used for 
the calculations (section 4.4).  
The St George’s Cancer Care centre (which was structurally damaged) was deemed to have low 
vulnerability because the WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment methodology does not 
include a modifier for buildings with unbalanced mass and multiple stories in very soft saturated 
sediment (Section 3.5.2.1). The unbalanced mass, multiple stories beneath ground level and 
liquefiable soils that characterised the St George’s Cancer Care centre site caused the structural 
failure of the building. As well, the WHO (2006) structural vulnerability assessment does not include 
measures that incorporate the cumulative effect of aftershocks which may explain why the Akaroa 
Hospital was classed as having a low seismic vulnerability but was structurally damaged. The affect 
of the Canterbury earthquakes rich aftershock sequence may have had an important influence upon 
Canterbury’s hospitals, because with each event structural systems are likely to be weakened further. 
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The structural damage assessment following the Christchurch earthquake may have influenced 
whether or not previous structural damage was correctly identified, public outrage and over caution 
may have caused the closure of certain buildings. The delayed identification of the Akaroa Hospitals 
structural damage was due to the miss interpretation of structural damage during the early 
assessments. There is also the probability that aftershocks during 2011 exacerbated the Christchurch 
earthquake structural damage (Section 4.6.1.2). 
The Canterbury inter-hospital transfer response for the first two weeks following the Christchurch 
earthquake was dominated by outgoing patients from Christchurch Hospital which also received the 
majority of the earthquake casualties. Severe earthquake casualties were transferred to ICUs as distant 
as the North Island, along with other non earthquake patients including geriatric patients.  
The main mode of transfer for the less critical patients within Christchurch and Canterbury was via 
road. However, transfer by road (Table 5.7) to the hospitals in the rest of the South Island and the 
North Island would have taken too long. Fixed wing flights and helicopters were used for the long 
distance transfers in order to reduce the transfer time (Table 5.5 & 5.6).The Christchurch Airport 
handled all the fixed wing transfers from Christchurch Hospital 
The use of helicopters and fixed wing flights to move patients within Christchurch and between cities 
greatly reduced the transfer travel time.  This was possible because of the low number of patients 
requiring transfer and air resources were not stressed beyond the point where patients that needed to 
be transferred could not be.  
The relative abundance of transport resources, good transfer planning and the relatively resilient built 
environment in Christchurch meant that fixed wing, helicopter and road transfers could all be utilized 
to reduce the time for patient transfers. Because fixed wing and helicopters were available, patients 
could be transferred to hospitals situated 300km to750km away in the North Island and distant areas 
of the South Island.  
New Zealand’s hospitals can be grouped into three categories in order to determine their level of 
functional loss following the Christchurch earthquake (Section 5.3). Category One hospitals are 
classed as being completely within the disaster zone, Category Two hospitals are classed as being 
partially within the disaster zone and Category Three hospitals are classed as being completely 
outside the zone of primary physical earthquake damage (Figure 5.9). The Category One hospitals 
were only located in Christchurch, the Category Two hospitals that were on the edge of the zone of 
primary physical earthquake damage were located in the towns that are adjacent to Christchurch. All 
the hospitals in category Three are located either in the areas in Canterbury far away from 
Christchurch or the other regions in the South Island or in the North Island. The Reduction in hospital 
bed capacity was limited to Category One hospitals (Table 5.8).  
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6.3 Key recommendations 
 
The key recommendations based on the findings and outcomes from the research are as follows:  
1. Nonstructural components are easily damaged in strong seismicity; as well the repairs are 
costly and disruptive. Reducing the seismic vulnerability of nonstructural elements, 
particularly suspended ceilings (plaster tile ties) and plaster walls increases resilience. 
Disruptive post earthquake repairs can be avoided if all nonstructural components are 
constructed and managed to withstand strong seismicity.  
2. Backup systems are vital following large earthquakes. Reducing the vulnerability of back up 
resources to the secondary consequences of seismicity such as disturbed sediment in backup 
generator fuel tanks and liquefied silt in back up bores is vital. Even after regular testing it is 
possible certain areas of vulnerability in backup systems can remain unidentified until an 
earthquake. 
3. Lifelines are integral in insuring hospitals remain operational immediately following a large 
earthquake. The portions of external lifelines that serve strategic buildings like hospitals need 
to be differentiated from the lifelines that serve non critical buildings in order to construct and 
manage them to withstand strong seismicity. 
4. Adaptive capacity within the hospital network’s Organisational environment is strongly 
beneficial.  Developing adaptive capacity by strengthening inter-hospital network 
relationships and generating plans to accommodate and redistribute capacity improves 
resilience. Specific consideration must be given to the framework required for inter hospital 
transfers and the out sourcing of services prior to earthquakes.  
5. Staff ingenuity and experience plays an important role in hospitals during the emergency 
phase of an earthquake. When staff can adapt under pressure and with limited resources they 
considerably mitigate the negative effects of earthquake induced hospital disruption.  
6. Diverse hospital/ hospital networks are beneficial following large earthquakes. Because 
earthquake damage is spatially variable; therefore if one area of a spatially diversified hospital 
network is lost, then another hospital which is able to perform the same functions but located 
in another area can accommodate the lost capacity.  
7. A robust understanding of the seismic hazards probability, magnitude and spatial variability 
in relation to all the internal and external components that constitute a hospital network is 
vital in identifying how the physical and organisational components of the hospital network 
can be made more resilient. 
8. Delayed identification of structural and nonstructural damage was a common theme observed 
throughout the post Christchurch earthquake Canterbury hospital network. Hospital networks 
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would benefit from having in place the means to conduct very detailed nonstructural and 
structural assessments immediately after an earthquake.  
9. Inter-hospital transfers are common following destructive earthquakes. The process of 
transferring patients is potentially disrupted by infrastructure damage and depleted transport 
resources. It would be wise for hospitals to plan for the probable destination of transfers and 





Achour, N. (2007). Estimation of Malfunctioning of a Health Care Facility in Case of Earthquake, PhD 
Thesis. Kanazawa University, Japan. 
 
Achour, N., Miyajima, M., Ikemoto, T., & Ingaki, J. (2005). Damage analysis of health care facilities in the 
2004 Niigata-Ken Chuetsu earthquake, Journal of Earthquake Engineering 28, Paper 164, 7 pp. 
 
Achour, N., Miyajima, M., & Kitaura, M. (2007). Response of wheeled equipment without restoring force to 
sinusoidal wave, 10th World Conference on Seismic Isolation, Energy Dissipation and Active 
Vibrations Control of Structures, (pp.12) Istanbul, Turkey.  
 
Alberts, C.J., Behrens, S.G., Pethia, R.D., & Wilson, W.R. (1999), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation SM (OCTAVE SM) Framework, Version 1.0. Networked Systems 
Survivability Program TECHNICAL REPORT CMU/SEI-99-TR-017 ESC-TR-99-01.  
Ardagh, M.W., Richardson, S., Robinson, V., Comp, R., Than, N.M., Gee, P., Henderson, S., Khodaverdi, L., 
McKie, J. & Roberston, G. (2012). The initial health-system response to the earthquake in 
Christchurch, New Zealand, New Zealand, in February. Lancet 2012; 379, New Zealand. D-11-
06194R2, SO140-6736(12)60313-4  
 
ASMS. (2012). Christchurch Hospital Emergency Department and the earthquake. Retrieved June 13, 2012, 
from University of Otago. Association of Salaried Medical Specialist 
website:http://www.asms.org.nz/Site/News/Latest_News/17a_Apr_2012.aspx  
Bavis, A. (2011). Canterbury Earthquake: remaining operational. Christchurch, New Zealand: Facilities & 
Engineering Manager CDHB. 
Beatty, M.F. (2006). Dynamics -The Analysis of Motion. Principles of Engineering Mechanics, Volume 2, 
Birkhäuser 
Berler. A., Spyrou, S., Monochristou, E., Yannis A. Konnis, T.G., Magglaveras, N., & Koutsouris. D. (2009). 
Risk Assessment in Integrated Regional Healthcare Networks. The electronic journal for emerging 
tools and applications on Electronic Commerce in Pervasive Environments, New special issue 
Volume 3, issue 1. 
Berggren R. (2005). Unexpected Necessities Inside Charity Hospital. The New England Journal of Medicine, 
N Engl J Med 2005; 353:1550-1553.  
Blyleven, M., & Burden, P. (2012). Keeping Christchurch Moving: Post EQ Traffic Management. 
Christchurch, New Zealand: NZTA & Christchurch City Council. 
Bruneau, M., Stephanie, E. Chang., Ronald. T., Eguchi. M., Lee. G.C., Thomas. D., O’Rourke.D., Andrei. M,. 
Reinhorn,E., Shinozuka. M.F., Tierney,K.G., William, A., Wallace, H., & Detlof von Winterfeldti 
(2003). A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of Communities 
Earthquake Spectra, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Volume 19, No. 4, pages 733–752. 
CCANZ. (2011). Seismic structural solutions. Featherston, Wellington New Zealand: Cement & Concrete 
Association New Zealand. 
139 
 
CDHB. (2012). Planning and funding Exception report. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury District 
Health Board. 
 
CDHB. (2012a). “We need the whole system to be working for the whole system to work”. Transition 2012. 
Canterbury, New Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board.  
 
CDHB. (2012b). Health first: Nursing. Canterbury, New Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board. 
CDHB (2012c). Evacuation of vulnerable people – Christchurch earthquake: Chair and Members. 
Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board. 
CDHB (2012d). Communications Media Release - Ashburton Hospital Theatre Block Closed Following 
Engineering Assessments. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board. 
CDHB (2012e). Chief executives update. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board 
CDHB (2012f). Diabetes Centre & Home Dialysis Training Building - future uncertain. Christchurch, New 
Zealand: Canterbury District Health Board. 
CDHB (2012g). The Princess Margaret hospital: Hospital Map & Address. Christchurch, New Zealand: 
Canterbury District Health Board. 
Celebi, M. (1997). Response of Olive View Hospital to Northridge and Whittier Earthquakes. M.ASCE, (Res. 
Civ. Engr., U.S. Geological Survey (MS977), 345 Middlefield Rd., Menlo Park, CA 94025).  Journal 
of Structural Engineering, Vol. 123, No. 4, April 1997, pp. 389-396. 
 
CHSSL, (2005). California’s Hospital Seismic Safety Law; Its History, Implementation, & Progress, Office of 
State wide Health Planning & Development. California, USA. 
Cimellaro, G.P., Reinhorn, A.M., & Bruneau, M. (2010). Organizational model of a hospital system; NZSEE 
Conference 2010 paper, 20. Retrieved from New Zealand Society for earthquake engineering 
database. 
 
City of Kobe, Japan. (1999). The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Statistics and Restoration Progress, 
December 1, 1998. In Urban Earthquake Hazard Reduction. Proceedings of the 6th Japan/United 
States Workshop on Urban Earthquake Hazard Reduction, 12-14 January 1999, International 
Conference Center Kobe, Kobe, Japan, 88-110. UNCRD Proceedings Series, no. 35. Nagoya, Japan: 
United Nations Centre for Regional Development, 1999. 
 
CWCART. (2013). The Westpac Rescue Helicopter, BK-117-B2 ZK-HJC. Christchurch, New Zealand: 
Canterbury West Coast Air Rescue Trust. 
 
Davenport, P.N (2004). Review of seismic provisions of historic New Zealand loading codes; Institute of 
Geological & Nuclear Sciences, Lower Hutt, New Zealand; 2004 NZSEE Conference, Retrieved from 
New Zealand Society for earthquake engineering database. 
 
DBH. (2011). Department of building and housing. Egress Stairs: Earthquake checks needed for some. 
Egress Stairs Practice Advisory 13. 30 September 2011. New Zealand Government.  
 
DHB. (2008). Department of building and housing. Significant changes in structural design 
: New Loadings Standards have been cited with substantial modifications Practice Advisory 9, June 




Dorn, C., Green, A. G., Jongens, R., Carpentier, S., Kasier, A. E., Campbell, F., Horstmeyer, H., Campbell, J., 
Finnemore, M., & Pettinga, J., (2010). High- resolution seismic images of potentially seismogenic 
structures beneath the northwest Canterbury Plains, New Zealand, Journal of Geophysical Research: 
Solid Earth, 115 (11). 
ECLAC. (2003). Handbook for Estimating the Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters, 
LC/MEX/G.5 LC/L.1874 United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC).PDNA. (2010). Post Disaster Needs Assessments. Guidance for health sector 
assessment to support the post disaster recovery process, version 2.2, World Health Organization 
(WHO) Humanitarian Health Action. 
EEFIT. (2009). The L’Aquila, Italy Earthquake of 6 April 2009: A Preliminary Field Report, Earthquake 
Engineering Field Investigation Team. London, United Kingdom. 
 
EERI (2006). The Kashmir Earthquake of October 8, 2005: Impacts in Pakistan.  Learning from Earthquakes, 
Special Earthquake Report; Accessed on 1 June 2012, http://www.safehospitals.info/. 
 
EQC. (2012). The value of Lifeline seismic risk mitigation in Christchurch. Wellington, New Zealand: New 
Zealand Lifelines, Fenwick. T.  
FEMA (2009). Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA E-74 Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural 
Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide (Fourth Edition), accessed on 16 November 
2009, http://www.atcouncil.org/FEMA74/FEMA74index.html.  
FEMA. (2007). Risk Management Series: Design Guide for Improving Hospital Safety in Earthquakes, 
Floods, and High Winds. Hospital design considerations. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
577. USA: 32.  
 
Filiatrault, A., Uang, C.M., Folz, B., Constantin, C.C., & Gatto, K.. (2001). Reconnaissance report of 
Nisqually (Seattle-Olympia) February 28, 2001 Earthquake. Structural systems research project the 
Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center and the Consortium of Universities for 
Earthquake Engineering (CUREE) Report No. SSRP-2001/2002, March 2001.  
 
Geonet (2011). 22 February 2011 – Christchurch badly damaged by magnitude 6.3 earthquake". Geonet. GNS 
Science. 23 February 2011. http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/feb-2011-christchurch-badly-damaged-
by-magnitude-6-3-earthquake.html. Retrieved 19 June 2012. 
Geonet (2012). Canterbury Earthquakes. <http://www.geonet.org.nz/canterbury-quakes/>. Accessed 18 
October 2011. 
Geonet (2013). Canterbury quakes: Aftershocks". Geonet. GNS Science. 26 December 2011. 
http://www.geonet.org.nz/canterbury-quakes/aftershocks/index.html. Retrieved 19 June 2012. 
Giovinazzi, S. (2005). The vulnerability assessment and the damage scenario in seismic risk analysis, Ph.D 
Thesis of the doctoral course “Risk Management on the built environment” jointly organized by 
University of Florence (I) and TU-Braunschweig (D) 
Goulet, C.A., Stewart, J. P., Bazzurro, P., Field, E. H. (2007) “Guidelines and tools for the integration of 
ground response analyses into probabilistic seismic hazard analyses.” 4th International Conference on 
Earthquake Geotechnical Engineering. Thessaloniki, Greece, June 25-28, 2007. Paper #1486. 
Grigoriu, M., & Kafali, C. (2003). Fragility analysis for nonstructural systems in critical facilities, 
Proceedings: ATC-29-2 seminar on Seismic Design, Performance, and Retrofit of Nonstructural, 
141 
 
Components in Critical Facilities, Newport Beach, CA, 23–24.  
Grünthal G (ed) (1998) European Macroseismic Scale 1998 (EMS-98). Cahiers du Centre Européen de 
Géodynamique et de Séismologie 15, Centre Européen de Géodynamique et de Séismologie, 
Luxembourg, 99 p 
 
Guest, R. (2004). Japanese Earthquake: Twenty seconds of terror leaves buildings ablaze and roads ruined, 
Flimsy homes become tombs for those trapped by tremor, Telegraph, 1 November 2004, London, 
accessed on 9 May 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/1995/01/18/kobeearthquake.xml.  
 
Hampton, S.J. (2010). Growth, Structure And Evolution of the Lyttelton Volcanic Complex, Banks Peninsula. 
PhD thesis. University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Hamburger, R.O. (2002). Building Code Provisions for Seismic Resistance, CRC Press: Taylor and Francis 
Group, Boca Raton, FL, 1–25.  
 
Henry, B., & Schwartz, B. (2006). Hospital Risk Assessment. The centre for excellence in emergency 
preparedness, disaster preparedness conference 2006. 
HHS. (2011). Agency for healthcare research; Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide. United States: U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services. 
Holmes Consultancy Group. (2012). Earthquake seismic report: Report 05, Akaroa Hospital. Canterbury 
District Health Board, Christchurch, New Zealand: Holmes Consultancy Group. 
Holmes, W.T. (1976). Seismic design of the Veterans' Administration Hospital at Loma Linda, California. 
University of Missouri-Rolla, International Symposium of Earthquake Structural Engineering, August 
19-21, 1976, St. Louis, MO., 1976-08. 
 
Hossain, L., & Danny Chun Kit (2012). Modelling coordination in hospital emergency departments through 
social network analysis; Disasters, 36(2): (pp. 338−364). Journal compilation © Overseas 
Development Institute. Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 
Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2010.01260.x 
Housner, G. W. (1963). The behaviour of inverted pendulum structures during earthquakes, Bulletin of the 
Seismological Society of America, 53, 403–417.  
 
ICEF (2011). State of Knowledge and Guidelines for Utilization. International Commission on Earthquake 
Forecasting for Civil Protection; Annals of geophysics, 54, 4, 2011; doi: 10.4401/ag-5350, 30 MAY 
2011. 
Hick, J.L., & Hanfling, D. (2004).Health Care Facility and Community Strategies for Patient Care Surge 
Capacity. The American College of Emergency Physicians. doi:10.1016/ j.annemergmed.2004.04.011. 
 
 
Johnston, D.M., Standring, S., Ronan, K., Lindell, M., Wilson, T.M., Cousins, J., McBride, S., Aldridge, E., A
rdargh, M., Dealy, D., in preparation. Nature and type of injuries from the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand. to be submitted in 2013. 
Kafali, C., & Grigoriu, M.F., (2004). Seismic Fragility Analysis. 9
th
 ASCE Specialty Conference on 
Probabilistic Mechanics and Structural Reliability.  
142 
 
KeteScap. (2010). Revision History: 1926 Akaroa Hospital, Shuttleworth Collection Christchurch: Banks 
Peninsula, New Zealand. 
King, A., McVerry, G (2004). Where is that new earthquake loadings standard? Institute of Geological and 
Nuclear Sciences, NZSEE Conference 2004, Lower Hutt.  
 
 
King, A.B. (1999). Serviceability Limit State Criteria for New Zealand Buildings. BRANZ, Study Report SR 
57, Judgeford.  
 
King, S.A., & Kiremidjian, A. (1994). Regional seismic hazard and risk analysis through geographic 
information systems. The John A Blume Earthquake Engineering Centre, Report No. 111.  
 
Kircher, C.A., & McCann, M.W. (1983). Development of fragility curves for estimation of earthquake-
induced damage. A Workshop on Continuing Actions to Reduce Potential Losses from Future 
Earthquakes in Arkansas and Nearby States: Proceedings of Conference XXIII. Open-File Report 81–
437. Washington, DC: US Geological Survey (USGS).  
 
Lagomarsino S and Giovinazzi S (2006). Macroseismic and mechanical models for the vulnerability and 
damage assessment of current buildings, B Earthquake Eng 4:415-443 
 
Lee, G.C., & Loh, C.H. (2000) The Chi-Chi Taiwan Earthquake of September 21, 1999: Reconnaissance 
Report, MCEER-00-0003, in press.  
Mahmood, W. Y. W., Mohammed, A. H., Minsnan, M. S., Yusof, Z. M., & Bakri, A. (2006). Development of 
quality culture in the construction industry, in Proceedings, International Conference on Computing 
and Informatics (ICCI 2006), University Utara Malaysia & IEEE Malaysia Kuala Lumpur. 
 
Makris, N., & Zhang, J. (1999). Rocking Response and Overturning of Anchored Equipment under Seismic 
Excitations, PEER Report 1999/06. Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center College of 
Engineering University of California, Berkeley November 1999. 1999-06, Berkeley, California.  
 
Masi, G., Santarsiero, L., & Chiauzzi. (2012). Vulnerability assessment and seismic risk reduction strategies 
of hospitals in Basilicata region (Italy), 15 WCEE. Department of Structures, Geotechnics and 
Engineering Geology, University of Basilicata, Potenza, Italy.  
McColl, G. (2012). Control and co-ordination during a health emergency response.  The Australian Journal of 
Emergency Management .Volume 27, No. 4. 
McIntosh, J.K., Jacques, C., Mitrani-Reiser, J., Kirsch, T.D., Giovinazzi, S. & Wilson, T.M. (2012). The 
Impact of the 22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake on Christchurch Hospital. 2012 NSEE conference paper 
 
MD, J. L. N. (2004). "Combined external and internal hospital disaster: Impact and 
response in a Houston trauma center intensive care unit." Critical Care Medicine Vol. 32(No. 3): 5.  
 
Miniati, R., & Iasio, C. (2012). Methodology for rapid seismic risk assessment of health structures: Case study 
of the hospital system in Florence, Italy. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.07.001 
MOH. (2010). New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action. Wellington, New Zealand: 
Ministry of Health 
Miro, O., M. Sanchez, G. Espinosa & J. Millá. (2004) ‘Quality and effectiveness of an emergency 
143 
 
department during weekends’. Emergency Medicine Journal. 21(5). (pp. 573–574). 
Miyamoto, H. K., Gilani, A. S. J., & Chan, T. (2009). The 2008 Sichuan earthquake: Assessment of Damage 
and Lessons Learned, Structure Magazine, (pp17–19). 
 
MOH, DHS, EDCD &WHO. (2002). A structural Vulnerability Assessment of Hospitals in Kathmandu 
Valley. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Health, Department of Health Services, Epidemiology & 
Disease Control Division, World Health Organisation. 
 
MOH Ministry of Health. (2010). New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action. 
Wellington: Ministry of Health. 978-0-478-35907-7; 5049. 
Nakashima, M., & Chusilp, P., (2000). A Partial View of Japanese Post-Kobe Seismic Design and 
Construction Practices. Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Uji, Kyoto 611-
0011, Japan Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Seismology, Vol. 4, No.  
 
NCREE. National Center for Research in Earthquake Engineering. b (1999). Damage Report on 921 Ji-Ji 
Earthquake (Draft), Report No. NCREE-99-033, December, Taipei, Taiwan (in Chinese). 
 
New Zealand Police. (2011). List of deceased. Christchurch, New Zealand: New Zealand Police. 
 
NZAAS. (2013). Air Ambulance Services. Napier, New Zealand: New Zealand Air Ambulance Service. 
 
NZIER. (2010). Fix flawed values of statistical life and life years to get better policy outcomes [Pamphlet]. 
Guria, J. 
 
NZRAF. (2013). Aircraft, C-130H Hercules. Wellington, New Zealand: Royal New Zealand Air Force  
 
NZSS 1900: (1965). New Zealand Standard Model Building Bylaw, Chapter 8, Basic Design Loads. New 
Zealand Standards Institute, Wellington. New Zealand Standards Institute, Wellington.  
 
NZS 4203: (1976). Code of practice for General Structural Design and Design Loadings for Buildings. 
Standards Association of New Zealand.  
 
NZS 4203: (1984). Code of practice for General Structural Design and Design Loadings for Buildings. 
Standards Association of New Zealand.  
 
NZS 4203: (1992). Code of practice for General Structural Design and Design Loadings for Buildings, known 
as the Loadings Standard. Standards Association of New Zealand.  
 
NZSS No. 95: (1935). New Zealand Standard Model Building By-Law, sections I to X. New Zealand. 
Standards Institute, Wellington.  
 
Oldfield, G.S., & Santomero, A.M., (1997). The Place of Risk Management in Financial Institutions. 
Financial institutions center working paper series, the Wharton school University of Pennsylvania 
95-05-B. 
OSHPD, Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development. (2009). Facilities Development 
Division (FDD): Seismic Retrofit Program – SB1953, accessed on 29 October 2009, http:// 
www.oshpd.ca.gov/FDD/seismic_compliance/SB1953/. 
 
PAHO. (2007). REGIONAL INITIATIVE ON SAFE HOSPITALS. 140th SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE Provisional Agenda Item 4.8 , Washington D.C. USA, Pan American Health 




PAHO. (2000). Principles of Disaster Mitigation in Health Facilities, disaster mitigation series. Pan American 
Health Organization, Emergency Preparedness and  Disaster Relief Coordination Program Regional 
Office of the World Health Organization Washington, D.C., 2000.  
 
Pickett, M. (1997). Northridge Earthquake: Lifeline Performance and Post-Earthquake Response, Report No. 
NIST GCR 97-712, National Institute of Standards and Technology.  
 
Rutenberg, A., Jennings, P. C.,& Housner, G. W. (1980). The Response of Veteran’s Hospital Building 41 in 
the San Fernando Earthquake, Report No. EERL 80-03, Pasadena, CA.  
 
Sandman, P. M. (1999). Risk = Hazard + Outrage: Coping with Controversy about Utility Risks Peter M. 
Sandman. Engineering News-Record, October 4, 1999, pp. A19–A23 
SCDHB (2011). Earthquake response 3, Statement from Chris Fleming, Chief Executive - South Canterbury 
District Health Board. Ministry of health, New Zealand 
http://www.scdhb.health.nz/news/52/58/Earthquake-Response-3.html  
Schmid, R. (2011). Risk = Hazard + Outrage Risk Engineering Global Workshop, Zurich Risk Engineering’s 
magazine, issue 33, Jan 2001. 
 
Shenton III, H. W. (1996). Criteria for initiation of slide, rock, and slide-rock rigid-body modes, Journal of 
Engineering Mechanics, 122, (pp. 690–693).  
 
Shulmeister, J., Soons, J. M., Berger, G. W., Harper, M., Holt, S., Moar, N., & Carter, J. A., (1999). 
Environmental and sea level changes on Banks peninsula (Canterbury, New Zealand) through three 
glaciations- interglaciation cycles, Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology, 152(1-2): 
101-127.  
Sperber, W.H. (2001). "Hazard identification: from a quantitative to a qualitative approach". Food Control 12: 
223–228 
SNZ. (2004). NZS 1170.5:2004, Structural design actions Part 5: Earthquake Actions- New Zealand. 
Standards Association of New Zealand.   
 
SNZ. (2009). NZS 4219:2009, Seismic performance of engineering systems in buildings. Standards 
Association of New Zealand. 
 
Soong, T.T., Yao, G.C., & Lin, C.C. (2000). Damage to Critical Facilities Following the 921 
Chi-Chi Taiwan Earthquake, Buffalo, New York.  
 
Stirling, M., Litchfield, N., Smith, W., Barnes, P., Gerstenberger, M., McVerry, G. & Pettinga., J. (2007). 
Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment for the Canterbury Region; GNS Science 
Consultancy Report 2007/232- ECan report Number U06/6 August 2007 
Stylianou G. (2012, April 11) Akaroa Hospital remains unusable. The press. Retrieved from 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/6719771/Akaroa-Hospital-remains-unusable 
Stylianou. (2012) Hospital facilities take hammering. The Press, Fairfax NZ News. Last updated 05:00 




The Press. (2012). Healthy prospects for 'bit of paradise'.  Fairfax New Zealand Limited, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/health/6540806/Healthy-prospects-for-bit-of-paradise Last 
updated 05:00 08/03/2012. Retrieved 16/07/2012. 
 
Ukai, T. (1996). Problems of emergency medical care at the time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, 
Annals of Burns and Fire Disasters IX, (pp.6). 
 
Uma S.R., & Beattie. G.J. (2010). Seismic Assessment of Engineering Systems in  Hospitals – A Challenge 
for Operational Continuity. GNS Science, Lower Hutt. Building Research Association of New 
Zealand, Porirua. 2010 NZSEE Conference. 
 
(USGS) United States Geological Survey, 2012. Magnitude 6.1- South Island of New Zealand Shakemap.  
<http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/global/shake/b0001igm/>.  Accessed 29 Apr. 
2012. 
 
Villamor, P., Litchfield, N., (2011). Greendale Fault: investigation of surface rupture characteristics for fault 
avoidance zonation. GNS science consultancy Report 2011/121. May 2011 ECAN Report R11/25 
 
Wagg, D.J., & Virgin, L. (2010). University of Bristol, Great Britain. Duke University, Duham, NC, USA 
Exploiting Nonlinear Behaviour in Structural Dynamics; International Centre for Mechanical 
Sciences. 
Wenzel, F., & Thieken, A. (2008). Multihazard risk analysis in Germany; The CEDIM Experience, in 
Proceedings, International Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Disaster Mitigation 
(ICEEDM08), I. Imran, A. Surahman, M. Moestopo and W. Sengara, Jakarta, Indonesia,( pp. 235–
244).  
 
W. Fawcett,. & C. S. Oliveira. (2000). Casualty Treatment after Earthquake Disasters: Development of a 
Regional Simulation Model; Disasters, 2000, 24(3): 271–287 © Overseas Development Institute. 
Published by Blackwell Publishers, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, 
USA.  
 
WHO. (2006); Health facility seismic vulnerability evaluation – a handbook –, outlined the structural 
vulnerability function; WHO Regional Office for Europe DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
WHO. (2008). Disaster Reduction Campaign, 2008-2009. The UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR) and the World Health Organization (WHO). United Nations, New 
York. 
 
WHO. (2006); Health facility seismic vulnerability evaluation – a handbook –, outlined the structural 
vulnerability function; World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe DK-2100 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
WHO 2009. Safe Hospitals. <http://www.who.int/hac/events/safe_hospitals_info.pdf>.  Accessed January 30, 
2013. 
 
Zhang, L., Li, H., Carlton, J. R., & Ursano, R. (2009). The injury profile after the 2008 earthquakes in China, 












Appendix A: Hospital and provider impact surveys 
 
Johns Hopkins University / University of Canterbury 
Health System Impact Survey 
 
 










Contact name: ____________________________________ 
 
Email address: ____________________________________  Tel: 
_____________________             
 
 
Contact name: ____________________________________ 
 
Email address: ____________________________________  Tel: 
_____________________             
 
 
Contact name: ____________________________________ 
 
Email address: ____________________________________  Tel: 




Section 1- Baseline Hospital Information 
 
1. What is the estimated size of the population served by/assigned to this hospital?
 ____________ 
 
Please fill in the following related to general hospital physical capacity and statistics in the year 
before the earthquake. Write in ‘NA’ if that service or those beds are not available in this 
facility. 
In-Patient Capacity 
2. Non-ICU Medical 
















a. Adult medical     
b. Adult surgical     
c. Pediatric     
d. Obstetric     
e. Other non-ICU beds 
 
                (please describe) 
    
 
3. Monitored beds/Non-ICU     
a. Adult     
b. Pediatric     
4. ICU Beds     
a. Adult medical ICU      
b. Adult surgical ICU      
c. Pediatric ICU     
d. Other ICU beds 
 
                (please describe) 
    
 
5. Psychiatric patients/beds     









7. Operating/Procedure rooms     
a. Major/In-patient     
b. Minor/Out-patient     
c. Delivery rooms     
1. Number of physically available and staffed beds during normal operations 
2. Number of annual patient discharges for each category 
3. Average length of stay for each category of patient (in days) 
4. Percent of each category of beds occupied on an annual basis 
 
8. What types of surgical procedures are performed at this facility (check all that apply)? 
a. General surgery  _____  g. Orthopedic surgery  _____ 
b. Cardiovascular/Thoracic _____  h. Genitourinary surgery _____ 
c. Gynecologic surgery  _____  i. Pediatric surgery  _____ 
d. Neurosurgery  _____  j. Other surgical procedures _____ 
e. Otolaryngology/ENT  _____  k. None    _____ 







9. Emergency/Accident and 
Emergency Department 








a. Emergency Dept/A&E      
b. Ped. Emergency/A&E     
 
10. Out-Patient Clinics      
a. Adult clinics (all)    
b. Pediatric clinics (all)   
c. Psychiatric clinics   
d. Other clinics   
 








12. How many physicians are on active staff (credentialed) at this facility? 
a. Total active medical staff      _________ 
b. Emergency/A&E department  _______ 
c. General or thoracic surgeons  _______ 
d. Orthopedic surgeons   _______ 
e. Primary care/Internal Medicine  _______ 
f. Pediatricians    _______ 
 
13. How many mid-level providers (nurse practitioners, midwives, etc) work at this facility/are on 
staff at this facility?       _________ 
 
14. How many nurses work at this facility/are on staff at this facility? _________ 
 
15. How many other clinical support staff work at this facility?  _________ 
a. Laboratory technicians   _______ 
b. Radiology technicians   _______ 
c. Clinical technicians/Paramedical _______ 
d. Other clinical staff   _______ 
 
16. How many non-clinical support staff are employed at this facility? _________ 
 




Now I am going to ask you a series of questions about how the hospital was impacted by the 
earthquake.  Some of these will be related to the physical damages to the structure, others to the loss 
of the usual services that a hospital supplies such as surgery, laboratory testing and even laundry. 
 
17. At the time of the earthquake how many patients were hospitalized in the facility? __________ 
 
18. Was the hospital completely closed by the earthquake?  Yes ____   No ____ 
 
19. Were there any deaths as a result of the earthquake in any of the hospital facilities?  
Yes, patient or visitor ____     Yes, staff  ____   No ____ 
20. Did the hospital suffer any physical damage during the earthquake of February 22nd, 2011?  
150 
 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 If ‘No’ then skip Questions 21-28 
 
Were physical areas affected so that the space was not usable as a result of the earthquake? These 
services may have been provided in alternative areas.  Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a service 
and a ‘P’ for partial loss, ‘0’ for no loss and an ‘NA’ if that service is not offered. 
















21. Non-ICU Floor Beds          
a. Adult medical         
b. Adult surgical         
c. Pediatric beds         
d. Other non-ICU         
22. Monitored beds/Non-ICU         
a. Adult         
b. Pediatric         
23. ICU Beds         
a. Adult medical ICU          
b. Adult surgical ICU          
c. Pediatric ICU         
d. Other ICU beds         
24. Psychiatric Beds         
25. Total Hospital Beds Lost 
(estimate actual number) 
        
26. Operating/Procedure 
Rooms 
        
a. Major/In-patient         
b. Minor/Out-patient         
c. Labor and Delivery         
27. Out-Patient Areas         
a. Emergency department         
b. Out-patient clinics         
c. Dialysis         
d. Other out-patient 
 
                      Please describe 
        
  
28. Other Clinical Areas 
 
                      Please describe 
        
 
29. Non-Clinical Areas         
a. Kitchen         
b. Laundry         
c. Social Work         
d. Administrative         
e. Medical records         
30. Did the hospital lose any ability to provide any clinical services following the earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 If ‘No’ then skip Questions 31-40 
 
Hospital services can still be provided even with the loss of physical areas by using alternative sites.  
Were services (or functions) usually provided by the hospital lost as a result of the earthquake?  This 
can be due to any reason such as loss of power or water, or lack of staff. 
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Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a service and a ‘P’ for partial loss, a ‘0’ for no loss, and 

















31. Accident/Emergency Services         
32. Out-Patient Clinic Services         
a. Medical/Primary care         
b. Surgical clinics         
c. Ob/Gyn clinics          
d. Pediatric clinics         
33. Surgical Services         
a. Major operative procedures         
b. Minor procedures         
c. Endoscopic procedures         
d. Other specialty procedures         
34. Obstetric/Delivery Services         
35. Rehab/Physical Therapy         
36. Laboratory Services         
37. Radiology Services         
a. Plain radiographs/x-rays         
b. CT scans         
c. MRI         
d. Ultrasound         
e. Interventional procedures         
38. Blood Bank         
39. Non-Clinical Services         
f. Kitchen         
g. Laundry         
h. Social Work         
i. Administrative         
j. Medical records         
40. Other 
 
          Please describe 












Were important internal and external logistical services lost to the hospital as a result of the 
earthquake?  
Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a service and a ‘P’ for partial loss, or check the ‘NA’ 

















41. Electrical Power          
a. Municipal power service         
b. Hospital back-up power         
42. Water         
a. All municipal water          
b. Municipal drinking water          
c. All hospital back-up water         
d. Hospital back-up drinking         
43. Medical Gases         
a. Oxygen         
b. Other gases         
44. Suction         
45. HVAC         
a. Heating system         
b. Cooling/Air conditioning         
46. Information Systems         
a. Computer system         
b. Medical records         
47. Communications         
a. Telephones, land lines- internal         
b. Telephones, land lines- external         
c. Telephones, cellular         
48. Elevators         
49. Other 
 
                    Please describe 
        
 
 
Please estimate the average number of days that the hospital has in-house stock of the following 
supplies (prior to the earthquake). Mark ‘NA’ if the supply is not used at the hospital. 










50. Pharmaceuticals/Medicines       
51. Medical Gases       
a. Oxygen       
b. Other       
52. Blood Products       
53. Diagnostic Supplies       
c. Laboratory       
d. Radiological       
e. Other        
54. Treatment Supplies       
a. Dressings and splints       
b. Surgical supplies       
c. Other supplies       
55. Support Supplies       
d. Laundry and linens       
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e. Personal care items1       
56. Food       
57. Other 
             Please describe 
      
 
1. Toiletries, etc 
 
Did the hospital run out of any supplies at any time after the earthquake? 
Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a supply and a ‘P’ for partial loss, a ‘0’ for complete loss, 















58. Pharmaceuticals/Medicines        
59. Blood Products        
60. Diagnostic Supplies        
f. Laboratory        
g. Radiological        
h. Other         
61. Treatment Supplies        
f. Dressings and splints        
g. Surgical supplies        
h. Other supplies        
62. Support Supplies        
i. Laundry and linens        
j. Personal care items1        
63. Food        
64. Other 
 
                    Please describe 
       
 
 
65. Were there other important pieces of equipment lost?  Yes ____   No ____ 
Please describe  
 
 
66. Were there other important services lost?    Yes ____   No ____ 
Please describe  
 
 
Section 3- Response to the Earthquake 
67. Please describe the staffing of the hospital after the earthquake compared to normal staffing 












a. Physicians       
b. Mid-levels/NPs       
c. Nurses       
d. Other clinical staff       
e. Other employees/support staff       
 
68.  Please describe the demand for OUT-PATIENT hospital services after the earthquake compared 
















a. Emergency/A&E services       
b. Surgical services       
c. Medical/Primary care        
d. Ob/Gyn services       
e. Pediatric services       
f. Psychiatric services       
g. Other clinical services       
 
69. Please describe the demand for IN-PATIENT hospital services after the earthquake compared to 














a. Surgical services       
b. Medical services       
c. Ob/Gyn services       
d. Pediatric services       
e. Psychiatric services       
f. Other clinical services       
 
70. Did the hospital have to evacuate ANY patients from the hospital building after the earthquake? 
a. ICU patients  Yes _____ No _____ Number evacuated  _________ 
b. Non-ICU patients Yes _____ No _____ Number evacuated  _________ 
c. How long did it take to evacuate ALL these patients outside? (in minutes) _________ 
 
71. Did the hospital move patients to other parts of the hospital but still within the hospital because of 
earthquake damage?          
a. ICU patients  Yes _____ No _____ Number moved  _________ 
b. Non-ICU patients Yes _____ No _____ Number moved  _________ 
c. How long did it take to transfer ALL patients within the hospital? (in minutes) _________ 
 
72.  Did the hospital discharge already hospitalized patients in the first 24 hours after the earthquake 
to make room for earthquake-related patients?   
a. ICU patients  Yes _____ No _____ Number discharged  _________ 
b. Non-ICU patients Yes _____ No _____ Number discharged  _________ 
c. How long did it take to discharge the FIRST patient? (in minutes)  _________ 
d. How long did it take to discharge ALL patients within the hospital? (in minutes) _________ 
 
73. Did the hospital transfer patients to other hospitals because of earthquake in the first week after 
the earthquake? 
Yes ____ No ____
  
74. Did the hospital accept any patients transferred from other hospitals as a result of the earthquake 
in the first week after the earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 
75. Did the hospital accept any patients transferred from other facilities such as nursing homes as a 
result of the earthquake in the first week after the earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 
76. If `Yes’ to the above questions please fill out the following table with the number of patients 











a. Transferred patients from this 
hospital to another hospital 
    
b. Transferred into this hospital from 
another hospital 
    
c. Transferred into this hospital from 
another facility/nursing home 
    
 
77. How were the patients transferred between hospitals (check all that apply) 
Hospital-based ambulances  ______ 
Municipal/public ambulances  ______ 
Private ambulances   ______ 
Military vehicles   ______ 
Other government vehicles  ______ 
Private vehicles   ______ 
Other (Please describe): 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 4- Final Observations 
 
78. What was the most difficult obstacle to providing care? (Please describe) 














79. In your opinion what was the most important impact of the earthquake that compromised the 







80. In your opinion what is the most important lesson for other hospitals to learn? 
Johns Hopkins University / University of Canterbury 















Email address: ____________________________________  Tel: 
_____________________     
 




First I am going to ask you a series of questions to help understand the type of care that is provided 
by you and this clinic. 
 
Section 1- Clinic Description 
 
1. What type of healthcare services are provided by this clinic/practice? (Check all that apply) 
a. General practice _____ 
b. Internal medicine _____ 
c. Ob/Gyn  _____ 
d. Pediatrics  _____ 
e. General surgery _____ 
f. Specialty surgery _____ 
g. Other  _____  Please 
describe:______________________________________ 
 
2. What is the estimated size of the population served by/assigned to this clinic/practice? 
___________ 
 
3. Does the clinic provide any of the following services on-site? (Check all that apply) 
a. Laboratory testing _____ b. Plain x-rays            ____ c. CT scans              
_____ 




g. Other                        _____ Please describe: 
 
 
4. How many total providers (doctors, nurse practitioners, etc) are employed here?
 ___________ 
 
5. How many nurses/nurse assistants work here?    
 ___________ 
 
6. How many other clinical support staff work here (Laboratory, etc)?  
 ___________ 
 
7. How many other non-clinical support staff work here?   
 ___________ 
 
8. How many physical treatment areas (beds, etc) are there?   
 ___________ 
 










Now I am going to ask a series of questions about how the clinic was physically impacted by the 
earthquake.   
 
10. Did the clinic building(s) suffer any physical damage during the earthquake of February 22nd, 
2011?  
Yes ____   No ____ 
 
11. Did the clinic lose any ability to provide any clinical services following the earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 
12. Was the clinic ever completely closed by the earthquake?1  Yes ____   No ____ 
a. If ‘Yes’, how many days?   
<1 day     _____ 1 day         _____ 2-3 days    _____ 
 
4-7 days   _____ 
 
8-14 days  _____ 
 
>2 weeks   _____ 
  
13. If closed, did you operate your business at another location? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
14. Did you have to evacuate staff or patients from the building after the earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
  
15. How long did it take to evacuate everybody? (in minutes)    _________ 
 
16. Were there any deaths in the building(s)?  
Yes, patient or visitor____     Yes, staff  ____   No ____ 
 
17. Did the clinic treat any patients injured as a result of the earthquake in the first week after the 
earthquake? 
Yes ____   No ____ 
 
a. If ‘Yes’, estimate how many people were treated?  ______ 
 
 
Please briefly describe the physical damage: 
 
  
                                                          
1
 This can be due to any reason, e.g., physical damage to the building, lack of personnel, loss of power, etc 
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Were important internal and external logistical services lost to the clinic as a result of the earthquake?  
Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a service and a ‘P’ for partial loss, or check the ‘NA’ 

















18. Electrical Power          
c. Municipal power service         
19. Did the clinic have a back up electrical supply? Yes _____ No _____   
d. Clinic back-up power lost         
20. Water         
e. Municipal water - All         
f. Municipal water drinking         
21. Did the clinic have a back up water supply? Yes _____ No _____   
a. Clinic back-up water lost         
22. Medical Gases         
c. Oxygen         
d. Other gases         
23. Suction         
24. HVAC         
c. Heating system         
d. Cooling/Air conditioning         
25. Information Systems         
c. Computer system         
d. Medical records         
26.  Communications         
d. Telephone (land lines-internal)         
e. Telephone (land lines-external)         
f. Telephone (cellular)         
27.  Elevators         
28. Other 
(please describe) 
        
 
 
29. Were there other important pieces of equipment lost?  Yes ____   No ____ 













Did the clinic run out of any supplies after the earthquake? 
Mark an ‘X’ for complete loss of a supply and a ‘P’ for partial loss, or check the ‘NA’ 















31. Pharmaceuticals/Medicines        
32. Diagnostic Supplies        
i. Laboratory        
j. Radiological        
k. Other         
33. Treatment Supplies        
k. Dressings and splints        
l. Surgical supplies        
m. Other supplies        
34. Support Supplies        
n. Laundry and linens        
o. Personal care items1        
35. Other 
 
                    Please describe 
       
 
 
Section 3- Response to the Earthquake 
Please describe the staffing of the clinic after the earthquake compared to normal staffing levels by 
the number of days after February 22
nd













36. Physicians/providers       
37. Nurses       
38. Other clinical staff       
39. Employees/support staff       
 
Please describe the demand for clinical services after the earthquake compared to normal. 













40. Routine primary care       
41. Injury care       
42. Exacerbated chronic illnesses       
43. Ob/Gyn services       
44. Pediatric services       
45. Psychiatric services       


















 month after the earthquake:  
 
 





Please complete the following for each of the providers in this clinic: 
 
Did you personally provide care to earthquake victims during the first week after the earthquake?  
Check all that apply 
  








d. Provided care at your office/clinic     
e. Provided care at a hospital     
f. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
g. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 












a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 
    
 








a. Provided care at your office/clinic     
b. Provided care at a hospital     
c. Provided care at a temporary/field hospital     
d. Provided care outside a health care facility (on 
the street, etc) 









Appendix B: Kafali et al., (2003) Fragility Analysis for Nonstructural Systems in Critical 
Facilities 
 
Kafali et al. (2003) outlines a method for the estimation of system fragility by Monte Carlo simulation 
and a second crossing theory method for stochastic processes. The Monte Carlo method outlined 
below uses linear and nonlinear models for nonstructural components and takes into account the 
interdependencies between the separate components (Kafali et al., 2003). 
The Monte Carlo method 
The Monte Carlo method for calculating fragility involves the following calculations; 
 
- The earthquake source to hospital site distance (m; r), moment magnitude and ground 
acceleration at the hospital site using; 
 
- The absolute spectral acceleration density at the attachment points with the hospital (first 
floor and roof floors) using; 
 
- correlated absolute acceleration at attachment points n samples using; 
 
- The C1 and C2 responses are calculated along with the correlated absolute acceleration 
sample by using linear/nonlinear dynamic analysis for each component. The output defines 
whether the nonstructural system fails (whether maxt jR1(t)j ¸ d1 or maxt jR2(t)j ¸ d2 occurs). 
 
- Approximate system fragility (m; r) using the probability of failure (Pf (m; r)), calculated by 
the ratio of the number of nonstructural system failures to the sample number (n, Pf (m; r) ' 
nf=n). 
Fragility surfaces for the components C1 and C2 can be obtained by the same procedure. For 
example, fragility for Ci can be estimated by Pf;Ci(m; r) ' nf;Ci=n, where nf;Ci is the number of 
times the event maxt jRi(t)j ¸ di is observed.  
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Crossing theory method 
The mean crossing rate for a system comprised of linear components can be calculated by using the 
fragility of the nonstructural system and the probability that the stationary systems response process 
R(t) = [R1(t) R2(t)]T leaves the safe set A = (¡d1; d1)x(¡d2; 
 
The crossing theory fragility calculation involves the following steps; 
 
- The earthquake source to hospital site distance (m; r), moment magnitude and ground 
acceleration at the hospital site using; 
 
- The absolute spectral acceleration density at the attachment points with the hospital (first 
floor and roof floors) using; 
 
- The spectral density nonstructural component linear responses calculated using the 
appropriate transfer equations outlined in the full methodology. 
- The mean nonstructural component crossing rate using; 
 
- The upper bound mean nonstructural system crossing rate using; 
 
- The fragility of the overall system is calculated using. 
 
Appendix C: WHO (2006) Nonstructural vulnerability evaluation HNVE-001/1, HNVE-001/2 
and HNVE-001/3 
The World Health Organization WHO; Health facility seismic vulnerability evaluation is based on 
estimating the expected nonstructural vulnerability and consequences for a given seismic risk. The 
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inputs include the number of buildings, type of nonstructural elements (architectural elements, 
equipment, furnishings and basic installations and services), seismic intensity, type of risk and the 
priority of the nonstructural elements. The method is compatible with FEMA-74 which defined the 
“nonstructural risk ratings” that are considered in the methodologies outputs. The “nonstructural risk 
ratings” are as follows; 
• Life safety (LS) risk: The risk of injury inducing failure of individual nonstructural elements such as 
falling ceiling tiles, not including failures of nonstructural safety systems such as fire sprinklers. 
• Property loss (PL) risk: The risk with respect to the financial cost of damage only includes the cost 
of repairs and replacement of the damaged elements not the indirect damage, such as water damage 
from broken pipes and the loss of data from damaged computers. 
The output vulnerability of the facilities and content PL is: 
- “Low (L) vulnerability”: The component is “reasonably well anchored” and the probability  it 
will be damaged when subjected to deformation is low 
- “Moderate (M) vulnerability”: There is a “moderate probability” the anchored component 
will fail when subjected to design forces and building deformation 
- “High (H) vulnerability”: The component is either unfastened or has inadequate fastening, 
the probability of damage is high when subjected to design forces and building deformation. 
• Loss of function (LF) risk: The risk that a particular component will lose functionality including the 
impact of the functional loss of the component on the operational continuity of the organization, the 
loss of components due to external lifeline damage is not included. 
The outputs for the LF category are: 
- “Low (L) consequences”: The component will likely not injure occupants or cause functional 
discontinuity when damage due to its physical characteristics and location in the building. 
- “Moderate (M) consequences”: The component has a moderate likelihood of injuring 
occupants or causing functional discontinuity when damaged due to its physical 
characteristics and location in the building.  
- “High (H) consequences”: When damaged the component will very probably injure or kill 
inhabitants and compromise the hospitals ability to operate continuously. 
The risk ratings are based on the assumption that the component isn’t seismically anchored or braced 
in any way and that the component’s located in a low-rise building or close to the ground level in a 
high rise building. 
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The vulnerability/consequences level is determined according to the ranges of TPL or TLF values 
given in Table 3.5 and Annex 1. The “nonstructural vulnerability/consequences level” is calculated by 
firstly determining the total PL (TPL) and total LF (TLF) using the following equations; 
 
TPI= [N L x (1) NM x (2) NH x (3)]  TIF = [N L x (1) NM x (2) NH x (3)] 
where NL, NM and NH are the number of L, M and H risk ratings, respectively, for the corresponding 
seismic intensity and group of nonstructural elements; (1), (2) and (3) are weighting factors; and NE is 
the number of the elements under consideration. The vulnerability/consequences level is determined 
by using Table 3.1. 
 
Table C.1: Vulnerability/consequences level (WHO 2006). 
Rating Low Moderate High  
Vulnerability level (TPL) 1- 1.7 1.7-2.3 2.3-3  
Consequences (TLF) 1- 1.7 1.7-2.3 2.3-3  
 
Appendix D: WHO (2006) Structural vulnerability assessment HSVE-001 and HSVE-002  
 
Structural damage is commonly the broadest calculation for an individual hospital as there are less 
interacting components than the nonstructural or organizational system of a large hospital. The WHO 
2006 structural vulnerability function has five damage states. The states are used to characterize the 
varied degrees of damage: (1) nonstructural damage; (2) slight structural damage; (3) moderate 
structural damage; (4) severe structural damage; and (5) collapse. The net risk of earthquake damage 
is calculated using the following equation;  
μᴅ = 2.5[I + tanh((1+0.125 TVI -13.1)/2.3)]  
Where μD is the mean damage grade, I is the EMS-98 (Table 3.2) seismic intensity and TVI is the 
total vulnerability index. The equation incorporates modifying indices including critical building 
elements such as the foundation type, the numbers of stories, the building code category, construction 
type, soil type, level of maintenance and ground slope. As well, soft stores and short columns are 
included as modifiers (Table 3.7). The mean damage grade is given by the European Macro seismic 
Scale (EMS-18 1998). EMS-98 classifies damage to buildings into five grades, as shown in Table 1. 
(Wenzel et al., 2008).  
Table D.1: EMS-98 classification of damage severity (Wenzel et al. 2008) 
Damage Grade (EMS-98) Description Damage ratio (%) CDF (%) Severity 
     





Slight damage Slight nonstructural damage 
  
 
 Grade 2: Moderate Slight Structural damage 1-20 
 
10 Slight 
damage Moderate nonstructural damage 
  
 
 Grade 3: Substantial to Moderate structural damage 20-60 
 
40 Moderate 
heavy damage Heavy nonstructural damage 
  
 
 Grade 4: Very heavy Heavy structural damage 60-100 
 
80 Major 
damage Very heavy nonstructural damage 
  
 
 Grade 5: Destruction Very heavy structural damage 100 
 
100 Major 
Appendix E: WHO (2006) Administrative/organizational vulnerability evaluation assessment 
HOVE-001/1 and HOVE-001/2 
 
Each of these parameters corresponds to the ability of the medical service to fulfill its tasks under both 
normal and emergency conditions and is rated according to the following scale: 
 
1) Optimal: Efficient allocation of resources and personnel. 
2) Adequate: Acceptable allocation of resources and personnel; operation can proceed normally. 
3) Minimal: Barely acceptable allocation of resources or personnel; operation can proceed with 
certain restrictions. 
4) Inadequate: Unacceptable assignment of resources or personnel; severe limits on the service 
in question or impossibility of carrying out the service in question. 
 
The overall capability of the health facility to meet its operational demands under normal and 
emergency conditions is shown by the ratings given to the medical services with an importance index 
of 5, 4 or 3, since those services are the most important in the case of an emergency. An overall 
capability rating of “high” means that all medical services with an importance index of 5 or 4 must 
have all parameters rated 1 or 2 to be deemed resilient. Those with an importance index of 3 can have 
an occasional rating of 3. If any of the parameters related to services with an importance index of 5 or 
4 are rated 3 (minimal) or 4 (inadequate), the overall capability of the health facility is rated 
“moderate” or “low”. 
Appendix F: Modeling coordination in hospital emergency departments through social network 
analysis following disasters (Hossain et al., 2012) 
The method proposed by Hossain et al. (2012) utilises the coordination theory (explained below) to 
measure the degree to which connections, centrality and density affect the performance of 
coordination in emergency departments (ED) where coordination is vital in providing continued 
healthcare.  Hossain et al. (2012) defines coordination as; “two or more actors who perform particular 
tasks to achieve common goals”. Coordination is further defined in a hospital as a “producer 
consumer relationship” between the clinical staff (producer) and the patients (consumer) the 
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performance coordination time variables quantify the efficiency which the ED is operating at and are 
as follows:  
- Time taken for the full diagnosis of a patient (from arrival at reception till admission, 
discharge or transfer).  
- Time taken for diagnosis (dependent on the priority of the patient and the number of patients 
waiting). 
- Average waiting time. 
- Average Length of stay (ALOS) in the ED. 
ii. The hospitals quality of service is measured from three perspectives;   
a) The hospitals’ medical/physical characteristics (structure). 
b) How patients are processed in the hospital (process). 
c) The patients health after treatment (outcome). 
The quality of ED coordination is quantified by: 
i. Revisits; Number of patients who have revisited the ED within 72 hours (Miro et al., 2004). 
ii. Deaths; The ratio of deaths in the ED compared to the number of people seen in ED (Miro et 
al., 2004). 
iii. Flights; Number of undiagnosed patients who have left the hospital (Miro et al., 2004). 
Performance of coordination in the social network 
The performance of ED coordination is influenced by the centrality of the network, density and the 
characteristics of connections. The ‘Centrality of the network’ is a concept where the ‘star’ (most 
influential part of the system) can impact the ED coordination performance by influencing the other 
individuals. Density is defined as the connections between points or ‘actors’ in the network. The 
‘degree of connection’ is defined by the number of relationships in the network.  
 
The following hypothesises proposed by Hossain et al. (2012) are possible for the performance of the 
ED coordination;  
 
Hypotheses 1: Performance of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the social 
network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 1a: Performance of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the 
centrality of the network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
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Hypothesis 1b: Performance of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the density 
of the network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 1c: Performance of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the degree 
of connections in the network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Quality of coordination in the social network 
The quality of coordination within an emergency department focuses on measuring the processes or 
what is done to patients and outcomes or how patients do after health care interventions. To measure 
the quality of coordination, we are focused mainly on the outcomes and how the outcomes may be 
influenced by network interactions.  
The measures of quality are the same for Performance of coordination in the social network; ‘patients 
revisited within 72 hours’, ‘deaths within the emergency department’ and ‘patients vacated prior to 
being seen by physician’. Centrality and density can also be assumed to influence the quality of care 
provided by the individual actors. The connections between actors affect the quality of coordination, 
by increasing the connections between actors a higher degree of communication and thus quality of 
coordination may be achieved. However it has been suggested by Coiera and Tombs (1998) that 
increased communication beyond a certain point may negatively affect the performance of 
individual’s (Coiera et al., 1998). 
 
The following hypothesises proposed by Hossain et al. (2012) are possible for the Quality of 
coordination in the social network; 
 
Hypotheses 2: Quality of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the social 
network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 2a: Quality of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the centrality of 
the network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 2b: Quality of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the density of 
the network (Hossain et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 2c: Quality of coordination in the emergency department is influenced by the degree of 
connections within the network (Hossain. et al., 2012). 
Appendix G: Organizational model of a hospital system, Cimellaro et al. (2010) 
 
This thesis describes a model to quantify resilience of hospital networks that include both technical 
and organizational aspects as well as the impact of the damage of the roadway system.  Each hospital 
in the network is modeled using a meta-model (Cimellaro et al., 2008) that is able to estimate the 
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hospital resilience and incorporate the influence of the structural damage in the organizational model.  
The damage of the road network is evaluated in increments of the travel time (Werner et al., 2006) 
Cimellaro et al., (2010) defines a method for calculating the functionality of individual hospitals by 
using waiting time (WT) in an Emergency Department (ED) as a key parameter in the quantification 
of the quality of service (QS). WT is defined by the time taken between the request for care by the 
patient and the provision of the care by the hospital, it is determined by the number of; staff on duty, 
labs, beds (B) and operating rooms (OR). The outcome of the model is the qualitative functionality 
(Qqs), which is calculated using the outcomes of the quality of service (QS). And the quantitative 
functionality (Qls) related to the losses in the healthy population calculated with the variables 
mentioned above (Cimellaro et al., 2010).  
The required data is as follows: 
 (Wt) waiting time in emergency department (saturated or unsaturated) 
 (B) Number of spare beds 
 (OR) Operating rooms 
 (WT0) Waiting time during normal unsaturated conditions 
 (WT(t)) Waiting time during saturated conditions 
 (NTR) Number of patients treated under saturated conditions (indicator of functionality) 
 (Ntot) Total number of patients requiring treatment 
 (NNTR) Total number of patients not treated 
 
The first Qualitative functionality (1) is a linear combination of the two functions, Qqs,1(t)and 
Qqs,2(t), expressed in equations 2 and 3. Alpha (α) is a weight factor that combines the two functions 
describing the behavior in non saturated and saturated conditions. In non saturated conditions the 
patient arrival rate is below the rate of treatment, λ ≤λU, where λU is the patient arrival rate in 
saturated conditions, the quality of care is expressed by the function Q qs 1(t). The loss of the healthy 
population is related to the patients that are not treated, so in saturated conditions when λ >λU, the 
function Qqs,2(t) will be derived from equation (3). 
Where WTcrit is the critical waiting time of the hospital in saturated conditions, U; WT0 is the waiting 
time in normal operative conditions when = 0 and WT(t) when = (t).When the hospital operates in 
saturated conditions, it is not able to guarantee the normal level of QS, because the main goal is to 
provide treatment to the most number of patients. In this case the number of patients treated (NTR) is 
the indicator of functionality (Q). The quantitative functionality (Qls(t)) is then defined as a function 
of the loss (L(t)), which are defined as the total number of patients not treated (NNTR) versus the total 
number of patients requiring treatment (Ntot). In this case, the functionality is defined in equation (4) 
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3. QQS (t) = (1-a)QQS,1 (t) +aQQS,2(t) 
4. QQS (t) =[max(WTcrit – WT (t)),0)]/WTcrit if λ≤λu 
5. QQS (t) = WTcrit/[max(WTcrit,WT (t))] λ≤λu 
6. QLS (t) = 1-L(t) =1- [NNTR(t)]/[Ntot(t)]=[NTR(t)]/[Ntot(t)] 
 
The total number of patients requiring care (Ntot) and the NNTR are given by the formulas; 
7. Ntot (t) =           
    
  
 
8. NNTR (t) = 1 – NTR(t)=1 –                




The total functionality (Q(t)) of the hospital is then shown as: 
 
9. Q (t) = QQS (t) ∙ QLS (t) 
(Cimellaro 2010) 
Appendix H: Vulnerability assessment and seismic risk reduction strategies of hospitals in 
Basilicata region (Italy) (Masi et al., 2012). 
 
Masi et al., (2012) defined the “Vulnerability assessment and seismic risk reduction strategy” In order 
to mitigate the risk of earthquake induced damage to the health care network in Basilicata Italy. 
The methodology consists of; 
7 The extensive analysis of current seismic vulnerability in hospital facilities. 
8 The financial estimation of seismic strengthening methods and the level of risk deemed tolerable. 
9 The calculation of “time-risk” curves showing the continuous reduction of seismic risk for the 
whole building considering strengthening options and their financial availability. 
10 The analysis of the results achieved by the strengthening strategies in order to define the most 
affective risk reduction strategy. 
11 The prioritisation of a seismic vulnerability intervention timescale. 
(Masi et al., 2012). 
The seismic vulnerability of buildings is calculated as a ratio of the buildings capacity to withstand 
PGA and the demand of the building to withstand PGA. Masi et al. (2012) defines the demand period 
as100 years with an exceedance probability of 10% for SLV and 63% for SLD. The seismic risk 





(Masi et al., 2012). 
 
Where; (PGASLV) equals the Peak Ground Acceleration value causing severe structural damage, 
(PGASLD) equals the value causing nonstructural damage, αSLV is the seismic risk index related to the 
structural safety, αSLD is the capability of the building avoiding unacceptable nonstructural damage. 
Masi, G et al (2012) states values close to 1.0 are acceptable according to seismic code requirements 
for new buildings, values lower than 1.0 are deemed to have excessive seismic risk levels (Masi et al., 
2012). 
 
Four models between current αSLV values and estimated costs have been proposed considering 
different buildings (Table 3.3). Table 3.3 reflects that in 1972 a new structural code came into force in 
Italy determining  remarkable changes to design and construction activities of RC structures (Masi 
2003).  
Table H.1: Summary of provided cost models (Masi et al., 2012). 
Cost model Model Criteria of Strategic 
    N1 Full retrofit of all buildings achieving αSLV=1 
N2 Full retrofit αSLV=1 of all post-1972 building and pre-1972 buildings with αSLV <0.8 
N3 Full retrofit achieving αSLV=1 of all buildings with αSLV <0.8  
N4 Upgrading of buildings having 0.2<αSLV <0.8 achieving αSLV <0.7 
 
The time risk curves outlined in this method depend on the strengthening strategy and the ratio 
between the available and the required financial resources. An index has been defined by Masi et al., 
(2012) in order to generate the risk curves. The outputs are constrained to the seismic hazard and 
vulnerability of the buildings, the number of people at risk (exposure) is not included. The number of 
individuals in the hospital can be assumed to be proportional to the net floor area. Also, the 
intervention costs are assumed to be proportional to the floor area. An index (ā) is used to quantify the 
life safety risk posed by the hospital starting from each buildings αSLV value. The ā index value is 
calculated using the following equation; 
 
Where; 
- αi (t); is the risk index αSLV of the “i-th building” at the time (t). 
- Si; is the total floor area of the “i-th building”.  
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αSLV and ā(t) have an inverse proportional relationship with the risk level, thus, the following 
equation can be used as a global risk index: 
 
Appendix I: Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA) 
 
The Health sector assessment and analysis frame work method is comprised of an assessment and 
analysis matrix that outlines a structure for the evaluations of; the changes in the epidemiology of the 
burden of disease (BoD), the physical damage, the performance of the hospitals organizational 
structure and the performance of six interdependent “building blocks” (service delivery, health 
workforce, information, medical products, financing and leadership). The methodology incorporates 
the influence of the assets, stakeholders, and hospital processes’ and how a disaster may affect them.  
The assessment is not limited to health sector buildings but also encompasses the recovery and 
emergency preparedness plans. A range of the required budgets for the implementation of the national 
safe and prepared hospital programme (not including implementation of extensive structural or 
nonstructural measures) are also included in the methodology.  
The WHO defined a number of subsectors for the health services building blocks (PDNA 2010). The 
following minimum services need to be available during the recovery phase in order for the hospital 
to maintain operational continuity. The essential minimum services have to be assessed with respect 
to the regional and national epidemiological profile including the change in epidemiological 
requirements during the response phase of a disaster.  
- Child Health, Nutrition, 
- Communicable diseases, 
- General clinical services, 
- Non Communicable Diseases (including injuries and Mental Health), and Environmental Health, 
- Sexual and reproductive health (including STI, HIV/AIDS, Maternal and Newborn Health, and 
clinical management of sexual violence). 
The sub-sectors also guide the assessment of the pre-existing BoD related to each subsector and 
whether it was affected directly or indirectly. By assessing the changes in subsectors, the morbidity 
attributed to the disaster may be calculated. The performance and capacity of the hospitals health 
programmes to address the morbidity are also assessed. 
3.3.3.1 Health sector assessment and analysis matrix 
The analytical matrix (Table 3.4) provides a structure for the estimation of damage and losses in the 
health sector. The matrix aims to identify the critical problems (headings on the top row and left 
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column) that impede the health system’s ability to respond and define strategies to address the issues. 
The cost of damages and losses calculation is defined in the ECLAC (2003). ECLAC 
Table I.1: Analytical matrix for the health sector PDNA and RF (PDNA 2010) 
Health Programmes 


























































































































1a Service delivery; 
health programmes                 




The health network 
(infrastructure, 
equipment, 
transport)                 
2. leadership and 
governance                 
3. Human resources 
for health                 
4. Health 
information system                 
5. Health financing                  
6. Medical products 
vaccines and 
technology                 
 
By adding key indicators and examples of minimal qualitative data requirements in the analytical 
matrix, it becomes a standardized protocol for assessment data collection and analysis, guided by the 
headings and the indicators in the template. The methodology also includes a table for examples of 
key indicators for the assessment of the pre-disaster baseline within each health subsector and for the 
health system building blocks. The choice of indicators are reviewed by age and sex and adapted 
based on the nation’s epidemiological characteristics. The table also provides examples of typical 
impacts and issues for the emergency and recovery phases.  
The methodology doesn’t fully assess the disaster preparedness and risk reduction plans; however the 
method defines gaps that need to be addressed and a constrained budget to accomplish the risk 
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reduction. Estimates are included in the methodology for the additional costs of making facilities risk 
resilient. The cost of constructing new resilient buildings is stated at 4-8% of the original cost, 
whereas retrofitting an existing building to be resilient is estimated to cost 20-25% of the original 
cost. 
Appendix J: Methodology for rapid seismic risk assessment of health structures: Case study of 
the hospital system Florence, Italy (Miniati et al., 2012) 
The aim of Miniati et al. (2012) is to build on prior reliability analysis methodology, flow 
modelling methodology, dynamic simulation methodology and numerical seismic analysis 
methodology in order to develop a rapid risk assessment method for health structures. Some prior 
holistic healthcare methods are affective at taking into account the complexity of the organization, but 
they are not robust enough when real data is used. Others methods work better when real data is used, 
but gaps are apparent in the outputs (Miniati et al., 2012). 
Miniati et al. (2012) is a proposed integrated method, designed to find weaknesses in hospital 
networks using a holistic approach which goes beyond the structural components. The method is 
based on the combination of the two following research concepts: the theory of complex systems 
analysis using the Leontief input–output inoperability model, and the rapid WHO seismic 
vulnerability assessment. The method was implemented within Florence’s (Italy) hospital network 
which consists of five main hospitals. The rapid spatial and temporal seismic exposure analysis is for 
















Appendix K: The calculation of travel time by road for transfers from Christchurch hospital to 
other hospitals (Rhise network) 
 




























Southern Cross  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 5.3 13 - Road 
  
Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
Papanui Rd 450 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 64.8         
Holy Rd 650 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 93.6         
Springfield 270 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 38.88         
Durham St 300 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 43.2         
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 680 Use 25km/h 6.944 97.92         
Hillmorton Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 4.5 13 4 Road 
  Riccarton Ave 600 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 144         
  Mandeville St 850 use 15km/h 4.167 204         
  Blenheim Rd 260 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 62.4         
  Whitleigh Ave 900  use 25 km/h 6.944 129.6         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 590  use 25 km/h 6.944 84.96         
St Georges  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 5.3 13 1 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 950  use 25 km/h 6.944 136.8         
Parklands 
hospital Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 6.1 15 1 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 2500 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 360         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 650  use 25 km/h 6.944 93.6         
Princess 
Margaret’s  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 8.3 19 41 Road 
  Deans Ave 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Moorhouse 450 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 108         
  Lincoln 1000 Use 25km/h 6.944 144         
  Barrington 3000 Use 35km/h 9.722 308.6         
  Cashmere 900 Use 35km/h 9.722 92.57         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 450  use 25 km/h 6.944 64.8         
Rosewood rest 
home Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 12 29 1 Road 
  Deans Ave 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Moorhouse 450 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 108         
  Lincoln 1000 Use 25km/h 6.944 144         
  Brougham st. 4000 
1/2 b/w 20-30km/h and 
1/2 b/w 30-40km/h so 
use 30km/h 8.333 480         
  Ensors 1100 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 113.1         
  Aldwin 1000 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 102.9         




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 950  use 25 km/h 6.944 136.8         
Burwood 
Hospital  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 16 27 41 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 1500 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 216         
  Innes Road 1300 35km/h 9.722 133.7         
  Cranford St.  2200 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 176         
  Queen Elizabeth 5600 50+km/h use 55 15.28 366.5         
  Burwood Rd 1100 use 35km/h 9.722 113.1         
  Mairehau rd 500 use 35km/h 9.722 51.43         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 850  use 25 km/h 6.944 122.4         
Lincoln Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 20.3 38 24 Road 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Main South Rd 2500 use 20km/h 5.556 450         
  Springs Rd 12600 use 55 km/h 15.28 824.7         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 600  use 25 km/h 6.944 86.4         
Rangiora Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 32.2 49 29 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 3100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 446.4         
  Main North Rd 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Main North Rd 6000 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 480         
  
Rest of the way to 
Rangiora 18400 
use 55km/h (average 




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 550  use 25 km/h 6.944 79.2         
Ellesmere Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 40.8 58 0 Road 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Main South Rd 2500 use 20km/h 5.556 450         
  
Rest of the Way to 
Ellesmere 33200 
use 58km/h (average 
from google maps) 16.11 2061         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 500  use 25 km/h 6.944 72         
Darfield Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 44 52 2 Road 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Yaldhurst Rd 5400 50+km/h so use 55km/h 15.28 353.5         
  Rest of the way to Darfield 33600 
use 67km/h (average 
from google maps) 18.61 1805         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 400  use 25 km/h 6.944 57.6         
Oxford Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 57.3 61 29 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 3100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 446.4         
  Main North Rd 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Main North Rd 6000 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 480         
  Rest of the way to Oxford 43300 
use 81km/h (average 




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 750  use 25 km/h 6.944 108         
Waikari 
Hospital  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 78.9 82 3 Road 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 3100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 446.4         
  Main North Rd 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Main North Rd 6000 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 480         
  Rest of the way to Waikari 65000 
use 74km/h (average 
from google maps) 20.56 3162         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 650  use 25 km/h 6.944 93.6         
Akaroa 
Hospital  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 83.7 83 4 Road 
  Deans Ave 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Moorhouse 450 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 108         
  Lincoln 2400 Use 25km/h 6.944 345.6         
  Rest of the way to Akaroa 77700 
use 70km/h (Average 
from google maps) 19.44 3996         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 650  use 25 km/h 6.944 93.6         
Ashburton 
Hospital  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 85.2 87 20 
Road/he
licopter 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Main South Rd 1600 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 384         
  Main South Rd 2500 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 360         
  Main South Rd 1400 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 144         
  
Rest of the Way to 
Ashburton 74600 
use 80km/h (average 




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 500  use 25 km/h 6.944 72         
Timaru Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 163 150 14 
Road/he
licopter 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Main South Rd 1600 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 384         
  Main South Rd 2500 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 360         
  Main South Rd 1400 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 144         
  Rest of the Way to Timaru 153000 
use 76.5km/h (average 
from google maps( 21.25 7200         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts -100  use 25 km/h 6.944 -14.4         
Kaikoura 
Hospital  Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 182 151 0 
Road/he
licopter 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 3100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 446.4         
  Main North Rd 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Main North Rd 6000 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 480         
  Rest of the way to Waikari 168000 
use 82.5km/h (Average 
from google maps) 22.92 7331         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 750  use 25 km/h 6.944 108         
Grey Base Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 238 190 3 
Road/he
licopter 
  Riccarton Ave 3300 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 792         
  Yaldhurst Rd 5400 50+km/h so use 55km/h 15.28 353.5         
  
Rest of the way to Grey 
Base 228000 
use 81km/h (Average 




Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 
roundabouts 0  use 25 km/h 6.944 0         
Wairau Riccarton Ave 1300 30-40km/h use 35km/h 9.722 133.7 313 247 1 
Road/he
licopter 
  Deans Ave 550 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 132         
  Harper Ave 1100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 158.4         
  Papanui Rd 3100 20-30km/h use 25 km/h 6.944 446.4         
  Main North Rd 1200 <20km/h use 15km/h 4.167 288         
  Main North Rd 6000 40-50km/h use 45km/h 12.5 480         
  Rest of the way to Wairau 299000 
use 82.5km/h (Average 
from google maps) 22.92 13047         
  
Sum of remaining distance 
small roads and 







Appendix L: ALOS (days) for all patients in the Christchurch Hospital (non-earthquake and earthquake related patients) following the 
Christchurch earthquake 

















































































































































ADC - Acute Dialysis Centre 0 - 0 0 - - 0.5 - 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0.05 
AMAU - Acute Medical Assessment Unit 0.73 2.04 4.92 3.64 1.75 2.93 2.93 3.52 3.65 3.46 3.29 5.47 4.16 2.96 3.9 3.64 3.31 
BMTU - Bone Marrow Transplant Unit 1 0 4.5 - 0 6 1 8.5 0.2 0 4 0.5 - 1 9 6 2.98 
CAA - Child Acute Assessment 2.45 1.14 0.77 1.07 1.33 1.33 0.7 0.6 2.11 4.67 1.58 1.22 0.43 1 0.73 0.91 1.38 
CATH - Cardiology Day Unit 0.14 - - - - 3 - 1 0 - 0 - - 0.5 0.71 0.5 0.73 
CCU - Coronary Care Unit 2.4 2.17 - 1 - - 5.25 - 2 - - 18 - - 2.5 4.5 4.73 
CHOC - Childrens Haem/Onc Centre 0 5 6 0 3 4 12.8 7 - - 0 - - 2 0 2.67 3.54 
CICU - Cardiac Intensive Care Unit 5 - 13 - 3 25 - - 
 
- - - - 4 - 5 9.17 
CTW - Cardiothoracic Ward - 1 - 0 - - - - - - - - - 11.3 - 6 4.58 
DOSA - Day of Surgery Admissions 2.36 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.8 1.25 1.67 1.52 
DSU - Day Surgery Unit 0.57 - - - - - - 0.08 0 0.1 0 - - 0.06 0.3 0.11 0.15 
EO - Emergency Observation Unit 1 0.83 0.39 0.3 1 0.29 0.67 0.25 1.69 1 0.38 1.15 0.67 1.75 0.4 0.43 0.76 
GAU - Gynae Assess Unit 0 0.25 0 1.29 0.33 - 0 1 0 0 0.4 1.5 0.75 0.88 0 0.3 0.45 
GLM - Gynae Lynd Med 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 
GLS - Gynae Lynd Surg 0 - - - - - 0 0 - 0 - - - 0 0 - 0 
GSD - Gastro Day Ward - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 
GYU - Gynaecology Ward, Level 2 1 3.5 - - 0 - 7 1 - 0 - - - 8 - 0.5 2.62 
HDTC - Home Dialysis Training Centre 0 - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
HDW - Haematology Day Ward 0 - - - - - - 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0 
ICU - Intensive Care Unit 2.43 - 4 2.5 5 3.67 23 - - 14 - 9 12 1 - - 7.66 
MDU - Medical Day Unit 1.06 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0.45 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0.13 
185 
 
NED - CWH Labout Ward 8.15 1.2 2.12 2.65 3.73 0.89 5.67 2 1.5 2.83 3.25 4.38 1.43 1.95 1.9 2.07 2.86 
NIC - Neonatel Intensive Care 3 - - - - 1 - - 
 
- - - - - - 2 2 
NIM - Neonatal Unit Mothers 4 - 1 0.5 6 2 - - 3 - 2 - - - - - 2.64 
OBD - CWH Labour Ward 0.87 0.93 1.61 2.04 1.33 0.86 1.47 1.73 1.57 1.55 1.32 1.94 2.33 1.29 1.7 1.58 1.5 
OBM - Maternity Ward - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - 2.5 5 - 3.83 
ODA - Obsetric Day Assessment Unit - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - 0 - - 0 
OPAES - Outpatient Extended Stay - - - - - - - - 
 
- - - - 0 - - 0 
OTU - Orthopaedic Trauma Unit 9 - - - 25 - 5 - - 7 - - - - 7 - 10.6 
PDP - Paediatric Day Patients 0 - - - - - - - 0 - 0 - - 1 0 0 0.17 
PHDU - Paediatric Hdu - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - 5 
PM3B - General Medicine - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.5 - - 3.5 
SARA - Surgical Assess Review Area 4.35 0.63 1.5 2 2.8 3.42 3.56 2.71 4 1.92 1.7 3.75 1.6 2.22 0.8 3.07 2.5 
SPCU - Surgical Progressive Care Unit 6 - - - - 4.5 - 4 - - - - - 31 - 9 10.9 
UU - Urology Unit 1 3 - 0 - 0 0 - - - - - - 0 - - 0.67 
WD12 - Ward 12 Cardiology 4.86 1.75 1.75 2.2 1.71 1.88 1.7 2.67 1.29 0.75 - - - - 3.5 3.14 2.27 
WD14 - Ward 14 Cardio/Nephro 2.63 2 1.44 1.8 1 1.75 1.38 3 0.86 0.5 1.38 5.2 1 2.07 3.71 5.67 2.21 
WD15 - Ward 15 General Surgery 6 - - - 5 - 2 - 3 12 - 5 2.5 4.5 - 18 6.44 
WD16 - Ward 16 General Surgery 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
WD17 - Ward 17 1.5 2 - - 1 - 7 - - - - - 2 3.67 3 - 2.88 
WD18 - Ward 18 Orthopaedics 4.21 9.15 4.29 3.5 2.8 4.25 1.5 3.25 3.09 4 6 3.33 - 7.25 4.17 5.2 4.4 
WD19 - Ward 19 Orthopaedics 12.1 2.47 8.5 6.17 2.25 - 2 2 6.75 4.2 4.25 4 - 3 0 5.4 4.5 
WD20 - Ward 20 Plastic Surgery 6.71 1.36 2.33 2.71 1.75 4.8 1.56 1 1.6 3.13 2.63 2.7 2.25 3 4 0.33 2.62 
WD21 - Ward 21 Paediatrics 1 - 0.67 0.5 3.5 5 - 4.67 1 2.5 2.5 - 0.5 0.33 2 0.67 1.91 
WD22 - Ward 22 Paediatrics - 0 - - - - - 8 - 4 1 - - 1 1.67 - 2.61 
WD23 - Ward 23 General Medicine - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - 5 
WD25 - Ward 25 Gen Medicine/Resps. 9 2 3 7 4 3.25 11 3.8 4.75 2.71 3.5 10 3.33 8.75 1.5 4.67 5.14 
186 
 
WD26 - Ward 26 General Medicine - - 5.67 2.5 - 1 3 1.67 - - 4 1 - 3 1 8 3.09 
WD27 - Ward 27 Oncology 3.33 - 3 2.5 - 9 - 4.5 2.5 2.25 3.75 - 3.5 3.38 4.8 3.25 3.81 
WD28 - Ward 28 Neurology/Neurosurgery 0 0 14 4.5 4.25 - 2.5 3.33 2.5 3 7 5 3 2.43 0 1 3.5 
WD29 - Ward 29 Gen Med/Gastro/Derm 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 
WD31 - Ward 31 Gen Medical Ward 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 
WD32 - Ward 32 Eyes/Ent 0.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.5 










































































































































































































































































































































AMAU 3 0 2 1 1 0   0   1 1 0 4 0 2 1 5 0   0   0 2 0   0   0 2.5 0.21 
CICU  1 0   1 13 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 7 0.07 
CTW   0 1 0   1   1   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0 1 0.21 
EO  2 0 1 0 1 0   1   0   0   0   0   0 1 1 1 0 0 1   0   0 1 0.21 
GSD    0 2 0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 2 0.07 
ICU  3 0 
 
13   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 3 1 
MDU  4 2 0 14   0   5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 2 1.5 
OBD 0 2   1   6   2 1 5   4   0   1   4   0   3   3   0   4 0.5 2.5 
OTU  9 -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 9 - 
SARA  9 0   0 1 1   0 1 0   1   0   0 0 0   0   0   0   0   0 2.75 0.14 
SPCU  6 0   2   0   1   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0 6 0.29 
UU 1 0   0   1 0 0   0 0 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 0.34 0.07 
WD12    0   2 1 0   3   0   0   0   1   1   0   0   0   0   0 1 0.5 
WD14  3 0   2   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   1   0   0   0   0 3 0.29 
WD17    0 3 2   4   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   1 3 0.64 
WD18  5 1 11 7 7 1 1 6 4 7 2 2   0 0 1 3 1   1   1   0 4 1 4 1 4.1 2.14 
188 
 
WD19  17 1 3 3 1 2 6 6 2 2   0 2 2 2 0 7 2   5   0   0   0 5 3 5 1.86 
WD20 8 0 1 1 4 3 2 2 1 1 4 1   0   0   0   0 2 0   0 9 0   0 3.88 0.57 
WD21   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 0 0   0   0   0   0   0 - 0 
WD28    1 0 6   1   4   1   0   0 3 2 1 2   2   0   0   0   0 1.34 1.34 
Grand 
Total 




Appendix N: Table 5.6: The distances, mode and time for transfers out of Christchurch Hospital to other Hospitals following the Christchurch 











































































































































































































































































































































































Southern Cross  4.1 13 10 18 - - - - - 13 - 13 - Road 
Hillmorton 3.3 13 10 18 - - - - - 13 - 13 4 Road 
St Georges  4.9 13 10 18 - - - - - 13 - 13 1 Road 
Parklands hospital 6.1 15 10 18 - - - - - 15 - 15 1 Road 
PMH  5.2 19 10 18 - - - - - 19 - 19 41 Road 
Rosewood rest home 7.2 29 10 18 - - - - - 29 - 29 1 Road 
Burwood Hospital  15.7 27 10 18 - - - - - 27 - 27 41 Road 
Lincoln 19.8 38 10 18 - - - - - 38 - 38 24 Road 
190 
 
Rangiora 32.6 49 10 18 - - - - - 49 - 49 29 Road 
Ellesmere 40.3 58 10 18 - - - - - 58 - 58 0 Road 
Darfield 44 52 10 18 - - - - - 52 - 52 2 Road 
Oxford 57.9 61 10 18 - - - - - 61 - 61 1 Road 
Waikari Hospital  73.9 82 10 18 - - - - - 82 - 82 3 Road 
Akaroa Hospital  81.4 83 10 18 - - - - - 83 - 83 4 Road 
Ashburton Hospital  84.7 87 10 18 75.36 - - - - 87 28 87 20 Road 
Timaru 163 150 10 18 139.54 45 14.6 19 64 150 48 48 14 Road/helicopter 
Kaikoura Hospital  182 151 10 18 146.37 100 2.8 6 106 151 46 46 0 Road/helicopter 
Grey Base 238 190 10 18 158.49 100 1 4 104 190 53 53 3 Road/helicopter 
Wairau 313 247 10 18 244.77 50 9.5 13 63 247 71 71 1 
Helicopter/Fixed 
wing 
Buller 333 253 10 18 209.26 65 8.3 15 80 - - - 1 Helicopter 
Dunedin 357 286 10 18 328.17 65 29.3 36 101 - 92 92 11 Helicopter 
Southland 565 453 10 18 465.92 100 4.9 8 108 - 69 69 2 Road/helicopter 
Nelson 415 308 10 18 248.76 50 5.8 11 79 - 71 71 7 
Helicopter/Fixed 
wing 
Auckland city  - - 10 18 746.33 80 18.6 25 123 - - 123 2 Fixed wing 
HAS - - 10 18 - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Hawke’s Bay 
(Royston) - - 10 18 552.72 90 22.5 25 133 - - 133 1 Fixed wing 
Middlemore - - 10 18 746.33 80 10.1 16 114 - - 114 2 Fixed wing 
Napier (Atawhai) - - 10 18 575.24 90 10.8 13 121 - - 121 1 Fixed wing 
North Shore - - 10 18 746.33 80 30.6 36 134 - - 134 2 Fixed wing 
Tauranga - - 10 18 715.9 115 8.7 15 148 - - 148 2 Fixed wing 
Waikato - - 10 18 666.92 100 13.2 17 135 - - 135 2 Fixed wing 
Wellington - - 10 18 304.42 55 4.9 9 82 - 92 82 13 
Helicopter/Fixed 
wing 
Average 132.8 116.39 10 18 415.93 79.06 12.23 16.75 105.93 72.47 71.25 69.3 7.64 
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